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ABSTRACT
The policy beliefs o f advocacy groups, policymakers, and other interested 
individuals help to shape public policy. Yet, policy beliefs are rarely used in policy 
analyses. This dissertation changes that by examining the role o f policy beliefs in 
pesticide regulatory reform in the 1980s and 1990s. Important concepts explored in 
this analysis of pesticide regulatory reform include: a determination o f whether the 
policy core beliefs of like-minded advocacy groups possess enough uniformity to 
justify categorization of these groups into larger advocacy coalitions, an identification 
of the process by which an advocacy coalition’s secondary policy beliefs toward 
pesticide regulations change over time, an examination of whether compromises in 
secondary policy beliefs among advocacy coalitions are associated with policy change, 
and an investigation into whether stronger advocacy coalitions influence compromises 
in secondary policy beliefs among weaker advocacy coalitions. Examining these 
concepts reveals the role of policy beliefs in shaping public policy. In addition, the 
answers to these questions help to compare two policy theories: the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework and Punctuated Equilibrium.
The findings help integrate key concepts from the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework and Punctuated Equilibrium to forge a new level of policy analysis that 
explores how the policy beliefs of advocacy groups change. By analyzing the debates 
over pesticide regulatory reform in the 1980s and 1990s, this dissertation finds that the
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policy beliefs of consumer-environmental advocacy groups exhibit a punctuated 
equilibrium pattern. In essence, these groups incorporate pro-agribusiness beliefs 
when a change in pesticide regulations seems imminent. This suggests that pro- 
environmental groups bargain with their beliefs in attempts to influence pesticide 
regulations. Other findings examine key tenets of both the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework and the Punctuated Equilibrium model through time-series analyses, group 
comparison tests, and interviews with agency personnel and advocacy groups.
Overall, these findings indicate that the need for policy reform often drives 
compromises in policy beliefs and that advocacy groups often use policy beliefs to 
directly influence other advocacy groups.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Policy beliefs shape public policy. These statements o f principle are the 
mantra o f advocacy groups, concerned citizens, and other organized entities at 
legislative hearings and other policymaking events. Over and over again, these groups 
state their policy beliefs to policymakers in order to influence public policy. 
Sometimes, these efforts help to change public policy. But more often than not, public 
policy stays the same. In the face o f policy stasis, how do these groups respond? Do 
they assess current political and socioeconomic forces and adapt their policy beliefs 
accordingly? Or do the groups keep their policy beliefs inflexible and hope for the 
perfect moment when their policy beliefs correspond to the beliefs o f policymakers 
and the public?
This dissertation explores these issues by examining the policy beliefs of 
advocacy groups, concerned citizens, and other organized entities in the policy 
subsystem of federal pesticide regulations. Defined in very general terms, policy 
beliefs are just statements that reveal what an organization or person believes in, and 
why the organization or person is currently advocating a particular policy position. 
Being relatively straightforward, policy beliefs play a key role in the policy process. 
Advocacy groups, concerned citizens, policymakers, and other organized lobbying
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2entities use their policy beliefs to influence executive and legislative policymakers to 
pass specific policy changes. As a result, policy beliefs constitute the core of 
American politics.
Although they often lead to specific policy changes, many like-minded 
advocacy groups, concerned citizens, policymakers, and other organized lobbying 
entities have similar policy beliefs. For example, many environmental advocacy 
groups share a common set of policy beliefs that emphasize environmental protection 
by increasing governmental regulatory efforts on specific chemical releases into the 
environment. When different environmental advocacy groups, concerned citizens, 
policymakers, and other organized lobbying entities share similar policy beliefs, 
political scientists often categorize them together as one advocacy coalition. 
Therefore, from the view of political science, any policy subsystem typically has at 
least one advocacy coalition influencing the policy process with its policy beliefs.
The major research questions o f this dissertation examine advocacy coalitions 
and involve two specific types o f policy beliefs: policy core beliefs and secondary 
policy beliefs. Policy core beliefs are general statements that identify what an 
organization or person believes. For example, a pro-environmental group may have 
policy core beliefs that state that the group believes in increasing governmental 
regulations of chemicals in order to protect human health and the environment. In 
contrast, a pro-chemical group may have policy core beliefs that state that the group 
believes in reducing governmental regulations of chemicals in order to enhance 
profitability for chemical manufacturers. Secondary policy beliefs are more specific.
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3They reveal the level o f support for a specific piece of legislation that impacts a policy 
subsystem. For example, a pro-environmental group may have a secondary policy 
belief that supports a specific piece of legislation that increases groundwater 
monitoring for an especially toxic chemical. In contrast, a pro-chemical group may 
have a secondary policy belief that does not support the same piece of legislation 
because of concerns about the impact of increased monitoring on future sales o f the 
chemical in question.
Both types o f beliefs play an important part in policy analysis. Political 
scientists use policy core beliefs to categorize similar advocacy groups, concerned 
citizens, policymakers, and other organized lobbying entities as one advocacy 
coalition. Additionally, political scientists use secondary policy beliefs to analyze the 
evolution of a policy subsystem and the impact of an advocacy coalition’s policy 
beliefs on policy change. This dissertation analyzes the use o f these two types of 
policy beliefs in federal pesticide regulations by asking 1) Do the policy core beliefs 
o f like-minded advocacy groups possess enough uniformity to justify categorization of 
these groups into larger advocacy coalitions? 2) If uniform advocacy coalitions exist, 
do their secondary policy beliefs toward pesticide regulations change over time?
3) Are increases in compromises in secondary policy beliefs among advocacy 
coalitions associated with policy change? and 4) Do stronger advocacy coalitions 
influence compromises in secondary policy beliefs among weaker advocacy 
coalitions?
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4Over the last two decades, a growing body of research suggests that these two 
types of policy beliefs are important units o f analysis that political scientists can use to 
study the public policy process. Witnesses at legislative hearings often state these 
beliefs as part of their testimony, making the beliefs part of the public record and 
accessible to researchers. However, these beliefs are also stated to policymakers in 
direct lobbying efforts and other communication pathways. As a result, these beliefs 
help to sway policymakers toward accepting or rejecting a particular public policy.
Using policy beliefs to learn more about advocacy groups and the policy 
process first gained widespread support in the early 1990s with the advent o f the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). The ACF is a theoretical model o f the policy 
process emphasizing the role of coalitions of advocacy groups, policymakers, 
concerned citizens, and other organized entities on the policy process. Its central 
theme is one o f openness and gradual policy belief change. For example, the ACF 
emphasizes that advocacy coalitions with divergent policy beliefs often gradually 
change their policy beliefs in light of new socioeconomic conditions and changing 
political forces (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 149). Over time, these gradual 
changes often result in different advocacy coalitions having similar policy beliefs.
This type of policy belief change, classified as policy-oriented learning by ACF 
scholars, eventually results in actual policy change.
Over time, Paul Sabatier, Hank Jenkins-Smith, and other researchers used 
policy beliefs within an ACF analysis to explore various public policy subsystems 
including: airline deregulation (Brown & Stewart, 1993), education policy
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5(Mawhinney, 1993), energy policy (Jenkins-Smith, St. Clair, & Woods, 1991), forest 
policy (Lertzman, Rayner, & Wilson, 1996), and natural resources policy (Ellison, 
1998; Weible & Sabatier, 2005). These studies helped to validate the ACF as a public 
policy model. By 2005, most political scientists viewed the ACF model with its 
emphasis on advocacy coalitions and policy beliefs as an acceptable way to analyze 
public policy. However, it was not viewed as the definitive public policy model. That 
honor usually went to the theory o f punctuated equilibrium (PE), a policy model that 
did not even emphasize policy beliefs in its theoretical construct (John, 2003, p. 482).
Working from research originally proposed by Eldredge and Gould (1972) in 
the field of evolutionary paleontology, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) applied the 
concept of punctuated equilibrium to public policy. In the PE view of public policy, 
policy subsystems are usually closed, unchanging systems dominated by a few policy 
actors such as prominent policymakers and advocacy groups. (Baumgartner & Jones, 
1993, pp. 7-8). These policy actors control the policy debate in the policy subsystem 
by limiting access to new policy actors. As a result, significant policy change in these 
subsystems usually does not occur. However, in rare circumstances a focusing event 
occurs that captivates the public’s attention and makes the policy subsystem more 
open to other advocacy groups and more susceptible to change.
For example, policymakers often pass new policies because o f accidents or 
scandals. As a result, if  a chemical manufacturing accident resulted in the deaths of 
thousands of people, then policymakers would probably respond to the crisis by 
considering a new regulatory policy aimed at preventing such an accident from
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6happening again. In considering this new policy, Congressional policymakers would 
hold hearings on the accident. At these hearings, policymakers would consider 
differing policy proposals from both pro-regulatory groups and anti-regulatory groups, 
even if anti-regulatory groups associated with chemical manufacturers controlled this 
subsystem before the accident. With policymakers finally considering the policy 
beliefs of the pro-regulatory groups, this policy subsystem would become more open. 
As a result, policymakers in this subsystem would be more likely to consider different 
policy beliefs and more likely to pass a policy change. However, once policymakers 
passed the new regulatory policy and no other accidents occurred, then the policy 
subsystem would probably revert to being a closed system dominated by anti- 
regulatory groups. PE researchers classify this phenomenon as a punctuated 
equilibrium type of policy change. In this type of policy change, a policy subsystem 
has long periods of policy stasis interrupted by short bursts o f policy change 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, pp. 19-21).
In contrast to the ACF model, studies using the PE model did not examine the 
policy beliefs of advocacy groups, concerned citizens, policymakers, or other 
organized entities involved in the policy process. Instead, most PE studies used more 
general data like budgetary information and content coded data that emphasized the 
topic discussed at a particular legislative hearing. These studies examined policy areas 
such as: health care (Hardin, 2002); immigration (Hunt, 2002); national security 
(True, 2002); nuclear power, pesticides, and smoking (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993); 
science and technology (Feeley, 2002); telecommunications (MacLeod, 2002); and
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wildfire management (Busenberg, 2004). Researchers also expanded the use of the PE 
model to examine federal budgetary system (Jones, Baumgartner, & True, 1998;
Jones, Sulkin, & Larsen, 2003; Jones, True, & Baumgartner, 1997; True, 2000). 
Overall, these studies supported PE as a useful and valid policy model. These studies 
showed that public policy is usually defined by long periods of stasis intermixed with 
short dynamic periods of policy change.
Scholars attempting to integrate the results of two decades’ worth of research 
from the ACF and PE models are left with two major conclusions. First, as shown by 
numerous ACF studies, the policy core beliefs and secondary policy beliefs of 
advocacy coalitions help to shape policy change, but these beliefs gradually change 
due to socioeconomic factors, political forces, and information-processing parameters 
in a policy-oriented learning style that results in lasting alterations to a coalition’s 
policy beliefs (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993, p. 42; Sabatier & Brasher, 1993, p. 
202-203; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 122). Second, as portrayed in various PE 
studies, policy change occurs in a punctuated equilibrium fashion as relatively rapid 
changes in public policy are followed by long periods of policy stasis (Baumgartner & 
Jones, 1993, p. 243-245; Busenberg, 2004, p. 146-147, 154; Hunt, 2002, p. 93; Jones, 
Sulkin, & Larsen, 2003, p. 166-167; True, 2002, p. 178).
These two conclusions result in a key theoretical disjuncture. If advocacy 
coalitions engage in policy-oriented learning, which results in their policy core beliefs 
and secondary policy beliefs changing and then staying at that changed level for some 
time, then how do changes in public policy follow a punctuated equilibrium pattern?
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If policy beliefs play an important role in the policy process and the policy process 
follows a punctuated equilibrium pattern, then shouldn’t policy core beliefs and 
secondary policy beliefs also follow a punctuated equilibrium pattern? Rather than 
remaining at newly changed levels for some time, shouldn’t policy core beliefs and 
secondary policy beliefs also go back to their original levels once policy change 
occurs? Theorists from both sides solve this disjuncture by pointing out that policy 
core beliefs can undergo an enduring change that leads to certain policy tipping points 
that help to produce a sudden and quick policy change (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 
1999, p. 147-148; see also MacLeod, 2002, p. 56-57; True, 2002, p. 162-163, 166). 
However, researchers have yet to prove this conclusion by comparing these two 
models with actual policy beliefs.
As a result, political science needs a new study to help better integrate these 
two models and discover which concepts of which model work better. Such a study 
can determine if general tenets o f these models are correct, and perhaps more 
importantly, discover the role of policy beliefs in the policy process by examining how 
policy beliefs change. This dissertation attempts to do that by examining the policy 
subsystem of federal pesticide regulations from 1982-2003. During that time, 
advocacy groups representing agriculture interests and environmental protection 
interests expressed their policy beliefs at Congressional hearings that eventually led to 
significant reforms in federal pesticide regulations.
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9Aims of Study
Over the last twenty years, the ACF and PE constructs have emerged as the 
predominant models o f the policy process in political science. Yet, no research effort 
has attempted to directly compare the models to see which one better captures the 
reality o f the policy process. This dissertation changes that by directly comparing 
these two research models. With this comparison, this dissertation can determine: if 
policy core beliefs can be used to categorize groups into advocacy coalitions, if 
secondary policy beliefs of advocacy coalitions change according to policy-oriented 
learning or in a more dynamic punctuated equilibrium way, if  increases in 
compromises in secondary policy beliefs correspond to changes in public policy, and 
if dominant advocacy coalitions cause compromises in secondary policy beliefs 
among more minor advocacy coalitions.
In addition, political science studies on federal pesticide regulations stopped 
after Christopher Bosso (1987) examined pesticide regulations in the late 1980s. This 
dissertation updates that study by explaining changes to federal pesticide regulations 
that occurred in the mid 1990s. These facts make this dissertation unique. Exploring 
these topics will help political scientists garner more knowledge about pesticide 
regulations and the role of policy beliefs in the policy process.
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As detailed in Figures 1 and 2, the underlying goal o f this dissertation is to 
explore whether advocacy coalitions’ secondary policy beliefs on pesticide regulations 
undergo an enduring change as theorized by the ACF model’s emphasis on policy- 
oriented learning, or whether these beliefs change quickly over the short term and then 
go back to their original state as theorized by the PE model. Exploring this goal 
should determine if policy beliefs act directly on the policy process or if  they act more 
as a tipping-point mechanism that indirectly influences the policy process. This makes 
this dissertation the first attempt by a political scientist to examine the role of policy 
beliefs in the policy process by comparing the two predominant policy models in the 
discipline. However, since research on advocacy groups and the policy process can 
cover a wide variety o f topics, it is also important to consider what this dissertation 
does not attempt to do in order to avoid confusion among readers and other 
researchers.
First, this dissertation does not attempt to determine if the policy subsystem of 
pesticide regulations is elitist or pluralistic. Bosso (1987) argued that since 1970 the 
pesticide regulatory subsystem is generally a pluralistic system with elements of 
elitism represented by dominant chemical makers (p. 11, 242). Research from this 
dissertation generally supports Bosso’s findings.






Figure 1: Hypothesized Behavior of Secondary Policy Beliefs 





Figure 2 : Hypothesized Behavior o f Secondary Policy Beliefs 
in the PE Model
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For example, from 1982-2003 data from this dissertation reveals that over 264 
unique advocacy groups testified in Congressional hearings on federal pesticide 
regulations. Only five of these groups appeared in more than 20% of the hearings and 
no group managed to appear in more than half of the hearings. This suggests that the 
pesticide regulatory policy subsystem was quite pluralistic from 1982-2000. While 
this is an interesting finding, it is not a major research emphasis o f this dissertation. 
Researchers interested in this line of research should examine Bosso’s work and 
extend his methodology to pesticide regulations since 1988.
Second, this dissertation does not emphasize collective action and the problems 
of forming an advocacy group. This is not a study to determine how collective action 
leads to group formation in the pesticide regulatory policy subsystem. Instead, this 
dissertation examines what happens to these advocacy groups after formation and the 
role their policy beliefs play in the policy process. Researchers wishing to learn more 
about collective action and the formation of advocacy groups, particularly 
environmental advocacy groups, should inspect the research o f Lubell, Schneider, 
Scholz, and Mete (2002).
Third, this dissertation does not examine policy implementation. It is just not 
concerned with implementation problems that may occur once a pesticide regulatory 
policy is passed and funded. As a result, this dissertation assumes that advocacy 
coalitions involved in pesticide regulations do not believe that passing a particular 
policy will lead to a non-implementation scenario. For this dissertation, once 
policymakers sign policy change into law, it is counted as a policy change.
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Researchers interested in the problems of implementing environmental policies should 
look at Scheberle’s (2004) analysis of federal and state environmental policy 
interactions.
Lastly, this dissertation is not an attempt at quantitatively modeling the public 
policy process. At its core, this dissertation just compares two public policy models 
by emphasizing the role of policy beliefs in the policy process. It does not attempt to 
model all o f the determinants of policy change in the pesticide regulatory process. It 
assumes that the policy process is a nebulous creature that political science researchers 
cannot entirely model.
However, this dissertation does cover a number of unique and noteworthy 
concepts. First, it compares two major policy models to discover which model, or 
which parts of the two models, best capture the public policy process. Second, it 
examines the role of policy beliefs on policy change with a goal of determining if 
secondary policy beliefs directly impact policy change or whether these beliefs act 
more like a tipping mechanism that indirectly influences policy change. Third, it 
explores how policy beliefs change over time. Fourth, it gives political science a 
policy history of pesticide regulations since 1982. All of these facts make this 
dissertation a unique contribution to political science research.
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The organization of this dissertation follows the traditional logic o f any 
research endeavor. First, the dissertation explains the ACF and PE models and goes 
over their place in the literature of public policy. Then, the dissertation provides a 
history of federal pesticide regulations and introduces the key concepts confronting 
advocacy coalitions and their belief structures from 1982-2003. After that, the 
dissertation integrates key concepts of the ACF and PE models and analyzes those 
concepts with data collected from the pesticide regulatory policy subsystem. Results 
from this analysis are then explained and examined. As a result, the organization of 
this study is as follows.
Chapter 2 delves further into the specifics of the ACF and PE models. This 
chapter goes over the major concepts from both models with a special emphasis on the 
role of policy beliefs in both models. In addition, this chapter explains the place o f the 
ACF and PE models in the interest group and policy process literature o f political 
science. Overall, Chapter 2 helps researchers understand the ACF and PE models, 
their place in the relevant literature, the concept o f policy beliefs, and the major 
unresolved questions confronting these two models.
Chapters 3 and 4 set the stage for analysis. These chapters examine the history 
of federal pesticide regulations and explain the major tenets of current pesticide 
regulations. These chapters go over regulatory issues such as the labeling of 
pesticides, pesticide residues on food, and the environmental fate o f pesticides. These
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chapters should help researchers understand the historical debate over federal pesticide 
regulations as well as the current reality o f pesticide regulations. Above all else, these 
chapters allow researchers to understand the issues confronting advocacy coalitions in 
the federal pesticide regulatory policy subsystem.
Chapter 5 explains this dissertation’s research methodology. It includes a 
discussion of hypotheses and how these hypotheses relate back to the four research 
questions presented in this chapter. This chapter also includes a discussion on data 
analysis methods including the use o f the McNemar’s test for ordinal data to 
determine the uniformity of policy core beliefs within advocacy coalitions, kurtosis to 
ascertain how secondary policy beliefs change over time, correlations to examine the 
relationship between compromises in secondary policy beliefs and changes in public 
policy, and structural equation models to determine which variables influence 
compromises in secondary policy beliefs. Chapter 5 also discusses data collection 
methods. It explains the content analysis used to code Congressional hearings on 
federal pesticide regulations, and also clarifies the importance and origin o f this 
dissertation’s other data sources. These include secondary historical documents that 
illuminate the debate on federal pesticide regulations and a small set o f interviews that 
verify results from the content analysis.
Chapter 6 provides the answers to the four research questions. This chapter 
includes results from various analyses that reveal which hypothesis is correct. Chapter 
7 provides the main conclusions of this dissertation and identifies areas o f future 
research.
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CHAPTER 2
ADVOCACY COALITIONS AND PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) and punctuated equilibrium (PE) 
models both examine the policy process and what forces influence it. These forces, 
usually independent of direct governmental control, can sway the policy process one 
way or another. Political scientists have long pondered the forces that influence the 
policy process. In studying these forces, many researchers emphasized the important 
role of advocacy groups, also known as interest groups or pressure groups. Although 
many political scientists link the origins o f such studies on interest groups to David 
Truman’s (1951) work on group theory, the emphasis on interest group research 
actually started with Arthur Bentley. Bentley’s (1908) research offered preliminary 
insights on how advocacy groups affect the policy process. After Bentley’s research, 
numerous studies on interest groups followed, with each study revealing the 
importance of interest groups to the policymaking process and the difficulty of 
measuring the impact of interest group influence on the policymaking process 
(Baumgartner & Leech, 1998, p. 45-46).
In addition to interest groups, political scientists also emphasized the role of 
bureaucrats, policymakers, and the media in the policy process. All of these entities
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could influence a specific policy subsystem such as agricultural subsidy policy, 
pesticide regulatory policy, or any policy considered by policymakers. Over the 
course o f 100 years, political scientists used case studies and quantitative analyses to 
further examine the impact o f these variables on the policy process. By the late 1980s, 
this collection o f research helped to provide the theoretical backdrop to models such as 
the ACF and PE that attempted to theorize about policy process.
The Origins of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)
The ACF owes much of its intellectual heritage to research on the impact of 
interest groups on the policy process. This line o f research started in the early 1900s 
and can be roughly divided into four eras. In the first era, lasting from 1900-1930s, 
researchers examined the pressure tactics of groups and the impact o f those tactics on 
the policy process. Significant works during this era included Arthur Bentley’s (1908) 
The Process o f  Government. Bentley broadly theorized that groups compete against 
one another in order to influence governmental processes (p. 222, 269). Although 
Bentley was not concerned with constructing specific theories on group activity, his 
research was the first to suggest that groups influenced the policy process. It also 
helped political scientists refocus their research efforts to other aspects o f government 
aside from legalistic examinations o f governing institutions (Bentley, 1908, p. 162).
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Similar works that examined the role of interest groups, or pressure groups as 
they were commonly known during this period, followed with each work examining 
the importance of interest groups in policymaking and reconciling that notion with 
theories of government and democracy (Griffith, 1939; Herring, 1929; Odegard, 1928; 
Schattschneider, 1935; see also Cleveland, 1913; Crawford, 1939; Croly, 1915; 
Pollock, 1927; Zeller, 1937). Even more than Arthur Bentley, whose work was 
generally not even recognized until the 1950s, these researchers made the study of 
interest groups’ impact on the policy process noteworthy (Garson, 1978, p. 77).
However, it was not until the 1950s that interest group research really became 
important to political science. During this second era o f research, lasting 
approximately from the 1940s-1960s, the study of interest group influence on the 
policy process reached its scholarly zenith as the administrative size o f the federal 
government increased. Research during this time period reaffirmed the importance of 
interest groups to policymaking (Griffith, 1951; Latham, 1952; Truman, 1951; see also 
Key, 1952; McConnell, 1966). Some o f the most influential research also extended 
the notion of interest group influence on the policy process to the notion that interest 
groups, policymakers, and agencies jointly controlled the policy process.
For example, Selznick (1949) showed how agencies could co-opt local interest 
groups in order to provide support for a specific agency and policy (p. 217). This was 
important because once an agency had support from these groups it helped to solidify 
their clientele or customer base. As a result, the agency could ensure its survival by 
actively promoting the policy interests o f their clientele groups (Long, 1949, p. 257;
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Simon, Smithburg, & Thompson, 1950, p. 385). Over time, this type o f relationship 
often turned into a permanent symbiotic relationship where policymakers and interest 
groups mutually benefited from policies that did not always benefit the public at large. 
Researchers exploring the physical structure of this relationship developed the notion 
o f subgovemments or iron triangles. In this type o f relationship, an interest group, an 
agency, and a legislative committee formed a close relationship over a specific policy 
area in order to influence it for the mutual benefit of all those in the relationship 
(Freeman, 1955, p. 31; Mass, 1950, p. 583).
Research during the second era often used a case study approach where the 
researcher learned all about a specific policy subsystem. However, as the 1960s 
ended, political scientists began to realize that their studies o f policy subsystems did 
not reflect the complex reality o f the policy process. As a result, as the second era 
came to a close, the importance o f examining the influence o f interest groups on the 
policy process faded for a majority o f political scientists.
This shift in interest group research occurred because political scientists 
realized that previous attempts to examine the relationship between interest groups and 
the policy process were too simple. Therefore, some political scientists started to 
focus on other elements of interest groups. This originated with the theoretical 
insights provided by Mancur Olson (1971) on why groups mobilize (i.e. the logic of 
collective action). After Olson, interest group research became divided into two areas: 
collective action analyses that built off Olson’s work, and influence studies that 
continued to show the effect o f interest groups on policy (Baumgartner and Leech
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1998, p. 7). In these two camps of research, more theoretical and methodological 
progress occurred in collective action analyses rather than influence studies.
As a result, during the third era o f research that examined the influence of 
interest groups on the policy process, researchers backed off from many o f the key 
findings of the previous era. During this time, lasting from the 1970s-1980s, interest 
group research focused on quantitative analyses that emphasized why rational 
individuals would join interest groups rather than case studies that focused on how 
interest groups influenced the policy process within a specific policy subsystem. 
However, some progress still occurred in influence studies as researchers tried to 
quantitatively measure the influence o f interest groups on policymaking (Culhane, 
1981; Fowler & Shaiko, 1987; Meier & Van Lohuizen, 1978).
Additional progress in influence studies occurred when other researchers 
working slightly after this era examined specific lobbying efforts of interest groups on 
the policy process. Building off research conducted by Lester Milbrath (1963) that 
defined the approach to lobbying surveys, researchers such as Jeff Berry (1977), Jack 
Walker (1991), and John Heinz, Edward Laumann, Robert Nelson, and Robert 
Salisbury (1993) analyzed effective lobbying strategies, described daily lobbying 
activities, and continued to offer insights on how lobbying groups influenced the 
policy process. The results of these studies suggested that successful lobbying efforts 
were complex and often depended on interest groups’ knowledge of their own 
organizational situation, as well as specific knowledge of the policy subsystem they 
were trying to influence (Berry, 1977, p. 45; Heinz et al., 1993, p. 371). In addition,
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the study by Heinz et al. (1993) argued that a major interest group influence strategy 
included joining other interest groups in lobbying coalitions is (p. 15). However, the 
Heinz et al. study also acknowledged that due to constantly changing political 
conditions, most interest groups operated their lobbying efforts in an environment of 
uncertainty (Heinz et al., 1993, p. 370). As a result, most interest groups focused their 
lobbying efforts on short-term policy goals that often resulted in no significant change 
to the policy subsystem (Heinz et al., 1993, p. 412).
Overall, the third era is best remembered for works that either stressed the 
diffuse, immeasurable nature of the policy process (Heclo, 1978), or works that 
questioned if the notion of traditional regulatory studies on the policy process was 
even accurate (Wilson, 1980). Research in the third era tended to invalidate the 
numerous case studies used in the second era. But, it’s also important to note that 
researchers during this era described what they saw. By the 1970s and 1980s the 
number o f active interest groups lobbying policymaking bodies exploded in the United 
States (Petracca, 1992, p. 13). This made interest group research difficult and led 
many researchers to lean toward a more diffuse explanation of the policy process. 
Unfortunately, this more diffuse explanation was harder to quantitatively validate.
As a result, in the fourth era, lasting from the late 1980s to the present, 
researchers developed various policy models that tried to theoretically explain the 
more diffuse policy process that became accepted in the 1970s. During this period, 
the focus shifted to the development of policy theories or models that could better 
explain the policy process observed in the 1970s and 1980s. Political scientists
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developed theories such as the ACF model, the PE model, and John Kingdon’s 
streams metaphor for policymaking to explain the policy process (Baumgartner & 
Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Research during this 
era incorporated many aspects of the traditional interest group literature. For example, 
the ACF examined the policy beliefs of interest groups and other entities in one policy 
subsystem over an extended time frame. In this way, this type o f research 
methodology mirrored the attempts o f researchers in the second and third eras to 
examine the influence of interest groups on the policymaking process. However, in 
the fourth era more researchers attempted to theoretically validate their findings 
through policy models.
While these theoretical models of the policy process took much from previous 
research that examined interest group influence on the policy process, they also took 
from previous research on systems analysis. Starting in the 1960s and 1970s, political 
scientists started to use systems analysis to better understand and theoretically model 
the policy process. The genesis of such attempts occurred with David Easton’s (1965) 
black box systems model of policymaking that constructed an input/output schemata 
to policy development. This type of approach helped to introduce the concept of 
systems analysis into political science and helped to form later models o f the policy 
process such as the ACF.
Easton (1965) argued that the policy process is a political system of inputs and 
outputs mediated by the structure o f government, social forces, political factors, and 
economic conditions (p. 32-33). Inputs such as elections, public opinions, and media
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coverage enter the black box of the political system where they are transformed into 
policy outputs such as laws, regulations, and policy decisions (Easton, 1965, p. 32-33; 
see also Birkland, 2005, p. 202). These outputs can then influence the political system 
or the inputs to the political system through a feedback loop (see Figure 3).
INPUTS OUTPUTS
- elections - laws
- public opinion - regulations











Figure 3: Systems Model of the Policy Process
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Easton provided a good, general theoretical model o f the policy process that 
influenced political science well into the 1980s. The genius o f Easton’s approach 
resided in the emphasis on the policy process. Rather than focusing on a specific 
institution involved in the policy process, Easton focused on the policy system as a 
whole. As a result, the black box systems model did not just look at a specific 
institution such as Congress, the presidency, the judicial system, a specific executive 
agency, or specific interest groups. Instead, this type o f analysis examined a policy 
process that could include many state, local, and federal agencies; different 
appropriations and oversight committees in Congress; court decisions from state 
courts and federal courts; and various interest groups operating at multiple levels of 
government (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 2). This provided political science 
with a more realistic description of the policy process.
However, there was a weakness in most studies using systems analysis to 
examine the policy process. These studies usually did not attempt to systematically 
examine the inner workings of the black box (Birkland, 2005, p. 223-224). Or, in 
other words, systems analysis did not try to hypothesize about the interaction of 
governmental structure, social forces, political factors, and economic conditions on a 
specific policy subsystem consisting of various policy actors. That line of analysis 
was left for ACF scholars.
Building from the systems approach to policy analysis as well as research that 
examined the influence of interest groups on the policy process, Sabatier and Jenkins- 
Smith developed the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) in the late 1980s. The
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ACF emphasized the role of beliefs on policy development and policy change within a 
specific policy subsystem. However, unlike other policy models, the ACF integrated 
the socioeconomic and political forces that could impact the influence tactics of 
interest groups and other organized entities into its theoretical construct. Therefore, 
the ACF opened the black box of political systems and served as an important bridge 
linking the research of traditional interest group theorists with theorists o f the policy 
process such as David Easton.
Aspects of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a theoretical model of the policy 
process emphasizing the role of policy beliefs and coalitions of advocacy groups on 
policy change. The ACF allows scholars to determine how various coalitions 
influence public policy within a particular policy subsystem as well as how those 
coalitions respond to dynamic changes impacting the policy environment (Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 123, 145, 149). The framework hypothesizes that stable 
parameters (such as basic problem attributes, natural resource distributions, cultural 
values, and governmental structure) interact with dynamic parameters (such as 
economic conditions, public support o f governmental leaders, and outcomes from 
other policies) outside a specific policy environment to influence the actions of
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various advocacy coalitions within a specific policy environment (Sabatier & Jenkins- 
Smith, 1999, p. 149) (see Figure 4).
In the framework, the policy beliefs of diverse policy actors such as advocacy 
groups, governmental agencies, private organizations, political leaders, and other 
entities coalesce around a set of policy core beliefs (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, 
p. 131). These coalitions then try to influence governmental authorities, given 
resource constraints and the interaction of external events (the stable and changing 
parameters discussed above), by using certain guidance instruments (such as lobbying, 
actual political support during elections, media manipulation, and even 
demonstrations) (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 142). The ultimate goal o f these 
influence tactics is a policy change that favorably aligns a new policy output with their 
policy beliefs.
Policy beliefs constantly adapt to changing socioeconomic conditions and 
political factors. The ACF emphasizes the role o f bounded rationality and the ability 
o f individuals within advocacy coalitions to effectively process new policy 
information, current socioeconomic trends, and relevant political information (Jenkins- 
Smith & Sabatier, 1993, p. 44; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 131). Once 
processed, the information becomes integrated into the existing policy beliefs of an 
advocacy coalition as new policy beliefs. Advocacy coalitions can then communicate 
these new beliefs to other groups, policymakers, the public, or even to other advocacy 
coalitions.
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Figure 4 : The Advocacy Coalition Framework
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The ACF classifies this type o f response to changing conditions as policy- 
oriented learning. In policy-oriented learning, advocacy coalitions change their policy 
beliefs to incorporate current conditions impacting the policy subsystem in which they 
operate. Conditions that impact a policy subsystem can range from the socio­
economic and political impacts discussed above to feedback information from 
previous policy changes to policy interactions from other advocacy coalitions 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 199, p. 149). Coalitions readjust their policy beliefs in 
light o f these conditions. This results in a long-lasting alteration to an advocacy 
coalition’s policy beliefs (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993, p. 42; Sabatier & Jenkins- 
Smith, 1999, p. 122).
Whether policy beliefs change or whether they stay the same, it is important to 
note that the ACF model stipulates that not all policy beliefs are created equally. 
According to the ACF model, there are three types of beliefs within an advocacy 
coalition: deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs, and secondary beliefs (Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 121-122). Deep core beliefs are broad, guiding beliefs that 
influence an advocacy coalition across policy subsystems. An example of such deep 
core beliefs could include the conservative versus progressive (liberal) belief debate. 
Policy core beliefs are more specific beliefs that unite groups into advocacy coalitions 
and usually only apply to a particular policy subsystem. An example o f policy core 
beliefs in pesticide regulations could include an “agriculture promotion” coalition that 
believes in reducing pesticide regulations in order to reduce economic burdens on 
farmers and agri-businesses, and a “consumer-environmental protection” coalition that
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believes in increasing pesticide regulations in order to improve the environment and 
human health. Finally, secondary beliefs are very specific beliefs that apply to a 
specific part of a policy or policy subsystem. Examples of secondary beliefs are 
policy preferences such as the belief that a certain division of an agency should be 
funded at a higher level than another division o f the same agency (see Table 1 for an 
example o f each o f these beliefs).
Table 1
Hypothetical Example of Beliefs o f a “Consumer-Environmental Protection” Coalition
Type of 
Policy Belief Definition of Policy Belief
Deep Core Government should ensure the protection of the environment
Policy Core Government should ensure the protection o f the environment and the 
safety o f human health from agriculture applications o f pesticides, 
fertilizers, and other substances and organisms.
Secondary To ensure the safety o f human health, the USEPA Office o f Water 
should increase its monitoring o f pesticides in groundwater.
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These differences in policy beliefs are very important to consider in any ACF 
analysis. According to the ACF model, policy beliefs are either broad or specific. In 
general, more specific policy beliefs enable advocacy groups to recruit new members 
and organize around key concepts. These types of beliefs often serve as the bond that 
holds an advocacy group together. These types of beliefs are also visibly 
communicated to policymakers in legislative hearings, direct lobbying efforts, and 
other communication pathways. In contrast, broader policy beliefs are often implied 
by the advocacy group and may only be explicitly stated in mission statements. These 
types o f beliefs are usually not visibly stated by the advocacy group in legislative 
hearings, direct lobbying efforts, or other communication pathways.
Most ACF analyses focus on secondary beliefs since these beliefs are the ones 
most likely to change over time (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Secondary beliefs 
are also where conflict occurs. With secondary policy beliefs, groups within an 
advocacy coalition can disagree about a specific part o f a proposed policy, while 
agreeing on the broader need for such a policy. Or, different advocacy coalitions can 
disagree about both the specific parts of a proposed policy as well as the broader need 
for such a policy. However, these conflicts over policy are usually short lived. Due to 
changing socioeconomic conditions and political factors, one coalition will usually 
move toward the secondary policy beliefs o f an opposing coalition over time in a 
policy-oriented learning manner (Sabatier & Brasher, 1993, p. 203).
In especially intense and long lasting conflicts, policy brokers can also operate 
within the policy subsystem. These actors try to resolve differences between the
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competing coalitions in a way that influences governmental authorities toward certain 
policy decisions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 122). Policy brokers can range 
from respected policymakers to respected members of an advocacy group. Wherever 
they originate, they must hold the respect o f all of the actors in the policy subsystem in 
order to successfully resolve a policy conflict.
Through the 1990s the ACF model gained prominence as a way for scholars to 
analyze policy beliefs and policy change within a specific policy subsystem. Scholars 
using the ACF in this time period typically analyzed data from public hearings in a 
case study approach that either quantitatively or qualitatively validated the 
framework’s numerous hypotheses concerning advocacy coalitions, policy change, 
and policy learning (for a qualitative approach see Barke, 1993; Brown & Stewart, 
1993; Ellison, 1998; Mawhinney, 1993; Munro, 1993; Weible, Sabatier, & Lubell, 
2004; for the more quantitative approach see Jenkins-Smith & St. Clair, 1993; Sabatier 
and Brasher, 1993; Weible & Sabatier, 2005). These research efforts allowed political 
scientists to examine if the policy beliefs o f advocacy groups within advocacy 
coalitions changed and why public policy changed at a certain time.
However, even though use o f the ACF model in research has become standard 
and accepted within political science, it still has three contentious concepts. First, the 
ACF theorizes that advocacy groups and other interested entities can unknowingly 
coalesce into advocacy coalitions. In some circumstances, these groups do not 
willingly engage other groups in the formation of an advocacy coalition. For example, 
the Sierra Club may not routinely enter into discussions with other environmental
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groups on the formation of a large environmental advocacy coalition for a specific 
pesticide regulatory issue. Although advocacy groups often join forces in support of 
specific legislation or to bring publicity to specific issues, the use o f advocacy 
coalitions within the ACF model is more of an aggregation tool for researchers. By 
using policy beliefs to aggregate similar advocacy groups into advocacy coalitions, 
researchers can learn more about the policy process and if the members of one 
coalition are moving towards the beliefs o f an opposing coalition.
Second, the ACF is a framework o f related hypotheses and not a definitive 
theoretical construct. Currently, the ACF has fifteen different hypotheses concerning 
advocacy coalitions, policy change, and policy learning (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 
1999, p. 124, 129, 134, 139, 140, 145). As a result, researchers can use the ACF to 
examine a wide variety o f traditional research problems in policy analyses, collective 
action studies, agenda-setting research, and even cognitive decision-making 
investigations. Indeed, the two major works on the ACF model by Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith reveal a broad framework in which it is hard to capture distinct insights 
on the policy process other than the facts that distinct advocacy coalitions exist in a 
policy subsystem, policy-oriented learning occurs in these coalitions, and exogenous 
political and socioeconomic forces significantly impact the policy process and the 
belief structure of advocacy coalition (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993; Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999).
As a result, detractors often note that the ACF model is too vague, has too 
many hypotheses, and attempts to explain too much. Nonetheless, effective ACF
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research can still occur as long as the researcher narrows the topic area o f ACF 
research. For example, instead of parsing through fifteen different hypotheses, this 
dissertation simply analyzes the most basic tenets o f the ACF as depicted in Figure 4. 
These tenets include the following: that researchers can group similar advocacy 
groups into larger advocacy coalitions, that socioeconomic and political forces can 
significantly impact the policy beliefs of advocacy coalitions, and that these policy 
beliefs help to influence policy change.
For the third contentious concept, the ACF model explains policy belief 
change within advocacy coalitions as a policy-oriented learning process whereby the 
policy beliefs of one coalition undergo an enduring change due to socioeconomic 
conditions, political forces, and information processing parameters (Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 123). As depicted in Figure 4, sudden socioeconomic or 
political shocks to the policy subsystem will lead to changes in policy beliefs and 
policy change. In response to external shocks, even if they are sudden, advocacy 
coalitions learn and re-adjust their policy beliefs to the new reality affecting their 
policy subsystem. This type o f change among advocacy coalitions allows individual 
members o f an advocacy coalition, or even an entire advocacy coalition, to move 
closer toward the policy beliefs of an opposing advocacy coalition due to changing 
socioeconomic and political conditions. As a result, the process o f change for an 
advocacy coalition’s policy beliefs as theorized in the ACF is one o f constant 
readjustment in response to socioeconomic and political forces.
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The concept of policy beliefs notably distinguishes the ACF from other models 
of the policy process such as punctuated equilibrium (PE). While the ACF model 
embraces the notion of policy beliefs and its role on policy change, researchers using 
the PE model usually just look at the process of policy change. However, the analysis 
in this dissertation is different in that it theorizes that a punctuated equilibrium process 
also occurs for the process of policy belief change within advocacy coalitions that 
operate in a specific policy subsystem.
The Origins o f Punctuated Equilibrium (PE)
Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould first proposed the concept o f punctuated 
equilibrium (PE) to explain the evolutionary speciation patterns o f organisms observed 
in the fossil record. In their original work, Eldredge and Gould (1972) described the 
process of speciation as rapid, episodic, and best represented by a PE process instead 
of a gradual process (p. 84). In evolutionary paleontology, the PE process works over 
a long period of time according to the following principles. First, any population of 
organisms has slight genetic variations within its individual members. Second, 
environmental changes isolate a small group of organisms within that population. 
Third, these new environmental conditions favor the further development o f genetic 
variations within the isolated group. Over a short amount of time, which can last 
thousands o f years in evolutionary paleontology terms, the descendants o f the isolated
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group become a new species morphologically different from the original population 
(Eldredge & Gould, 1972, p. 94-95; Gould 2002, p. 766-768). As a result, organisms 
rarely show any gradual evolutionary change throughout their phylogeny. Instead, 
new species appear quite suddenly in the fossil record.
Working from the theoretical insights o f Eldredge and Gould, Frank 
Baumgartner and Bryan Jones used PE to explain their observations on public policy. 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) found that for long periods of observations on different 
policy subsystems, policy change rarely occurred (p. 17-18). However, on rare 
occasions certain policy conditions fluctuated such as the venue for a policy debate or 
the public’s image of a specific policy problem. Fluctuations in venue and image 
often led to a quick policy change that was immediately followed by additional long 
periods o f policy stasis (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, p. 38). As a result, Baumgartner 
and Jones concluded that the evolution of any public policy followed a PE pattern 
rather than a gradual, incremental pattern.
While Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones owed much of their insights on PE 
to Eldredge and Gould, they also used previous research from agenda-setting studies, 
the policy subsystems literature, and social choice theory to help configure the idea of 
PE to existing research on public policy. By using these three concepts from social 
science research, Baumgartner and Jones brought a theory from evolutionary 
paleontology to political science. This made PE a viable model o f the policy process.
With the incorporation of agenda-setting, the PE model had its basic political 
science foundation. Political scientists classify agenda-setting as a debate among
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advocacy groups, agencies, policymakers, the public, the media, and any other 
interested organizations over the problems that should be on the active policy agenda 
of policymakers (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, p. 10; Kingdon, 1995, p. 3). Once on 
the agenda, governmental debates over a policy problem occur and the probability of 
policy change increases. Therefore, agenda-setting becomes important in the PE 
model because it helps to describe the most fundamental part o f policy change.
Bringing a policy problem to the agenda is a tough process. Successful 
agenda-setting usually happens when the public directs the right mix o f attention to 
policymakers on a policy problem that already has various solutions advocated by 
organized interests (Hunt, 2002, p. 75-76). This helps to change the image of the 
policy problem from the perspective o f policymakers. Such a change in image also 
causes more policymakers to consider solving the problem with new legislation.
When more policymakers know more about a specific policy problem, a 
change in venue for debates over the problem often occurs. By moving the policy 
discussion from its usual venue, such as a particular Congressional committee, policy 
change is more likely to occur. With the interaction of changing images and venues, 
more people become involved in the policy process and it becomes more open and 
more susceptible to change.
This is an important process because policy venues are usually closed to 
outsiders. This helps to explain long periods of policy stasis. With the same actors 
involved with a particular policy and with the public usually indifferent to such a 
policy because the policy image has remained constant, policy change rarely occurs.
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However, with the interaction of changing images and different venues, the policy 
process becomes more open. The notion o f a closed policy system originates from the 
subgovemment literature. As discussed earlier in the “Origins o f the ACF” section, 
the subgovemment literature often explained the structure of closed policy systems as 
iron triangles. These iron triangles usually prevented significant policy change from 
occurring to the mutual benefit of the agency, interest groups, and policymakers 
involved in the process.
The sub-government literature helped Baumgartner and Jones explain periods 
o f stasis in policymaking, while agenda-setting research helped them understand why 
policy changed. To understand why policy change would quickly revert back to 
policy stasis, Baumgartner and Jones looked at the expansive literature on social 
choice theory. Basic research on social choice examines how individual preferences 
become group choices (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, p. 13). Researchers expand this 
basic concept to consider the fact that no policy and no election in a democratic 
society can ensure political equilibrium (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, p. 14). In other 
words, for every issue and every policy there will be an opposing group with views at 
odds with the current policy and political reality. This fact ensures non-equilibrium in 
policymaking.
So if policymaking is not in equilibrium, how can this be resolved with the 
notion of long periods of policy stasis that is central to a PE model o f policymaking? 
According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993), the answer lies in the fact that most of 
the public is apathetic toward policymaking (p. 38). As a result, it takes a skilled
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policy entrepreneur to define a policy issue in terms that motivate the public to act 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, p. 38). In addition to public apathy, a closed policy 
subsystem helps to exclude new entrants to the policy process. All o f these forces act 
to quickly ensure policy stasis after a policy change.
Aspects of Punctuated Equilibrium (PE)
A PE model of policymaking explains policy change as being dependent on a 
positive feedback system and serial processing. Baumgartner and Jones (2002) make 
clear that public policy subsystems are either in a state of positive feedback or 
negative feedback (p. 3). Most of the time, policy systems are in a negative feedback 
situation. This is policy stasis: a time o f stability with no new policy outputs. During 
this time, small shocks to the policy subsystem can occur, but they are so small that 
the various policy actors within the policy subsystem can react to them and readjust 
actions accordingly (Baumgartner & Jones, 2002, p. 8-9).
For example, when a pesticide storage container leaks into the drinking water 
supply o f a small town, it causes a loud and vocal response from local citizens. 
Citizens complain about the problem to their elected officials and the media. In 
response, legislative bodies hold hearings on the matter. But ultimately, since it is an 
isolated incident, the legislative body passes no new pesticide regulations. Therefore, 
no new policy outputs occur. This is policy stasis and negative feedback. Actors
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within the policy subsystem readjust their plan of action to meet the crisis at hand. In 
this case, policymakers held hearings to examine the issue.
But what if  pesticide storage containers leaked into the groundwater supplies 
o f communities across the nation? In response to such a serious situation, more 
citizens across the country voice their concern to policymakers and the media. With 
greater media coverage, the image of pesticide regulations changes. Multiple 
legislative bodies across the country hold hearings on pesticide regulations. Now, 
policymakers, pesticide regulatory agencies, and agri-chemical interest groups know 
that a change in pesticide regulations has to occur. When the policy process opens up 
like this in response to a crisis, positive feedback occurs and often results in policy 
change.
The process of positive feedback occurs as the public and the media focus 
more attention on a particular policy problem. This reveals new aspects o f a policy 
problem to various actors in the policy subsystem. But more importantly, 
policymakers shift their attention to these new aspects since humans are serial 
information processors who can only think about one dimension of issue information 
at a time (Baumgartner & Jones, 2002, p. 15; see also Simon, 1985; Simon, 1997). As 
more o f the policy subsystem shifts to this new aspect, more actors within the policy 
subsystem start to focus on this new aspect in a mimicking type of behavior 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2002, p. 16). The resulting effect is like rolling a boulder 
down a hill. As the boulder rolls down the hill, momentum constantly builds up in a 
positive reinforcing cycle. Except in the PE model, the need for policy change
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constantly builds up in policy actors due to a continual focus on a policy problem by 
the public and the media.
In the PE view of public policy, policy subsystems are closed, unchanging 
systems maintained by dominant policy actors (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, p. 7-8). 
Points o f stability such as the same venue for policy debates and a steady image o f a 
public policy ensure that policy change rarely occurs (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, p. 
38). When these points of stability become upset, new groups and new policymakers 
enter the policy process. As a result, when policy change happens, it is a remarkable 
event.
Comparing the Two Models
Political scientists have used either the ACF or PE models to study the policy 
process for over two decades. However, political scientists have yet to directly 
compare these models to determine their accuracy and appropriateness for examining 
the policy process. This dissertation attempts to do that by using the ACF and PE 
models to examine policy change and the process of policy belief change among 
advocacy coalitions in the federal pesticide regulatory subsystem from 1982-2003.
This is not an easy process since the models were never really designed for 
such an endeavor. For example, ACF researchers specify that policy beliefs play a 
major role in the policy process. Advocacy coalitions, bound by policy beliefs and the
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current socioeconomic and political reality, compete with one another to influence 
policy change (John, 2003, p. 490-491; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 118-119; 
Schlager & Blomquist, 1996, p. 657). However, policy beliefs are rarely mentioned in 
the PE model. About the only time they are mentioned is in discussions on agenda- 
setting where they are mentioned as tipping-point mechanisms for policy change 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 147). As a result, the ACF model focuses more 
on group interactions and the changes in policy beliefs that occur because o f those 
interactions rather than just on policy change like the PE model (Wood, 2006, p. 2).
Even though an emphasis on policy beliefs sets the ACF and PE models apart, 
the two models do have similarities. For example, both models focus on the policy 
subsystem rather than on a specific group or institution. This continues the line of 
interest group research as first envisioned by Bentley in 1908. In addition, the two 
models emphasize policy change in their theoretical constructs. The ACF model 
explains that policy change occurs due to fluctuating policy conditions such as 
socioeconomic conditions and political factors that lead advocacy coalitions to change 
their policy beliefs. Similarly, the PE model explains that policy change occurs due to 
fluctuating policy conditions such as policy venues and policy images that cause a 
change in the perceived importance of an issue among the public, media, 
policymakers, and other organized entities.
Both models also have their respective faults. The PE model often places too 
much emphasis on agenda-setting when describing the policy process (True, Jones, & 
Baumgartner, 1999, p. 97). While agenda-setting is important, it is only one aspect of
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the process of policy change. The process of policy change can also happen in other 
stages o f the policy process such as enactment, implementation, or evaluation. In 
addition, the PE model really makes no attempt to specifically outline what forces lead 
to changing policy venues and policy images. In contrast, the ACF model at least 
theorizes that socioeconomic conditions and political factors are the primary 
motivators behind policy change and policy belief change.
However, even more faults can be found with the ACF model. The largest 
fault o f the ACF is that it is too broad. As a theoretical framework, the ACF is a mix 
of theories that attempts to explain the behavior of interest groups, agencies, 
policymakers, and other organized entities in the policy process; why policy changes 
at a particular time; the role of scientific and policy information in the formation of 
policy beliefs; and the cognitive processing limitations of individuals involved in the 
policy process (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 153-154). Unlike the PE model 
that primarily focuses on the process of policy change, the ACF model focuses on too 
many topics. As a result, because the ACF model explains so much, researchers 
continually question whether it really explains anything at all.
Despite these problems, both models make useful contributions to research. At 
the most fundamental level, both models theorize about how policy changes. For the 
ACF model, policy beliefs of advocacy coalitions become transformed due to new 
socioeconomic conditions and political factors. In turn, these transformed beliefs help 
to change public policy. For the PE model, policy changes due to fluctuating policy 
images and policy venues that allow more people to enter the policy process and
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debate public policy. The issue that has to be further explored in both models is the 
role o f policy beliefs in policy change. As a result, this dissertation will determine if 
the PE model can use the concept of policy beliefs as a primary unit o f analysis and 
determine if policy beliefs o f advocacy coalitions change according to a punctuated 
equilibrium pattern.
Examining the Models in the Pesticide Regulatory Subsystem
This dissertation uses the ACF and PE models to examine the federal pesticide 
regulatory subsystem from 1982-2003. During this time period, pesticide regulations 
were the primary issue discussed by policymakers, advocacy groups, agencies, the 
media, and other organized entities. However, other issues also emerged during this 
time period. In addition to pesticide regulations, actors in the subsystem debated other 
agri-environmental issues such as agricultural conservation efforts like Integrated Pest 
Management (IPM), the impact of agricultural fertilizers on water pollution, 
biotechnology, the economic health of agri-businesses, the declining state o f the 
American farmer, and farmland loss. Therefore, while this dissertation examines the 
changing state of pesticide regulations from 1982-2003, these other issues also 
appeared from time to time. In other words, even if a debate was supposed to focus on 
pesticide regulations, these other issues often appeared in the debate. This is a
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significant fact and will be explored more in Chapters 3 and 4. But, overall, groups 
seemed to use these other issues to help influence the debate on pesticide regulations.
Two advocacy coalitions opposed one another during this time period, a 
coalition o f “consumer-environmental protection” activists and a coalition of 
“agriculture promotion” advocates. Although not named as advocacy coalitions, 
previous research on pesticide regulations and agricultural policy by the Board on 
Agriculture of the National Research Council (1987), Bosso (1987), Browne (1988; 
1995), Chuang (1994), Hosemann (2003), Meiners & Yandle (2003), and Smith 
(1994), clearly identifies these two coalitions. These previous research endeavors 
papers indicate that which is intuitive: a “consumer-environmental protection” 
coalition and an “agriculture promotion” coalition exist in the agri-environmental 
policy subsystem. Above all else, this dissertation will empirically demonstrate that 
such coalitions exist. In addition, this research will examine which factors influence 
the ability o f advocacy coalitions to influence public policy.
Such an emphasis contributes to the uniqueness of this dissertation. Other 
researchers have examined parts o f the pesticide regulatory debate. For example, 
Bosso (1987) explored aspects of pesticide politics from the 1940s through the 1980s. 
But his research did not include the significant changes to pesticide regulations made 
in 1996 with the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA). Other researchers have also 
examined pesticide regulations with the ACF or PE models. However, these research 
efforts also did not include regulatory changes made with FQPA. In addition, these 
researchers did not directly compare the two theoretical models to determine which
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
parts of which model are accurate. Overall, no previous research attempted to 
accomplish what this research project hopes to accomplish: namely, to examine the 
pesticide regulatory subsystem since 1982 with two different policy models in an 
attempt to determine which policy model better explains the process o f policy change.
Concluding Remarks
Overall, the ACF and PE models have a rich research history. Researchers 
have used both models to successfully explore a variety of policy subsystems. Even 
with specific problems and quirks, these two models have emerged as the dominant 
descriptions of the policy process within political science. However, researchers have 
yet to directly compare each model in a research effort. This dissertation attempts 
such a comparison.
This chapter served three primary purposes. First, it explained the origins and 
theoretical bases of both the ACF and PE models. The chapter clarified the basic 
concepts behind each model and showed how the models compared against each other. 
Second, this chapter placed the ACF and PE models of the policy process in the extant 
political science literature on interest groups and the policy process. This helped to 
determine why researchers developed each model and how each model continues 
research traditions that first appeared in the early 1900s. Lastly, this chapter 
introduced the pesticide regulatory subsystem and the two advocacy coalitions
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
operating in that subsystem. The next chapter examines this subsystem more 
thoroughly by explaining the history of federal pesticide regulations from the early 
1900s to the late 1970s.
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CHAPTER 3
PESTICIDE REGULATIONS BEFORE THE 1980s
In many respects, the historical development o f federal pesticide regulations 
mirrored the development of American public policy in the 20th century. In American 
public policy before the 1930s, policymakers passed basic policies that minimally 
affected the public. The power of policies increased through the 1940s and 1960s as 
the administrative size of the federal government increased. During this time, 
policymakers often passed policies to benefit preeminent advocacy groups and to 
ensure their continued control over a specific policy subsystem. Policy subsystems 
generally became more open and more focused on public welfare as the number of 
interest groups increased in the late 1960s and 1970s. However, after the 1970s, 
policymakers transformed most non-defense policies with anti-regulation and anti- 
federal control initiatives that emphasized economic growth as a way to protect the 
public welfare.
Like most federal policy subsystems, the pesticide regulatory subsystem also 
went through this type of evolution. For example, federal policymakers passed the 
first pesticide regulations in the early 1900s to protect the economic interests of 
farmers. Throughout this time period and into the late 1930s, federal policymakers
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primarily used pesticide regulations to protect farmers from unscrupulous pesticide 
manufacturers who used deceptive pesticide labels to exaggerate the effectiveness of 
their product. This focus on product efficacy remained from the late 1930s through 
the 1960s even as some federal regulations started to focus on product safety. During 
this time period, a cadre o f chemical manufacturers and agricultural groups dominated 
the debates on federal pesticide regulations. As discussed in Chapter 2, this helped to 
establish a closed policy subsystem for federal pesticide regulations. Then, during the 
1970s, as the number o f interest groups increased and a wave of pro-environmental 
sentiment spread across the nation, federal pesticide regulations changed to focus 
more on product safety rather than product efficacy. Finally, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the scope and power o f federal pesticide regulations generally decreased as 
policymakers and agribusiness leaders successfully linked a decline in the agricultural 
industry to excessive pesticide regulations.
As a result, federal pesticide regulations represent a perfect lens by which to 
analyze the ACF and PE models o f the policy process. Over time, policymakers 
incorporated the policy beliefs of consumer and environmental protection advocates, 
as well as agriculture promotion advocates, into pesticide regulatory policy to satisfy 
the public’s changing attitude toward food and environmental safety. This chapter 
shows that process at work by examining the major points in the evolution o f federal 
pesticide regulations from the early 1900s through the late 1970s.
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Early Federal Pesticide Regulations
Pesticide regulations at the federal level commenced in 1910 with the passage 
of the Federal Insecticide Act (FIA). Like most pesticide regulations before the 1960s, 
this act served to protect farmers’ interests more than the public’s by ensuring that a 
pesticidal product worked as advertised. FIA used labels on pesticide products as a 
way to protect farmers from ineffective, counterfeit pesticides made by illegitimate 
manufacturers. It mandated that a pesticide’s label contain a list o f the product’s 
ingredients and also made sure that any claims on the product’s label were truthful 
(Federal Insecticide Act, 1910).
Hearings on FIA occurred in 1910 in the U.S. House o f Representatives’ 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (the U.S. Senate did not hold 
hearings on FIA). Debates in the hearings were generally peaceful because the 
prominent agriculture promotion advocates, represented by the pesticide 
manufacturers and farmers, wanted this type of pesticide efficacy regulation. The FIA 
helped farmers by ensuring that purchased pesticides were effective. As a result, 
pesticides became a viable and reliable tool for farmers. Farmers could now believe a 
pesticide’s label because chemical manufacturers had to operate under a standard set 
o f rules when marketing products as pesticides. This contrasted with life before FIA 
when farmers often purchased products labeled as pesticides that were in fact anything 
but effective pesticides.
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The FIA also helped chemical manufacturers by ensuring that legitimate 
pesticides were sold to farmers. At the time, farmers mainly relied on pesticides that 
either had arsenic or lead as the main ingredient (Perkins, 1982, p. 3). However, 
dishonest salesmen and manufacturers often sold pesticides to farmers that didn’t have 
these ingredients or made other exaggerated claims about the pesticidal properties of 
some new substance. As a result, before the passage o f FIA, genuine pesticide 
producers faced a major problem: the selling and manufacture o f these counterfeit 
pesticides threatened the continued use o f authentic pesticides. The passage o f FIA 
helped to solve that problem. With stricter labeling provisions, chemical 
manufacturers could assure farmers that purchased pesticides were genuine, effective 
products.
While FIA strengthened labeling requirements and stabilized the pesticide 
market, it had three major weaknesses. First, FIA had no regulatory strength. The 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) enforced the act by creating the Bureau o f 
Chemistry, but the Bureau had no real power to recall pesticides violating FIA (Bosso, 
1987, p. 48). In addition, the leaders o f USDA had no desire to pull pesticides off the 
market (Bosso, 1987, p. 48).
Second, FIA had a narrow technical scope. It only applied to lead-based and 
arsenic-based pesticides. In 1910, lead and arsenic were the primary pesticidal 
compounds. However, by the 1930s and 1940s the number of synthetic pesticidal 
compounds significantly increased and surpassed the use of lead- and arsenic-based
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pesticides (Osteen, 1993, p. 308). This weakness directly led to a significant revision 
to FIA in 1947.
Third, FIA offered no safety regulations. The FIA emphasized pesticide 
efficacy or the idea that a pesticide should work as advertised, not pesticide safety. 
Throughout the twentieth century, pesticide regulations either emphasized efficacy, 
safety, or both. FIA really had no provisions to ensure product safety. This is 
somewhat surprising given the progressive concern over food safety sweeping the 
nation at the time policymakers passed this act. This lack o f emphasis on safety could 
indicate that the initial debates on pesticide regulations were closed to the few 
progressive advocacy groups and farmers concerned about the use o f pesticides on 
food. But by the 1920s, rampant concern over pesticidal residues in food helped to 
transform an older food safety law into a quasi-pesticide regulation.
This older law was the Pure Food and Drug Act (PFDA) o f 1906. Debates on 
PFDA occurred in the U.S. House’s Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 
Once again, the U.S. Senate did not hold hearings on PFDA. Consumer protection 
advocates who wanted the act and food manufacturing advocates who did not want the 
act dominated the hearings. Bolstered by popular progressive sentiments, consumer 
protection advocates were able to influence policymakers to a greater extent. Indeed, 
the wave o f progressive enthusiasm for food and drug safety helped PFDA pass into 
law in 1906. Progressive enthusiasm for food and drug safety, best exemplified by 
articles on the dangers of patent medicines, Upton Sinclair’s (1906/2003) account of 
lax food safety in The Jungle, and Harvey Wiley’s campaign on the dangers o f food
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preservatives while heading the USDA’s Bureau o f Chemistry, led policymakers to 
pass PFDA (Bosso, 1987, p. 47).
PFDA aimed to prevent the sale or manufacture of adulterated food, drugs, 
medicines, and liquors. The act defined adulteration as a process o f deliberately 
reducing the quality or strength o f a substance by mixing or packing it with another, 
inferior substance (Pure Food and Drug Act, 1906). It specifically gave USDA’s 
Bureau of Chemistry (later to be replaced by the FDA: the Food and Drug 
Administration) the authority to set adulteration tolerances for substances harmful to 
health (Pure Food and Drug Act, 1906). Tolerances ensured food safety. They 
represented the maximum level at which a dangerous substance could be in a food 
product and still be considered safe. PFDA also gave the Bureau of Chemistry/FDA 
the ability to seize products that exceeded an established tolerance level (Pure Food 
and Drug Act, 1906). But the act also gave the seller or producer o f the adulterated 
product the explicit right to a jury trial to decide if  the seized product really was 
adulterated and dangerous (Pure Food and Drug Act, 1906).
Like FIA, PFDA was a weak regulation. While the act gave the Bureau of 
Chemistry/FDA the authority to set tolerances, these tolerances did not have the force 
of law. Rather, PFDA tolerances were recognized only as administrative guidelines 
that helped inspectors determine when food was dangerous (Whorton, 1974, p. 112). 
Since they did not have the force o f law, lawyers for producers and sellers could easily 
invalidate a tolerance and overturn a seizure order from the agency. Nonetheless, 
policymakers o f the time viewed PFDA as an important step toward protecting the
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public from the dangers o f adulteration. Policymakers amended PFDA in 1912, 1913, 
and 1930 (Jackson, 1970, p. 8). However, these amendments did not substantially 
change the PFDA provisions that eventually impacted pesticide regulations.
While technically not a pesticide regulation, the limited authority given to 
Bureau o f Chemistry/FDA officials under PFDA played an important role in the 
evolution o f pesticide regulations. By 1919, Bureau of Chemistry officials suspected 
that residues from arsenic pesticides on fruits and vegetables posed an unacceptable 
risk to consumers (Whorton, 1974, p. 95-96). Yet, USDA as a whole ignored the 
Bureau’s concerns and continued to aggressively advocate the application o f arsenic 
pesticides. Instead of using the Bureau to regulate pesticide residues, USDA used the 
Bureau to hold meetings with farmers on ways to lower residues by preventing 
excessive applications o f arsenic pesticides (Whorton, 1974, p. 124). These meetings 
were not successful. Farmers continued to overuse arsenic pesticides and concern 
over residues continued. That same year, the city o f Boston seized pears throughout 
the city after a health inspector noticed pears heavily inundated with a white powder 
that later turned out to be arsenic residue (Whorton, 1974, p. 95).
It was not until 1925 that the issue of arsenic pesticides became a concern for 
USDA. During that year, European countries with established tolerances levels for 
arsenic pesticides banned the importation o f American apples because o f concerns 
about high arsenic levels (Whorton, 1974, p. 133-134). The outright ban o f American 
apples finally made the USDA take regulatory action on arsenic pesticide residues. In 
1926, with the Secretary o f Agriculture’s blessing, a USDA-sponsored group o f
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toxicologists established the first tolerances for arsenic on apples (Whorton, 1974, p.
155-156). However, Bureau officials viewed the tolerance as too lenient. The Bureau 
even announced a more stringent tolerance later in the year that was further modified 
after meetings with farmers (Whorton, 1974, p. 161). By the end o f 1926, the Bureau 
of Chemistry, farmers, and the main leaders o f the USDA reached a compromise on 
the tolerance level for arsenic pesticide residues. The more stringent Bureau tolerance 
level still applied starting in 1928, but for 1927 all of the participants agreed to a more 
lenient interim tolerance (Whorton, 1974, p. 163). This allowed farmers time to 
transition to the new tolerance level.
The long debate over establishing a tolerance for arsenic pesticides garnered 
the Bureau o f C hem istry a large number o f critics. Within the USDA, officials viewed 
the Bureau as too progressive and not giving enough consideration to the impact of 
residue regulations on the economic well-being of farmers (Piott, 2006, p. 177). 
Outside o f USDA, the general public viewed the Bureau as being too lenient to 
farmers at the expense of public safety (Bosso, 1987, p. 48). Many also viewed the 
Bureau’s dual role o f protecting farmers’ interest through FIA while at the same time 
protecting consumers’ interest through PFDA as contradictory and untenable (Bosso, 
1987, p. 48).
As a result, USDA abolished the Board in 1927 and replaced it with the Food, 
Drug, and Insecticide Administration, later to be known as the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) (Weber, 1928, p. 1). FDA only had to enforce PFDA, not FIA. 
Therefore, with a newly established FDA, the USDA could now theoretically keep
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farmers’ and consumers’ interest separate. However, the FDA also had its fair share 
o f critics among interested stakeholders and federal policymakers. The animosity 
toward FDA became so intense that by the late 1930s, policymakers stripped the 
agency o f funds needed to examine the potential negative effects o f pesticide spray 
residues on fruits and vegetables (Bosso, 1987, p. 50).
Under increasing pressure from critics worried about consumer safety, 
policymakers strengthened PFDA with the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act o f 1938, 
and moved FDA out o f USDA in 1940 (Bosso, 1987, p. 49). This left the regulation 
o f pesticide residues outside o f USDA’s jurisdiction. The agency that ensured 
farmers’ interests by regulating product efficacy finally separated from the agency that 
ensured consumers’ interests by regulating product safety. This formal separation 
between regulating pesticide efficacy and pesticide safety defined pesticide regulations 
for the next six decades.
The Emergence o f FFDC A
PFDA and FIA possessed minimal pesticide regulatory strength. Since PFDA 
pesticide tolerances were considered administrative tolerances, not legal tolerances, 
regulated parties could effectively delay the establishment of any pesticide tolerance 
through the use o f jury7 trials. These jury trials often invalidated pesticide tolerances, 
as members o f the jury possessed little knowledge o f toxicology and often had strong
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sentiments that favored farming interests (Whorton, 1974, p. 112). In addition, both 
acts did not prevent the sale o f many products that contained potentially dangerous 
substances. By the 1930s, the USDA had only classified a few substances as too 
dangerous to include in pesticide products (Whorton, 1974, p. 196). As a result, as 
long as the pesticide’s label did not include these banned substances, and as long as 
the label listed other potentially dangerous substances as ingredients, then it was 
legally okay to sell the product (Whorton, 1974, p. 197).
Policymakers awakened to the weaknesses o f PFDA in 1937. During that 
year, a patent medicine marketed as the “Elixir Sulfanilamide” killed over one 
hundred consumers (Whorton, 1974, p. 238). Realizing that existing regulations 
prevented any type o f meaningful response to such an incident, officials within 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration began to advocate a stronger regulation that 
could replace PFDA and better protect consumers from dangerous substances. This 
led to the passage of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) in 1938.
Hearings on various bills that eventually became FFDCA started in 1933 and 
continued through 1935 (Jackson, 1970, p. 225). Hearings took place in the U.S. 
House’s Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and the U.S. Senate’s 
Committee on Commerce (Jackson, 1970, p. 225). The hearings on FFDCA proved 
quite contentious. Organized interests representing consumer safety and organized 
interests representing farmers and pesticide manufacturers debated one another over 
the merits o f FFDCA.
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Some o f the fiercest debates over passage of FFDCA concerned its provisions 
that allowed FDA to establish legal pesticide tolerances that had the full force o f the 
law. With the authority to establish legal tolerances, FDA could assert greater control 
over the regulatory process. If disputes occurred over legal tolerances, the FDA could 
simply present a case in court that a manufacturer exceeded the established legal 
tolerance. In contrast, with just administrative tolerances, the FDA had to prove to the 
court (and a jury) that the tolerance was valid and that exceeding the tolerance harmed 
public health (Bosso, 1987, p. 52).
Farmers feared the possibility o f legal tolerances. Their primary concern was 
that a single agency could control how much pesticide they could apply to their crop. 
Ever since the Bureau o f Chemistry adopted the first administrative pesticide 
tolerances in the 1920s, farmers feared that agency officials too often protected the 
consumer without considering the economic impact o f the regulation on their 
economic well-being. During the debates on FFDCA, farmers formed various 
associations to protest the possibility o f legal tolerances. These groups classified such 
tolerances as dictatorial and even un-American (Bosso, 1987, p. 52). For a revised 
food and drug law, these groups wanted to continue the use o f administrative 
tolerances with judicial review by jury trials in district courts (Jackson, 1970, p. 180). 
They additionally wanted the option of continuous judicial review (Jackson, 1970, p.
180). Or, in other words, they wanted the option o f legally disputing a tolerance 
whenever the manufacturer or user o f the product wished.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
58
The FDA and other consumer protection advocates opposed this type of 
judicial review fearing a reprisal o f the effective judicial blocking efforts o f 
agricultural interests that undermined PFDA (Bosso, 1987, p. 52). The final language 
in FFDCA reached a compromise. It gave FDA the authority to establish legal 
tolerances for pesticides and it gave farmers the ability to contest the tolerance but 
only for ninety days after the issuance of the tolerance (Whorton, 1970, p. 242). 
Unlimited ability to contest a tolerance at any time it adversely impacted the farmer 
was not allowed. In addition, the act enabled the judicial review o f tolerances in 
circuit courts only (Jackson, 1970, p. 189). This prevented the use o f jury trials at the 
lower district court level.
Both sides obtained what they wanted with FFDCA. The FDA received the 
ability to set legal tolerances for pesticides, and farmers were allowed an opportunity 
to contest the validity o f a tolerance in court. This helped to alleviate farmers’ fear 
about one agency’s ability to set tolerances that could negatively impact their way of 
life. But the FDA and consumer protection advocates were the real winner from 
FFDCA. The act gave the agency not only the power to set legal tolerances for 
pesticide residues, but also required drug manufacturers to submit test results for new 
products to FDA in order to protect consumers from dangerous products (Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 1938). This helped to strengthen FDA’s regulation of 
pesticide residues and especially pharmaceutical products.
FFDCA did much more than regulate pesticide residues. It also regulated 
drugs and cosmetics. But the debates over pesticides were perhaps the most
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controversial because the policy beliefs o f agriculture promotion advocates clashed 
with the policy beliefs o f consumer protection advocates. Publicly, policymakers 
incorporated many o f the policy beliefs o f consumer protection advocates into the 
final version o f FFDCA. But hidden from the public’s eye, policymakers crafted 
many o f FFDCA’s provisions with the policy beliefs o f agriculture promotion 
advocates in mind.
For example, FFDCA mandated that FDA establish legal tolerances from 
research performed by the U.S. Public Health Service (Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, 1938). FDA’s problem with the Public Health Service concerned 
research methodology. The FDA, and especially its predecessor the Bureau of 
Chemistry, often used actual laboratory experiments on animal and human subjects to 
assess the safety o f products (Taylor, 1991, p. 203; Young, 1989, p. 152-153). In 
contrast, the Public Health Service often relied on surveys that assessed pesticide use 
and farmers’ health (Bosso, 1987, p. 50-51). FDA viewed these surveys as unreliable 
(Bosso, 1987, p. 50-51). As a result, the use o f this type of data often led to FDA 
issuing more lenient pesticide tolerances. Additionally, FFDCA mandated that FDA 
could only set legal tolerances for pesticide residues after farmers applied the 
pesticidal product on the field (Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 1938). This 
presumed innocence clause prevented FDA from analyzing a product before it entered 
the marketplace. As a result, under FFDCA, FDA could not prevent a potentially 
dangerous pesticide from entering the market and being used by farmers. FDA could
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only regulate pesticide residues after farmers or consumers noticed adverse effects of 
pesticides.
FFDCA Amendment o f 1954
Over time, the inability to regulate before a product entered the market caused 
great concern among consumers and public health advocates. This concern deepened 
as the number o f man-made, synthetic pesticides continued to greatly increase after the 
passage o f FFDCA in 1938. Increasing numbers o f synthetic pesticides corresponded 
to increased use and FDA simply did not know how their use impacted consumer 
health. O f particular concern during this time period was the widespread use o f DDT, 
an especially potent synthetic pesticide that remained in ecosystems long after the 
application date. The large increase in synthetic pesticide use and the concern over 
their use expressed by FDA, policymakers, and the public resulted in two substantial 
amendments to FFDCA in the 1950s. These amendments were the Miller Amendment 
o f 1954 and the Delaney Amendment o f 1958. These amendments, together with the 
passage o f FIFRA (the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act) in 1947, 
set the basic framework for federal pesticide regulations for the next four decades.
Policymakers passed the Miller amendment after hearings conducted by the 
U.S. House o f Representatives’ Select Committee to Investigate the Use o f Chemicals 
in Food and Cosmetics. Established in 1950, Democratic policymakers formed the
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committee due to concern about weaknesses in FFDCA and the ever-increasing use of 
synthetic pesticides on food crops (Bosso, 1987, p. 72). Just forming the committee 
proved controversial. While urban policymakers and a few progressive policymakers 
from rural areas favored the establishment o f the committee, most policymakers from 
rural states strongly opposed the establishment o f the committee (Bosso, 1987, p. 72- 
73). In the end, the realization that the hearings could alleviate concern among many 
urban constituencies about the safety o f pesticides in food made the hearings a reality.
Representative James Delaney o f New York, a Democrat, chaired the 
committee. As a result, the committee quickly became known as the Delaney 
Committee. The Delaney Committee examined the health impact and economic 
necessity o f using chemicals in food production (Bosso, 1987, p. 73). Despite having 
the support of the powerful Democratic Speaker o f the House Sam Rayburn, the 
committee faced stiff opposition from rural policymakers and farmers who did not 
want more pesticide regulations (Bosso, 1987, p. 72-73).
The Delaney hearings lasted from 1950-1952 and reached two main 
recommendations. First, in order to protect consumer safety, FDA needed the 
regulatory ability to examine a pesticidal product before farmers used it (Bosso, 1987, 
p. 75). This was known as pre-market notification. Policymakers saw this as an 
important step not just toward protecting consumer health but also toward aligning 
FFDCA’s process of drug regulations, which already had pre-market notification, with 
FFDCA’s process o f pesticide residue regulations. With this recommendation, FDA 
could protect consumer safety before the public used a pharmaceutical, cosmetic
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product, or a pesticidal compound. Second, the committee found that farmers needed 
pesticides, even extremely toxic pesticides, in order to maintain an acceptable level of 
food production that met consumer demand (Board on Agriculture o f the National 
Research Council, 1987, p. 164).
From those hearings emerged various attempts to revise FFDCA with a more 
explicit and stronger role for FDA in the regulation o f pesticide residues. Republican 
Representative Arthur L. Miller o f Nebraska, who was a member o f the Delaney 
Committee, offered his own FFDCA amendment in 1953. This amendment called for 
the FDA to consider pesticide and chemical residues on raw fruits and vegetables as 
harmful and not safe until conclusive evidence indicated otherwise (Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act Amendments, 1954). The amendment also called for pre­
market notification. Under the amendment, manufacturers had to give FDA data that 
proved the safety of new chemicals used on food before the chemical was available on 
the open market (Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Amendments, 1954). From 
there, the FDA had ninety days to either establish a tolerance level for the chemical on 
any raw fruit and vegetable crop, proclaim the chemical as safe for use on any raw 
fruit and vegetable crop, or classify the chemical as unsafe for use on any raw fruit and 
vegetable crop (Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Amendments, 1954).
Under the amendment, the FDA also had to consider the risks o f using the 
chemical versus the benefits o f using the chemical (Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act Amendments, 1954). The balancing o f risks versus benefits pleased rural 
policy makers, farmers, and other advocates o f agriculture promotion. This helped to
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ensure passage o f the amendment, but the balancing act also made sense. As the 
Delaney Committee discovered, the nation needed pesticides to ensure an adequate 
supply of food, even if residues from those pesticides posed a certain amount o f risk to 
human health.
Despite strong debates during the Delaney hearings from consumer safety 
advocates and agriculture promotion advocates, the Miller amendment passed into law 
in July 1954 with no additional hearings occurring in the U.S. Senate (Bosso, 1987, p. 
77). The amendment generally pleased both sides. With the risk/benefit balance test, 
the amendment addressed the concerns o f rural policymakers and the agricultural 
community about the impact o f pesticide residue regulations. But by giving the FDA 
increased authority to regulate pesticide residues on raw agricultural crops, the 
amendment also addressed the concerns o f urban policymakers and consumers 
concerned about food safety. The Miller amendment, also called the Pesticide 
Residues Amendment, became codified as Section 408 of FFDCA. Perhaps not 
wishing to disrupt the relative harmony achieved between consumer protection 
advocates and agricultural promotion advocates, the amendment specifically excluded 
any mention of regulating pesticide residues in processed food (Board on Agriculture 
o f the National Research Council, 1987, p. 165). The regulatory' debate over pesticide 
residues in processed food had to wait until 1956.
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Shortly after the Miller amendment became law, the FDA used Section 406 of 
the FFDCA to enact a “flow through” provision for processed food (Board on 
Agriculture o f the National Research Council, 1987, p. 163). Under this provision, 
FDA gave de facto approval to any amount o f pesticide residue in processed foods as 
long as the pesticide residue did not exceed its established tolerance level for raw food 
(Board on Agriculture o f the National Research Council, 1987, p. 163). The 
significance o f this provision greatly increased after the passage o f the Delaney 
Amendment, also known as the Food Additives Amendment.
Passed in 1958, the Delaney amendment to FFDCA set a more rigid safety 
standard for pesticide residues and food additives in processed food. It specifically 
directed the FDA to establish tolerances for food additives and pesticide residues in 
processed food without any balancing of costs and benefits (Food Additive 
Amendments, 1958). Remember, one o f the key tenets of the Miller amendment to 
FFDCA was the provision that when setting tolerances for pesticides, FDA had to 
consider the risks and benefits of pesticide use. This helped to ensure passage o f the 
amendment in 1954. However, the Delaney amendment included no such provisions. 
The Delaney amendment also specifically prohibited the addition o f any additive, 
including pesticide residues, to processed food if  scientific evidence suggested the 
additive/residue possessed carcinogenic potential (Food Additive Amendments, 1958). 
As a result, if  the additive or residue posed just a slight risk o f being a cancer-causing
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agent in humans or animals, then the FDA had the regulatory power to ban it. This 
was known as a zero risk standard for carcinogens in processed food.
The idea for a zero risk standard for carcinogens in processed food emerged 
from a meeting of the International Union Against Cancer (IUAC) in 1954. IUAC 
promoted the idea that a safe tolerance for chemicals containing carcinogens was 
impossible (Epstein, 1974, p. 79-80). Any amount o f carcinogen posed immediate and 
irreversible damage to humans and animals. This idea, which was a policy belief of 
the IUAC, influenced policymakers as they debated legislation that eventually became 
the Delaney amendment.
Policymakers passed the Delaney amendment after two years o f sporadic 
hearings in the House on the safety o f food additives and pesticide residues in 
processed food. The U.S. House’s Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee held 
preliminary hearings in 1956 and continued the hearings in 1958 (Board on 
Agriculture o f the National Research Council, 1987, p. 166-167). The hearings 
focused on the carcinogenic risk o f food additives and pesticides in processed food as 
well as the Section 406 “flow through” provision used by the FDA. Consumer 
protection advocates gave evidence that miniscule amounts o f carcinogens in food 
products could greatly harm humans. Agriculture promotion advocates demanded that 
policymakers exempt pesticide residues from any possible amendment and classify 
pesticides as a non-additive substance (Board on Agriculture o f the National Research 
Council, 1987, p. 166). In general, the agricultural advocacy groups opposed any 
more regulations for pesticides. They noted that the 1954 Miller amendment
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guaranteed the safety o f pesticides (Board on Agriculture o f the National Research 
Council, 1987, p. 166). However, the real debate over the Delaney amendment 
centered on FDA’s “flow through” provision.
More progressive policymakers like Representative James Delaney wanted to 
end any type of “flow through” provision for processed food. In particular, 
Representative Delaney’s initial version o f the food additive amendment contained no 
“flow through” provision for processed food (Board on Agriculture o f the National 
Research Council, 1987, p. 167). Some groups concerned with consumer safety, like 
the FDA, favored the continued use o f the “flow through” provision (Board on 
Agriculture o f the National Research Council, 1987, p. 170). Agricultural and 
chemical manufacturer groups continued to oppose the amendment no matter how it 
was designed (Board on Agriculture o f the National Research Council, 1987, p. 166).
The Delaney amendment eventually passed with the “flow through” provision 
intact. Now codified as Section 402(a)(2)(C) and Section 406 o f the FFDCA, the 
“flow through” provision allowed FDA to regulate pesticide residues in processed 
food under tolerances established for raw food (Board on Agriculture o f the National 
Research Council, 1987, p. 26-27). Only if  the residue amount in processed food 
exceeded the tolerance established for raw food would the FDA invoke the stricter 
Section 409 regulations. In addition, the amendment had the Delaney clause. This 
clause stipulated that the FDA could not approve a food additive that induced cancer 
in humans or animals (Board on Agriculture o f the National Research Council, 1987, 
p. 1-2). As a result, if  a pesticide residue in processed food was higher than the
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established tolerance in raw food, and if that pesticidal compound posed any amount 
of carcinogenic risk, then the FDA had to prohibit any amount o f the pesticidal 
compound in any processed food product. In practice, such a prohibition also caused 
regulators to forbid the use o f the compound on raw food since there was always the 
potential for raw food to become processed food.
The Delaney amendment had two major weaknesses. First, the amendment 
established the Delaney Paradox by permitting the use o f inconsistent regulatory 
standards for raw and processed food (Board on Agriculture o f the National Research 
Council, 1987). When setting tolerances, regulations for processed food excluded any 
mention of potential benefit, while regulations for raw food specifically included a 
consideration of potential benefit. This created a more stringent regulation for 
pesticide residues that tended to concentrate in processed food. In addition, the 
Delaney amendment was simply too strict. As codified, the amendment required a 
zero risk standard for carcinogens in processed food (Food Additive Amendments, 
1958). This may have been fine in the 1950s when scientists could only detect 
residues in the parts per million range. But by the 1970s and 1980s, scientists had the 
ability to detect residues in the parts per billion and parts per trillion range (Taylor, 
1991, p. 205). As a result, if  regulators took the Delaney amendment at face value in 
the 1980s, then they would have to prohibit the sale o f many pesticides and chemicals 
that only posed a minimal carcinogenic risk that was undetectable decades earlier. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, this posed an incredibly large problem for FFDCA regulations
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
and eventually led to the regulations being revised as the Food Quality Protection Act 
(FQPA) in 1996.
After the Delaney amendment, policymakers amended the pesticide portions of 
FFDCA only three times. In 1960 policymakers passed an amendment backed by 
agriculture promotions advocates that exempted pesticidal based preservatives from 
certain labeling requirements (Bosso, 1987, p. 106). In 1970, regulatory authority to 
set tolerances for pesticide residues went to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) (Bosso, 1987, p. 153). However, FDA still retained the authority to enforce 
tolerance levels on raw and processed food (Bosso, 1987, p. 153). And in 1996, 
policymakers revised the pesticide portions o f FFDCA into the Food Quality 
Protection Act (FQPA). However, from 1958 through 1996, policymakers basically 
left the major regulations o f FFDCA untouched. In contrast, policymakers repeatedly 
revised regulations dealing with product efficacy from the 1940s through the 1990s.
The Emergence o f FIFRA
The only pesticide efficacy regulation, the Federal Insecticide Act (FIA), had 
become obsolete by 1947. Increasing technological breakthroughs, coupled with a 
federal subsidy policy that stressed more productive agriculture, resulted in the 
widespread adoption of synthetic pesticides by farmers. Since almost all o f these
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
69
synthetic pesticides did not contain lead or arsenic as ingredients, FIA quickly lost its 
relevance.
To ensure farmers that these new pesticidal products were legitimate, 
policymakers agreed to amend FIA to include the new synthetic pesticides. These 
more expansive regulatory amendments became the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) in 1947. Just like the original version of FIA passed in 
1910, FIFRA protected farmers from buying ineffective pesticides. But the act also 
served to legitimize the continued use o f synthetic pesticides on crops. As a result, 
farmers and pesticide manufacturers actively pursued the passage o f FIFRA (Bosso, 
1987, p. 54). Thus, FIFRA emerged because agri-business wanted a regulatory 
process to ensure the availability o f these new pesticides to farmers. Safety to actual 
consumers was not an overriding concern. Those involved shared the view that all 
types o f pesticides, and especially the newer pesticides developed after WWII, were 
safe, effective, and needed by farmers to ensure America’s food production system.
Hearings over FIFRA occurred in the U.S. House of Representatives’ 
Committee on Agriculture from 1946-1947. Representative John W. Flannagan, a 
Democrat from Virginia, chaired the Committee in 1946 while Representative Clifford 
Hope, a Republican from Kansas, chaired the Committee in 1947 (Bosso, 1987, p. 54, 
56). The debates were not contentious. Republican policymakers, Democratic 
policymakers, urban policymakers, and rural policymakers all wanted new pesticide 
efficacy regulations. Additionally, USDA officials, the agricultural community, and 
pesticide manufacturers all actively supported a new pesticide efficacy bill (Bosso
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1987, p. 56). Policymakers excluded groups concerned with pesticide safety and even 
the FDA (Bosso, 1987, p. 59). Consequently, policymakers passed FIFRA in 1947 
without any hearings in the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Agriculture and Forestry and 
without the vigorous types o f debates that often characterized FFDCA legislation in 
the 1940s.
The main part o f FIFRA expanded USDA’s existing labeling requirements to 
the new synthetic pesticides dominating the marketplace. However, the act also 
included a registration process that included premarket notification. Under this 
provision, pesticide manufacturers had to register a pesticide with the USD A before it 
entered the market. This included submitting the pesticide’s ingredients, directions for 
use, and label to the USDA before the product entered the market (Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 1947). Once submitted, the USDA then registered 
the pesticide for use. FIFRA even provided for cases when the USDA refused to grant 
a registration. If USDA denied a registration, then FIFRA still allowed manufacturers 
to protest it and receive a registration under protest (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act, 1947). As a result, FIFRA gave the USDA no real power to ban 
a pesticide. Instead, that power remained with federal district courts in a provision 
retained from FIA that allowed manufacturers to challenge agency administrative 
decisions (Bosso, 1987, p. 56). The lack o f power to legally ban pesticides caused no 
concern among USDA officials or policymakers. After all, in their view FIFRA was 
only a pesticide efficacy law, not a pesticide safety law. Policymakers designed the
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registration process to protect farming and pesticide manufacturers’ interests, not to 
ensure safety.
FIFRA was a major event in the history o f federal pesticide regulations. At the 
time of the act’s passage, the agricultural community and pesticide manufacturers had 
the complete approval o f the USDA and important policymakers within Congress.
The approval was so great and the debate over FIFRA so peaceful that some authors 
viewed FIFRA as an example o f iron triangle policymaking at work with agricultural 
interests, pesticide manufacturing interests, USDA officials, and policymakers on 
agricultural committees all working together for a mutually beneficial pesticide 
regulation (Bosso, 1987, p. 53).
If an iron triangle policymaking system existed in 1947, it soon collapsed. In 
1959, policymakers debated another amendment to FIFRA in the U.S. House’s 
Committee on Agriculture. The 1959 amendment expanded FIFRA’s scope to include 
new classes o f pesticide products such as nematicides, defoliants, plant regulators, and 
desiccants (Toth Jr., 1996, p. 1). The debates over the 1959 amendment were again 
peaceful. But by the 1960s, the situation had changed. With the publication o f Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962, a new concern over synthetic pesticides emerged from 
the public.
Carson’s (1962) book examined the environmental dangers o f DDT, an 
insecticide commonly used in agricultural and urban areas in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Carson’s work riveted the public’s attention to the use o f pesticides. In contrast, many 
farmers and pesticide manufacturers viewed the book as muckraking sensationalism
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that failed to mention the positive role that DDT played in eliminating public health 
threats from insect-based diseases (Dahlberg, 1993, p. 282). Whatever the view of 
Carson’s work, the publication o f Silent Spring caused citizens and newly emergent 
environmental advocacy groups to lobby for more stringent pesticide regulations. 
Environmental groups soon lobbied the federal government, as well as state 
governments, for a complete ban on the use o f DDT (Bosso, 1987, p. 127). These 
actions caused a ripple effect as policymakers in many states considered a more 
stringent state registration system for pesticides. By 1963, a state-by-state registration 
system for pesticides became a real possibility.
With the public and environmental groups concerned about pesticides, and 
with pesticide manufacturers and farmers concerned about pesticides having to go 
through fifty state registration systems, policymakers passed another FIFRA 
amendment in 1964. Once again, debates over the amendment occurred in the U.S. 
House’s Committee on Agriculture in 1963 and 1964. This time, the debates were not 
peaceful. Instead, environmental and consumer protection advocates (here after 
identified as consumer-environmental protection advocates) actively debated the 
agricultural promotion advocates who historically dominated FIFRA hearings.
The 1964 amendment gave USDA the authority to immediately suspend 
pesticide registrations if they posed an immediate health hazard to the public and 
required pesticide manufacturers to put toxicity-based warnings on pesticide labels 
(Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments, 1964). In 
addition, the 1964 amendment abolished the option of protest registrations (Federal
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Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments, 1964). The amendment 
also gave anyone, not just manufacturers, adversely impacted by a pesticide 
suspension judicial standing (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
Amendments, 1964). As a result, those affected by a pesticide suspension could 
challenge the agency's decision in court. Policymakers passed this provision for 
farmers. But over time, courts used the clause to increasingly give standing to citizens 
concerned about the impact o f pesticides on the environment and human health 
(Bosso, 1987, p. 159).
These provisions significantly increased the regulatory power o f USDA. 
However, USDA seemed reluctant to use its new regulatory authority . The agency 
rarely suspended a pesticide registration even when a manufacturer violated the 
provisions o f FIFRA (Bosso, 1987, p. 139). USDA officials seemed to hold the view 
that suspending even one registration could unduly harm modem agriculture.
However, by the late 1960s, this view was out o f step with the public’s growing 
concern about the environmental and health effects o f pesticides.
Governmental officials also became increasingly concerned with USDA’s role 
in pesticide registration and the inability o f pesticide registration to ensure pesticide 
safety. A report from the General Accounting Office (GAO) severely criticized 
USDA’s registration enforcement activities in 1968 (Bosso, 1987, p. 138). Then, in 
1969 a commission established by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare issued its findings on the issue o f pesticide risks. The Mrak Commission 
discovered evidence that the federal government needed to implement some type of
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corrective action in order to adequately protect human health and the environment 
from the potential harm of pesticides (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, 1969).
Pressure from the public, as well as reports from GAO and the Mrak 
Commission, helped to end USDA’s regulatory responsibilities with pesticide 
registration. In 1970 policymakers transferred USDA’s regulatory responsibilities on 
pesticide registrations, along with FDA’s authority to set tolerances for pesticide 
residues, to the newly created U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (Bosso, 
1987, p. 153). By 1972, the U.S. Congress passed an amendment to FIFRA that 
transformed the act from a mere pesticide efficacy regulation to an act that ensured 
pesticide efficacy while concurrently ensuring pesticide safety. Passed as the Federal 
Environmental Pesticides Control Act (FEPCA), the 1972 amendment set the stage for 
modem debates on pesticide regulations. In one comer were agricultural promotion 
advocates consisting o f USDA, the agricultural community, and pesticide 
manufacturers. In the other comer were consumer-environmental protection 
advocates consisting o f EPA, FDA, and the community concerned about the 
environmental and health impact o f pesticides.
FIFRA Amendment o f 1972
The 1972 FIFRA amendment, known as the Federal Environmental Pesticide 
Control Act (FEPCA), substantially transformed pesticide registration. Most
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importantly, the amendment linked pesticide safety with pesticide efficacy for the first 
time. The debates over the 1972 amendment started in the U.S. House of 
Representatives’ Committee on Agriculture (Bosso, 1987, p. 160). Chaired by Texas 
Democrat W. Robert Poage, the committee heard testimony from the agricultural 
community, pesticide manufacturers, and environmental groups in 1971 (Bosso, 1987, 
p. 160). Agricultural and pesticide manufacturing interests, who dominated debates 
on previous FIFRA amendments, this time faced stiff competition from consumer- 
environmental protection groups. Initially, the wave of environmentalism was so 
strong, that everyone knew that some sort o f FIFRA amendment that better protected 
the environment and human health would pass.
But as the debate progressed, the strength o f consumer-environmental 
protection groups faded. Pro-agricultural sentiments from strong members o f the 
committee, in conjunction with some consumer-environmental protection groups 
outright dismissing any negative economic impact o f strengthened regulations on 
farmers, led the House committee to weaken a somewhat strong environmental bill 
initially proposed by the administration (Bosso, 1987, p. 161-162). In particular, the 
Committee's revised bill significantly reduced penalties for regulatory offenders; 
required a National Academy o f Science (NAS) advisory panel for all cancellation 
decisions; and required financial payments to farmers, pesticide manufacturers, and 
pesticide merchants to offset any economic loss sustained due to pesticide 
cancellations or suspensions (Bosso, 1987, p. 160).
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From 1971-1972, the U.S. Senate debated the revised bill in the Committee on 
Agriculture and Forestry, chaired by Georgia Democrat Herman Talmadge (Bosso, 
1987, p. 167-168). The Agriculture Committee removed the financial payment 
provisions, but also rejected other amendments to the bill that strengthened 
environmental and safety regulations (Bosso, 1987, p. 171). However, the real 
breakthrough in the 1972 amendments occurred when Senator Talmadge gave 
authority to revise the bill to the Senate’s Committee on Commerce chaired by Philip 
A. Hart, a Democrat from Michigan who generally favored stricter regulations for 
pesticides (Bosso, 1987, p. 171). Apparently, the transfer was a quid pro quo. Senator 
Talmadge transferred authority to Senator Hart’s Committee, which generally favored 
stronger environmental regulations, so that Senator Hart would drop a proposal to 
transfer authority to regulate meat, poultry, and egg inspections from the USDA to a 
newly proposed agency focusing on consumer health (Bosso, 1987, p. 171).
Once in the Commerce Committee, the bill became stronger. The Committee 
made cancellation requirements more expansive and required a greater amount o f data 
submission from pesticide manufacturers for registration (Bosso, 1987, p. 172). Final 
negotiations between the House and Senate resulted in a compromise bill that was 
weaker than what many consumer-environmental protection groups wanted. For 
example, the final bill gave greater weight to considerations o f benefits rather than 
costs in registration decisions, suspension orders, and cancellations (Bosso, 1987, p.
172). Additionally, the final bill allowed citizens to only sue the EPA for either non-
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enforcement or over-enforcement o f FIFRA (Bosso, 1987, p. 173). Suits against the 
makers, sellers, and users of pesticides were not allowed.
As passed, the 1972 amendment mandated that the EPA consider risks and 
benefits when issuing a registration for a pesticide (Federal Environmental Pesticide 
Control Act, 1972). To fulfill this regulatory requirement, EPA had to develop new 
risk analysis procedures for data submitted by pesticide manufacturers (Federal 
Environmental Pesticide Control Act, 1972). This was a substantial change from the 
original version o f FIFRA that mainly emphasized labeling requirements and nothing 
more.
Other important provisions mandated a “general use” and “restricted use” 
classification system for all pesticides. These provisions gave EPA the authority to 
place more dangerous pesticides in the “restricted use” category where only specially 
trained personnel could apply them (Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act,
1972). Perhaps most importantly, the 1972 amendments gave EPA authority to 
suspend a pesticide registration for a limited amount o f time or cancel it forever if  the 
pesticide had “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” or if  the 
manufacturer refused to comply with labeling requirements (Federal Environmental 
Pesticide Control Act, 1972). However, the 1972 amendments did not apply to 
pesticides sold before 1970. For those pesticides, o f which there were thousands, the 
1972 amendments mandated that EPA reregister them under FIFRA’s new 
requirements within four years (Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, 1972).
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Pressure from consumer-environmental protection groups as well as findings 
from the Mrak Commission helped to pass the 1972 amendment. In these debates, 
consumer-environmental protection groups finally received unprecedented access to 
pesticide regulatory hearings where they were able to state their policy beliefs to 
policymakers. However, the results were really not what the consumer-environmental 
protection groups wanted. Instead o f a strong pesticide regulation that primarily 
protected consumers and the environment from pesticide use, they had a watered- 
down regulation that still placed more emphasis on the benefits o f pesticide use rather 
than the risks.
Consumer-environmental protection groups and the EPA accepted the 1972 
amendment, but it is clear they were not happy with it (Bosso, 1987, p. 169). This is 
surprising given the fact that the environmental movement was arguably at its 
strongest point in the early 1970s. Yet even at its strongest point, a consumer- 
environmental protection coalition of environmental groups, consumer safety 
advocates, and progressive policymakers was no match for an agriculture promotion 
coalition o f agricultural groups, pesticide manufacturers, and conservative 
policymakers. Realizing that the regulatory policy they truly wanted could not pass, 
the consumer-environmental protection groups seemingly compromised with their 
secondary policy beliefs on pesticide regulations and accepted more lenient 
regulations than they initially wanted. As the 1970s progressed, this type o f behavior 
among consumer-environmental protection advocates increased.
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FIFRA Amendments o f 1975 and 1978
Policymakers amended FIFRA two more times in the 1970s. These 
amendments were not as significant as the 1972 amendment, but they continued to 
reflect the weakened position o f consumer-environmental protection advocates. A 
scheduled revision to FIFRA occurred in 1975 as funding authorization for the 1972 
amendments expired. Policymakers mainly held hearings on reauthorization in the 
House’s Agriculture Committee, although at least one hearing on extending the 
authorization o f the 1972 amendment occurred in the Senate’s Committee on 
Agriculture and Forestry (Bosso, 1987, p. 191). Debates in the hearings were once 
again contentious. The main issue was EPA’s implementation of the 1972 
amendment. The agricultural community and pesticide manufacturers attacked EPA 
for not fully considering the economic impact o f pesticide cancellations and even 
questioned EPA’s scientific methodology for risk analysis (Bosso, 1987, p. 192).
They especially cited the agency’s desire to cancel chlordane, a pesticide used on com, 
as an example o f the agency’s extremism and non-scientific analyses (Bosso, 1987, p. 
190).
Hearings on the 1975 amendment dragged on from May to November. The 
final version o f the amendment passed on November 19 and included provisions that 
weakened EPA’s regulatory power (Bosso, 1987, p. 191). Most significantly, the 
1975 amendment required EPA to consult with USDA before taking any regulatory
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action against a pesticide and to consider the impact o f pesticide cancellations on 
commodity prices and production costs (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act Extension, 1975). This was a large win for agriculture promotion 
advocates. They now had their representative agency back at the table in regard to 
pesticide regulations. In addition, the inclusion o f considerations o f commodity prices 
and productions to EPA risk analyses gave the agricultural community another 
significant policy victory.
EPA’s position continued to deteriorate as authorization for FIFRA again 
expired in 1977. Policymakers initiated another round o f hearings on FIFRA in the 
House’s Committee on Agriculture and the Senate’s Committee on Agriculture and 
Forestry (Bosso, 1987, p. 203). This time, criticism focused on EPA’s reregistration 
process.
The 1972 FIFRA amendment established a deadline o f 1976 for EPA to 
complete the reregistration of older pesticides (Federal Environmental Pesticide 
Control Act, 1972). However, with over 30,000 older pesticides needing 
reregistration, EPA had to establish some sort o f streamlined data review process in 
order to meet the deadline. The agency’s answer was the Rebuttable Presumption 
Against Registration (RPAR) process. In the RPAR process, EPA instituted a 
complete review of pesticide data for a reregistration only if the data indicated that the 
pesticide: 1) exhibited acute toxicity to humans and other species, 2) showed signs of 
chronic toxicity, such as oncogenic and mutagenic effects, to humans and other 
species, or 3) had no known antidotes or other emergency procedures for humans
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exposed to the pesticides (National Research Council, 1980, p. 29). When a pesticide 
violated any of these three provisions, EPA instituted a complete reregistration data 
analysis.
Even with the RPAR process, the agency still failed to meet its statutorily 
defined 1976 deadline for reregistration o f older pesticides. In addition, pesticide 
manufacturers called the RPAR process unfair and environmental advocates thought 
the process was not stringent enough (Bosso, 1987, p. 195). In particular, consumer- 
environmental protection advocates criticized the ability of pesticide manufacturers to 
overturn a complete reregistration analysis with data that showed how the pesticide’s 
benefits outweighed any potential risks (Bosso, 1987, p. 195).
As a result, the emphasis o f the 1977-1978 debates remained on EPA’s 
implementation of the 1972 FIFRA amendment. During the debates, EPA lobbied for 
a conditional registration process whereby products could enjoy a type o f temporary 
registration until completion of testing protocols and review o f data points (Bosso, 
1987, p. 200). The 1978 amendment, known as the Federal Pesticide Act, gave that 
authority to EPA. Additionally, the 1978 amendment gave states that adopted 
pesticide laws equivalent to the 1972 amendment to FIFRA, the ability to enforce 
EPA’s registration decisions (Federal Pesticide Act, 1978). The 1978 amendment also 
abolished any type o f deadline for reregistration and simply directed the EPA to 
complete reregistration as quickly as possible (Federal Pesticide Act, 1978).
In retrospect, policymakers passed the 1978 amendment to reduce the 
regulatory workload o f EPA. By abolishing the deadline for reregistration, giving
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states a prime role in registration enforcement activities, and approving EPA’s 
conditional registration system, policymakers gave the agency a workable regulatory 
system. Throughout the 1970s, implementation o f reregistration remained one of 
EPA’s biggest problems. The 1978 amendment helped to make the reregistration 
process more workable. But even with the 1978 amendment, reregistration was still a 
problem for EPA well into the 1980s.
Policy Trends
This chapter gave a general overview o f the evolution o f federal pesticide 
regulations from the early 1900s to the late 1970s. The chapter detailed only the 
major events and major provisions in the history o f federal pesticide regulations. 
Nonetheless, by covering the evolution o f federal pesticide regulations in this manner, 
three interesting policy trends emerged.
First, from 1906 until the mid 1960s policymakers passed two distinct types of 
pesticide regulations. One type o f regulation focused on pesticide efficacy while the 
other type o f regulation focused on pesticide safety. During this time period, 
agriculture promotion advocates consisting o f farmers, pesticide manufacturers, rural 
policymakers, and USDA influenced pesticide efficacy regulations. Consumer- 
environmental protection advocates consisting o f concerned citizens, progressive 
groups, environmental groups, urban policymakers, Bureau o f Chemistry/FDA, and
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EPA influenced pesticide safety regulations during this time period. As indicated in 
Table 2, each type o f pesticide regulation had its own set of specific policies.
Second, agriculture promotion advocates usually influenced policymakers to a 
greater extent than environmental protection advocates. In essence, agriculture 
promotion advocates were stronger. Their policy beliefs led policymakers to pass 
pesticide efficacy regulations in 1910, 1947, and 1959 with almost no input from 
consumer and environmental protection advocates. In contrast, consumer- 
environmental protection advocates always actively debated the policy beliefs of 
agriculture promotion advocates as policymakers passed pesticide safety regulations in 
1906, 1938, 1954, and 1958. When it came to pesticide regulations, the policy beliefs 
o f agriculture promotion advocates directly influenced pesticide efficacy regulations 
and indirectly moderated the incorporation o f consumer-environmental protection 
advocates’ policy beliefs into pesticide safety regulations.
The strength o f agriculture promotion advocates decreased in the 1960s. With 
an increasing concern over the effects o f pesticides on human health and the 
environment helping to launch modem environmentalism, the regulatory separation 
between efficacy and safety began to dissolve. In 1964, the policy beliefs of 
consumer-environmental protection advocates influenced the passage o f a pesticide 
efficacy regulation for the first time. This was a significant event signifying that 
agriculture promotion advocates had lost absolute control of their pesticide efficacy 
policy subsystem.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84
Table 2
Evolution o f Federal Pesticide Regulations Emphasizing Pesticide Safety and 
Pesticide Efficacy from 1906 to 1980
PESTICIDE SAFETY
1906 -  Pure Food and Drug Act (PFDA)
1938 -  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)
1954 -  Miller Amendment to FFDCA 
1958 -  Delaney Amendment to FFDCA
1972 -  Federal Environmental Pesticides Control Act (FEPCA) / FIFRA Revision
1975 -  FIFRA Amendment
1978 -  Federal Pesticide Act / FIFRA Amendment
PESTICIDE EFFICACY
1910 -  Federal Insecticide Act
1947 -  Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
1959 -  FIFRA Amendment 
1964 -  FIFRA Amendment
1972 -  Federal Environmental Pesticides Control Act (FEPCA) / FIFRA Revision
1975 -  FIFRA Amendment
1978 -  Federal Pesticide Act / FIFRA Amendment
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However, the loss of control did not last. Even as early as 1972, the position of 
agriculture promotion advocates strengthened due to extreme policy beliefs taken by 
many environmental protection advocates. This led policymakers to pass a version of 
the 1972 FIFRA amendment that was weaker than what many consumer- 
environmental protection advocates wanted. But consumer-environmental protection 
advocates supported the amendment anyway since it improved pesticide safety 
regulations and finally integrated pesticide safety and pesticide efficacy regulations 
into one cohesive set o f regulations. In 1975, the weakness o f consumer- 
environmental protection advocates continued as agriculture promotion advocates 
influenced policymakers to give back a limited amount of pesticide regulatory 
authority to USD A.
The third trend that emerged from this overview is the importance of external 
focusing events for pesticide safety regulation. As seen in Table 3, external events 
often led to some type o f pesticide safety regulation. In the early 1900s, muckraking 
campaigns led by Progressive authors directly led to the adoption o f PFDA. In the 
1920s, USDA officials finally used their PFD A authority to issue the first pesticide 
residues after European countries boycotted American fruits and vegetables due to 
fears about residues from arsenic based residues. In 1937 a patent medicine killed 
over 100 consumers and led policymakers to pass FFDCA. Then, in the 1960s the 
publication o f Silent Spring helped to spread environmentalism across the country.
This wave of environmentalism helped to influence the 1964 FIFRA amendment and 
the 1972 FIFRA amendment. These focusing events allowed the pesticide regulatory
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subsystem to become more open and more malleable to consumer-environmental 
protection advocates concerned about pesticide safety.
Table 3
Timeline o f Key Pesticide Focusing Events (1906-1978)
Year Event
1919 Cities seize raw fruits and vegetables with arsenic residues
1925 European countries boycott American produce because o f high residues
1937 Patent medicine “Elixir Sulfanilamide” kills over 100 consumers
1954 IUAC statement on carcinogens in food
1962 Silent Spring published
1969 Mrak Commission Report
Concluding Remarks
The history o f federal pesticide regulations from the early 1900s through the 
mid 1960s reveals two distinct policy subsystems. Agriculture promotion advocates 
dominated the subsystem that emphasized pesticide efficacy. Agriculture promotion 
advocates had so much power over this subsystem that they blocked consumer 
protection advocates and environmental protection advocates from even testifying at 
any pesticide efficacy hearings in the 1940s and 1950s. Agriculture promotion 
advocates also dominated the other subsystem emphasizing pesticide safety, but to a 
lesser extent. Intense competition between consumer-environmental protection
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advocates and agriculture promotion advocates actually occurred in the pesticide 
safety subsystem. In this subsystem, policymakers incorporated many of the policy 
beliefs o f consumer-environmental protection advocates into pesticide safety 
regulations. However, agriculture promotion advocates were still able influence 
pesticide safety regulations and weaken them.
These two policy subsystems merged in the mid 1960s due to increasing public 
concern over the use o f pesticides. Aided by an increasing wave o f environmentalism, 
consumer-environmental protection advocates successfully influenced policymakers to 
include more safety provisions in efficacy regulations in 1964. By 1972, 
policymakers officially integrated pesticide efficacy regulations with pesticide safety 
regulations by passing the Federal Environmental Pesticides Control Act (FEPCA). 
Consumer-environmental protection advocates were initially stronger in this new 
policy subsystem. However, even while in the dominant position, consumer- 
environmental protection advocates could not completely influence policymakers and 
implement all of their policy beliefs. Instead, consumer-environmental protection 
advocates compromised with their beliefs. That is, they adapted their secondary 
policy beliefs on pesticide regulations to support pesticide safety regulations that were 
not as strong as they wanted. Unlike pesticide efficacy debates in the 1940s and 
1950s, consumer-environmental protection advocates as well as agriculture promotion 
advocates often compromised with their beliefs in debates over pesticide safety in the 
1960s and 1970s. These compromises were a direct consequence o f the competition 
between an agriculture promotion coalition consisting of pesticide manufacturers,
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agri-business advocates, farmers, and rural policymakers, and a consumer- 
environmental protection coalition consisting o f environmental protection groups, 
consumer protection groups, and urban policymakers.
Agriculture promotion advocates quickly reestablished their dominant position 
in the mid 1970s by capitalizing on lobbying mistakes made by consumer- 
environmental protection advocates. During this time, many consumer-environmental 
protection advocates came under increased pressure from policymakers for unrealistic 
policy beliefs. As a consequence policymakers weakened many pesticide safety 
provisions.
The evolution of these policy subsystems validates two important tenets 
relevant to the ACF and PE models o f the policy process. First, pesticide regulations 
have two types of advocates: agriculture promotion advocates and consumer- 
environmental protection advocates. Examining the policy history o f pesticide 
regulations, it is easy to group the agriculture promotion advocates into a larger 
agriculture promotion coalition, and the consumer-environmental protection advocates 
into a larger consumer-environmental protection coalition. This helps to justify the 
usefulness o f the ACF. For any given policy, there will usually be two opposing sides 
that can be grouped into larger coalitions.
Second, external events that capture the attention of a large segment o f the 
public help to open policy subsystems and lead to policy change. This happened with 
pesticide safety regulations in the early 1900s with progressive concerns over food 
quality, in the 1930s as the public became concerned over the deaths o f consumers
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from dangerous products, and in the 1960s with the publication o f Silent Spring. Just 
as the PE model suggests, all o f these events directly led to more advocates entering a 
policy subsystem and helping to pass a new type o f policy.
Understanding the process o f policy change is often a difficult process, even 
for a relatively narrow scope o f policies such as pesticide regulations. While this 
chapter only examined the major provisions o f changes in federal pesticide regulations 
from the early 1900s through the late 1970s, important trends and concepts emerged. 
These concepts give further support to both the ACF and PE models o f the policy 
process. But more importantly, these concepts help set the stage for the policy debates 
over pesticide regulations that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s.
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PESTICIDE REGULATIONS IN THE 1980s AND 1990s
Federal pesticide regulations fundamentally changed in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Responding to increasing concern over the safety of pesticides from consumer- 
environmental protection advocates, policymakers moved pesticide registration 
authority from the USDA to the EPA and consolidated the regulation o f pesticide 
efficacy and pesticide safety into one regulation. These moves helped to open the 
federal pesticide regulatory subsystem to consumer-environmental protection 
advocates. However, as EPA’s implementation of FIFRA faltered in the late 1970s, 
the ability o f consumer-environmental protection advocates to successfully influence 
pesticide regulations faded. This decline continued in the 1980s and 1990s as both 
agriculture promotion advocates as well as consumer-environmental protection 
advocates became dissatisfied with the state o f federal pesticide regulations.
This chapter describes the debates over federal pesticide regulations in the 
1980s and 1990s. During this time period, debates on pesticide regulations continued 
to include significant criticism of EPA’s implementation of FIFRA and FFDCA. With 
anti-regulatory sentiment increasing among the public during this time period and with 
increasingly conservative policymakers, agriculture promotion advocates were able to
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use this criticism to advocate FIFRA and FFDCA amendments that were more aligned 
to their policy beliefs.
Criticism on federal pesticide regulations generally focused on three problem 
areas during the 1980s and 1990s. The first problem area was EPA’s registration of 
new pesticides. In order to register a pesticide, EPA first had to analyze toxicity data 
points that revealed the safety o f the pesticide’s chemical ingredients to the 
environment and human health. However, chemical companies often refused to make 
such information readily available to EPA scientists and interested third parties. This 
helped to delay the formal registration process and resulted in EPA issuing temporary, 
conditional registrations for many pesticides without knowing the potential effects of 
the pesticidal chemical on the environmental and human health. Predictably, this 
process angered many consumer-environmental protection advocates since it 
seemingly gave more weight to the benefits o f using pesticides rather than the risks. 
When evidence finally did emerge that a pesticide used by farmers posed unacceptable 
dangers to the environment or human health, EPA cancelled or suspended the 
pesticide’s registration. However, suspension and cancellation orders angered 
agriculture promotion advocates The final result was a registration process that both 
agriculture promotion advocates and consumer-environmental protection advocates 
viewed as not functioning properly.
The second problem area concerned EPA ’s reregistration of older pesticides. 
Reregistration, first passed in the 1972 FIFRA amendment, mandated that EPA 
analyze older pesticides previously registered by the USDA under the pre-1972 system
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of pesticide registration (Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, 1972). 
However, EPA could not complete reregistration by statutorily defined deadlines. The 
problem centered on the complexities o f reregistration. To reregister a pesticide, EPA 
had to examine a large number o f health and environmental data points to ensure the 
pesticide’s safety. Even with programs that expedited the reregistration process, like 
the RPAR program, EPA still could not reregister pesticides fast enough. While 
policymakers abolished deadlines for pesticide reregistration in the late 1970s, 
problems with the implementation o f pesticide reregistration were always at the 
forefront of pesticide policy debates in the 1980s.
The third problem area concerned the Delaney clause o f FFDCA. As detailed 
in Chapter 3, the Delaney clause mandated that pesticide residues could not have any 
carcinogenic risk in processed food. However, by the 1980s the strict interpretation of 
this clause created a potential policy quagmire. With new analytical techniques, 
laboratories could find a small amount o f carcinogenic risk in just about any pesticide 
residue. As a result, if  agency officials followed the Delaney clause to a tee, then the 
country faced the real possibility o f losing a substantial number o f pesticides. Many 
policymakers, agriculture promotion advocates, and consumer-environmental 
protection advocates questioned the usefulness of the Delaney clause. In fact, many 
policymakers and advocates wanted a new pesticide safety regulation that focused on 
other health concerns rather than on small and often inconsequential carcinogenic risk 
potentials in pesticide residues.
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Policy criticisms over these three problems drove the debates over federal 
pesticide regulations in the 1980s and 1990s. During this time period, the schism of 
policy beliefs between agriculture promotion advocates and consumer-environmental 
protection advocates continued. However, while these advocates continued to hold 
divergent policy beliefs, they also realized that regulatory reforms had to occur to 
correct problems associated with registration, reregistration, and the Delaney clause. 
This realization helped to bring the policy beliefs o f many agriculture promotion and 
consumer-environmental protection advocates closer for a brief period of time. The 
resulting impact on pesticide regulations was FIFRA regulatory reform in 1988 and 
FFDCA/FIFRA regulatory reform in 1996. But before those significant reforms, 
agriculture promotion advocates specifically tried to limit the power o f FIFRA in 1980 
and 1982.
FIFRA Amendment of 1980
As the 1970s ended, EPA’s implementation o f pesticide regulations came 
under attack from consumer-environmental protection advocates as well as agriculture 
promotion advocates. Consumer-environmental protection advocates criticized the 
agency’s registration and reregistration processes as being too favorable to pesticide 
manufacturers at the expense of public health. Agriculture promotion advocates also 
criticized the agency’s registration and reregistration processes. In particular, these
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advocates criticized the agency’s RPAR process as well as its decision to cancel the 
registrations for many organochlorine-based pesticides such as DDT and chlordane 
(Bosso, 1987, p. 196). Criticism from agriculture promotion advocates intensified in 
1978 with EPA’s decision to suspend the registration for Mirex, a fire ant pesticide. 
The suspension o f Mirex caused EPA great harm within the House of Representatives’ 
Committee on Agriculture. Since fire ants were such a large problem in many 
southern states, southern policymakers on the Committee accused EPA of recklessness 
in its registration decisions (Bosso, 1987, p. 205). In response to the Mirex decision, 
southern policymakers in the House o f Representatives sponsored another amendment 
to FIFRA in 1980 as debates on the reauthorization o f the regulation started.
Representative William Wampler, a Republican from Virginia, and 
Representative Kika de la Garza, a Democrat from Texas, sponsored the 1980 
amendment. The amendment required the EPA to use a scientific advisory panel to 
review any o f its decisions to suspend a pesticide’s registration (Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments, 1980). In addition, the 1980 
amendment allowed for a Congressional veto of any EPA regulatory decision 
promulgated under FIFRA (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
Amendments, 1980). With the 1972 FIFRA amendment, EPA had a NAS advisory 
panel that examined its pesticide cancellation decisions. Now with the 1980 FIFRA 
amendment, also known as the Wampler amendment, EPA had a scientific advisory 
panel that examined its pesticide suspension decisions as well as a potential
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Congressional veto of any regulatory action. These provisions were a direct response 
to EPA’s controversial suspension and cancellation of pesticides in the late 1970s.
Debates on the 1980 amendment and the reauthorization o f FIFRA were brief. 
Only two hearings were held on the matter. As usual, the House Committee on 
Agriculture held the first hearings. Much like the late 1970s hearings on FIFRA, these 
debates focused on EPA’s implementation o f FIFRA. After testimony from EPA on 
its pesticide regulatory procedures, the first House hearing quickly became one-sided, 
as the rest o f the witnesses testifying were agriculture promotion advocates such as the 
National Agricultural Chemicals Association and the Chemical Specialties 
Manufacturers Association {FIFRA Extension, 1979a). These advocates wanted more 
oversight over EPA and therefore supported the provisions o f the 1980 amendment. 
Policymakers on the Committee easily passed the amendment.
The other hearing occurred in the Senate Committee on Agriculture and 
Forestry. Once again, the hearing focused on EPA’s implementation o f FIFRA. 
Agriculture promotion advocates also dominated this hearing by criticizing EPA’s 
implementation o f FIFRA (FIFRA Extension, 1979b). With almost no testimony form 
consumer-environmental protection advocates, the Senate Committee passed the 
amendment. By the end o f the year, the 1980 amendment easily became law.
The 1980 FIFRA amendment continued policymakers’ attempts to further 
constrain EPA’s pesticide regulatory capabilities. These attempts increased after 1980 
due to changing political conditions. Chief among these new political conditions was 
a large increase in the number o f pro-business/anti-regulation advocates (Bosso, 1987,
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p. 208). This helped to augment the expanding strength of agriculture promotion 
advocates who generally held pro-business, anti-regulation policy beliefs. 
Additionally, the election o f Ronald Reagan to the U.S. Presidency in 1980 also 
helped to expand these types o f beliefs among policymakers. Agriculture promotion 
advocates such as agri-businesses and chemical manufacturers generally liked the new 
anti-regulatory climate promoted by Reagan’s administration. As debates over the 
reauthorization o f FIFRA occurred once again in 1981, these advocates thought they 
finally had the chance to revise major sections of FIFRA and make it more focused on 
the policy beliefs of agriculture promotion advocates rather than the policy beliefs of 
consumer-environmental protection advocates.
Debates on FIFRA: 1981-1982
Bolstered by favorable political conditions in 1981, agriculture promotion 
advocates lobbied for a new, pro-agriculture amendment to FIFRA that significantly 
relaxed pesticide registration and reregistration requirements on pesticide 
manufacturers. The proposed amendment eased data submission requirements for 
pesticide manufacturers, made independent verification of submitted data more 
difficult, and expanded the legal rights o f pesticide manufacturers to limit the use of 
their data by non-governmental entities (Bosso, 1987, p. 219-220). These changes had 
the potential to significantly alter the landscape o f FIFRA registration and
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reregistration decisions in favor of agriculture promotion advocates. For example, 
with data submission guidelines relaxed, pesticide manufacturers could more easily 
delay the submission o f toxicity results for pesticides in the registration or 
reregistration process. And with independent verification of submitted data made 
more difficult, the validity of the entire registration and reregistration process could 
become questionable since the accuracy o f the submitted data could not be validated 
by non-governmental entities (which were often interested consumer-environmental 
protection advocates).
Agriculture promotion advocates successfully lobbied policymakers to include 
many o f these provisions in a proposed 1982 FIFRA amendment. Attempts by 
consumer-environmental protection advocates to sway the proposed amendment back 
toward their policy beliefs generally failed. Consumer-environmental protection 
advocates were only able to include a provision in the proposed amendment that 
increased the ability o f private individuals to sue pesticide manufacturers on pesticide 
matters (Bosso, 1987, p. 220-221). Representative George Brown, a Democrat from 
California, sponsored the amendment and hearings on the reauthorization o f FIFRA, 
and the 1982 FIFRA amendment began in the House Committee on Agriculture’s 
Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture on 
February 4, 1982.
The 1982 amendment passed the House Agriculture Committee but faced a 
more formidable challenge on the House floor. During the floor debates, 
policymakers aligned with consumer-environmental protection advocates were able to
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successfully delete provisions o f the amendment that made pesticide toxicity data less 
open to the public (Bosso, 1987, p. 222). That change, in conjunction with a change 
that continued to permit states to issue their own pesticide regulations, made the 
amendment slightly more acceptable to consumer-environmental protection advocates. 
As a result, the amendment as well as reauthorization o f FIFRA for two more years 
passed the House o f Representatives (Boss, 1987, p. 222).
Debates on a Senate version o f the amendment then took place in the Senate’s 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry. Under Republican leadership for 
the first time in over three decades, the Committee simply adopted the amendment’s 
provisions as originally passed by the House Agriculture Committee (Bosso, 1987, p.
222). This included provisions that made pesticide data less open to the public.
The Senate FIFRA amendment passed the Committee. But afterwards, it 
stalled on the Senate floor. Consumer-environmental advocates were able to persuade 
key Senators to delay consideration o f the amendment (Bosso 1987, p. 223). After 
realizing that a Senatorial floor debate on the amendment would probably produce a 
modified version of the 1982 FIFRA amendment that they did not want, agriculture 
promotion advocates were also able to persuade key Senators to delay consideration of 
the amendment (Bosso, 1987, p. 223). The delay lasted the entire Congressional 
session. Congress passed no new FIFRA amendment in 1982. The only action taken 
was a simple one-year reauthorization o f FIFRA at the end o f 1983 (Bosso, 1987, p.
223).
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The ability to prevent the passage o f a new FIFRA amendment more aligned 
with the policy beliefs o f agriculture promotion advocates indicated that consumer- 
environmental protection advocates were still influential participants in the policy 
debates over pesticide regulations. Policymakers had increasingly made FIFRA more 
aligned with the interests o f agriculture promotion advocates since 1975. However, 
those revisions were generally minor changes that gave agriculture promotion 
advocates more oversight over EPA regulatory decisions. In contrast, with provisions 
that specifically reduced pesticide registration and reregistration requirements on 
pesticide manufacturers, the proposed 1982 amendment actually weakened the validity 
of FIFRA’s regulatory process. As a result, the debates over the proposed 1982 
amendment showed that while consumer-environmental protection advocates were no 
longer able to influence policymakers to adopt strong pesticide regulations, they still 
possessed enough influence to stop the passage o f a FIFRA amendment catered to 
agriculture promotion advocates that significantly weakened the pesticide regulatory 
process.
The Origin of Pesticide Regulatory Reform
In many respects, the debate over the 1982 amendment signaled the end of the 
1970s debates on pesticide regulations. The 1970s debates first focused on passing 
new registration and registration requirements to FIFRA that satisfied consumer-
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environmental protection advocates. Then the debates shifted to passing new 
restrictions on EPA in their implementation o f FIFRA. This helped to satisfy 
agriculture promotion advocates in the latter part o f the decade. In contrast, policy 
debates on pesticides after 1982 focused on significant reform that specially tried to 
satisfy both sets o f advocates. After 1982, both sets o f advocates knew that a 
substantial reform to pesticide regulations had to occur in order to solve problems 
associated with registration, reregistration, and the Delaney clause.
The need for pesticide regulatory reform became clear at the end of 1982. 
Representative George Brown, a California Democrat who chaired the Committee on 
Agriculture’s Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and Foreign 
Agriculture, held a hearing on a report prepared by the Subcommittee’s own staff that 
criticized the current state o f federal pesticide regulations. The report discovered a 
registration and reregistration process in disarray, and a pesticide tolerance-setting 
process that did not adequately assess health risk and carcinogenic risk (EPA Pesticide 
Regulatory Program Study, 1982, p. 84, 87). In addition, the report criticized the EPA 
for not considering more stringent health risks when setting pesticide tolerances (EPA 
Pesticide Regulatory Program Study, 1982, p. 173-176). The report concluded that 
EPA had to reform its pesticide regulatory procedures in order to make the registration 
and reregistration process work, and implement new, cumulative risk standards for 
pesticide tolerances that better estimated risks (EPA Pesticide Regulatory Program 
Study, 1982, p. 83-84).
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The immediate consequence o f the report was controversy. Other members of 
the Subcommittee criticized the report as subjective and refused to endorse it as an 
official report o f the Subcommittee (EPA Pesticide Regulatory Program Study, 1982, 
p. 6). Nonetheless, the report had the effect that Chairman Brown wanted. The report 
signaled to consumer-environmental protection advocates and agriculture promotion 
advocates that true policy reform had to occur in pesticide regulations. As a result, the 
hearing on the Subcommittee’s report, which lasted only forty-five minutes, directly 
led to new policy debates on significant reforms to FIFRA as well as FFDCA.
Consideration o f FIFRA Reform: 1983-1984
The Brown report from 1982 first signaled the need for reform to all o f the 
participants in the pesticide regulatory debates. In 1983, consumer-environmental 
protection advocates and agriculture promotion advocates reacted to the report by 
asking for time. EPA in particular wanted additional time to review the current state 
o f its pesticide regulatory process (Bosso, 1987, p. 224). After the harsh debates from 
1980-1982, agriculture promotion and consumer-environmental protection advocates 
also wanted more time to review the new political conditions surrounding pesticide 
regulations and form the necessary policy beliefs that could help lead to FIFRA reform 
(Bosso, 1987, p. 224).
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By 1983, political conditions surrounding pesticide regulations were quickly 
changing in favor of consumer-environmental protection advocates. During that year, 
Ann Burford was removed as EPA administrator and replaced with William 
Ruckelshaus (Bosso, 1987, p. 211). Ruckelshaus was the first EPA administrator from 
1970-1973 and was seen as the only person who could help the agency regain its 
footing after the controversial administration o f Burford. Ironically, the 
administration of Burford helped consumer-environmental protection advocates. 
Burford’s administration caused such a national scandal with the mismanagement of 
EPA’s Superfund program that the public supported consumer-environmental 
protection advocates to a greater degree than they had from 1980-1982 (Bosso, 1987, 
p. 223). This helped to bolster the strength o f consumer-environmental protection 
advocates during the upcoming debates on FIFRA reform.
Changing political conditions also helped strengthen the position of consumer- 
environmental protection advocates in 1984. During that year, approximately 15,000 
people died in Bhopal, India when a Union Carbide pesticide plant accidentally vented 
a pesticidal precursor compound (Bosso, 1987, p. 236). The publicity over that 
tragedy increased the public’s concern over the manufacturing, storage, and use of 
pesticides in the United States. The increasing concern over pesticides led many state 
policymakers to consider new state regulations that allowed state governments to issue 
pesticide registrations that limited the use and storage of especially lethal pesticides.
The prospect of state pesticide registrations alarmed agriculture promotion 
advocates. Above all else, agriculture promotion advocates wanted to avoid the
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potential of fifty different state registrations on pesticides. After 1984, this led many 
agriculture promotion advocates to compromise on the registration and reregistration 
issues associated with FIFRA reform as long as consumer-environmental protection 
advocates agreed to limit the ability o f states to issue pesticide registrations. Since 
they wanted to avoid the potential o f fifty different state registrations on pesticides, 
many agriculture promotion advocates issued joint policy statements on FIFRA reform 
with consumer-environmental protection advocates. After decades o f intractable 
policy beliefs, changing political conditions and the very real prospect o f conforming 
to fifty state pesticide registrations made agriculture promotion advocates accept some 
o f the policy beliefs o f consumer-environmental protection advocates. In return, 
agriculture promotion advocates asked for a reform to FIFRA that limited the ability 
of state governments to issue pesticide registrations, protected the proprietary pesticide 
data o f chemical manufacturers during registration and reregistration, and prevented 
the sudden cancellation or suspension o f a pesticide’s registration.
For their part, most consumer-environmental protection advocates were finally 
willing to compromise on their secondary policy beliefs on the issue of pesticides. 
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, many consumer-environmental protection 
advocates narrowly viewed pesticides as a dangerous product that had to be 
eliminated. The environmental benefits o f some pesticides and the integral part that 
all pesticides played in modem agriculture were not considered. However, those types 
o f policy beliefs often angered agriculture promotion advocates and helped result in 
FIFRA amendments in 1978 and 1980 that gave agriculture promotion advocates, such
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as the USDA, more oversight over the implementation o f FIFRA. After failing to turn 
many of their policy beliefs into public policy from 1978-1982, consumer- 
environmental protection advocates were finally ready to compromise on reforming 
FIFRA’s registration and reregistration process. Consumer-environmental protection 
advocates just wanted to ensure that the registration and reregistration process 
remained open to external reviewers and that both processes protected the 
environment and human health.
First Attempt at FIFRA Reform: 1985-1986
Many o f the major agriculture promotion and consumer-environmental 
protection advocates informally met in 1985 to work on a joint proposal to reform the 
registration and reregistration provisions o f FIFRA. Participating in these meetings 
were large pesticide manufacturers represented by the National Agricultural 
Chemicals Association (NACA) and a coalition o f major consumer and environmental 
groups called the Campaign for Pesticides Reform (CPR) Left out o f these 
discussions were smaller chemical manufacturers and some major environmental 
protection groups such as the National Audubon Society who left the meetings after 
refusing to compromise on certain policy issues beneficial to the chemical industry 
(Bosso, 1988, p. 12).
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These informal meetings occurred because FIFRA’s registration and 
reregistration requirements were quickly turning into a regulation that no one wanted. 
For agriculture promotion advocates, FIFRA’s registration and reregistration 
requirements allowed: proprietary pesticide data to be stolen, unfair cancellations and 
suspensions o f pesticide registrations by EPA, and state-specific pesticide registrations 
that impaired the ability of farmers to use specific pesticides in certain states. For 
consumer-environmental protection advocates, FIFRA’s registration and reregistration 
requirements did not protect the environment or human health because the 
reregistration of older pesticides was over a decade behind schedule, pesticide 
manufacturers often did not submit accurate toxicity data during the registration 
process, and many pesticides with cancelled registrations still showed up in residues 
on imported agricultural commodities (Nownes, 1991, p. 10).
The joint FIFRA reform proposal crafted at these meetings attempted to solve 
many of these deficiencies associated with registration and reregistration. It 
envisioned a major reform to FIFRA that included a five- to six-year timetable for 
EPA to complete reregistration, greater public access to pesticide toxicity data 
submitted in the registration process, enhanced EPA enforcement power to issue fines 
when manufacturers intentionally submitted false toxicity data during the registration 
process, a ban on the importation o f commodities into the U.S. that had detectable 
residues from pesticides with cancelled registrations, a limit on the ability o f state 
governments to issue pesticide registrations, and a five-year reauthorization for FIFRA 
that included increased fees to adequately fund the registration process (Bosso, 1987,
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p. 225-226, 230). The joint proposal reflected more of the policy beliefs of consumer- 
environmental advocates rather than agriculture protection advocates. However, 
agriculture promotion advocates still accepted it and envisioned it as their best chance 
to make FIFRA reform more aligned to their beliefs.
Initially, the chances for passage o f this type of FIFRA reform seemed good. 
Policymakers in both the House and Senate Committees on Agriculture were 
impressed with the joint policy proposal and agreed to consider it as a legislative bill 
(Bosso, 1987, p. 226-227). In addition, the time for policy reform seemed right. 
Agriculture promotion advocates, consumer-environmental protection advocates, and 
key policymakers all wanted FIFRA reform.
Hearings on the FIFRA reform bill once again started and primarily occurred 
in the House Agriculture Committee. Hearings started in the Committee on 
Agriculture’s Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research and Foreign 
Agriculture in March 1986. The Subcommittee and Committee passed the bill with no 
changes (Bosso, 1988, p. 13). On September 19, the full House passed the bill in a 
floor vote (Bosso, 1988, p. 13).
T he Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry also held 
hearings on a similar version o f the bill (Bosso, 1988, p. 13). However, the Senate 
version o f the bill included a provision to protect groundwater from pesticide 
contamination (Bosso, 1988, p 13). This key provision angered agriculture promotion 
advocates It was not part of the initial joint policy proposal and it made the Senate 
bill more aligned to the policy beliefs o f consumer-environmental protection
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advocates. Nevertheless, the Senate Committee passed the bill with the groundwater 
protection provision intact (Bosso, 1988, p. 13). On October, 6, the full Senate passed 
the bill in a floor vote (Bosso, 1988, p. 13).
House and Senate members then crafted a joint version of the bill. The joint 
legislation eventually included a patent extension provision that allowed pesticide 
manufacturers an extended amount o f time to have patent protection for a particular 
pesticide (Bosso, 1988, p. 13). Pesticide manufacturers wanted this provision since 
many manufacturers experienced registration delays that often prevented them from 
selling their pesticides in a timely fashion. With an extension o f patent protection, 
pesticide manufacturers felt that these types of delays would no longer compromise 
the economic lifespan o f a patented pesticide for the manufacturer.
The House ended up passing the joint legislation. However, the joint 
legislation then stalled in the Senate. With elections approaching and with many 
consumer-environmental protection advocates such as the National Audubon Society 
unsatisfied with the joint legislation, it failed to advance (Bosso, 1988, p. 13). This 
ended any chance o f FIFRA reform in 1986.
The reasons for policy failure in 1986 primarily occurred due to the more 
extreme advocates o f agriculture promotion and consumer-environmental protection. 
For example, many consumer-environmental protection advocates still refused to 
accept the initial, joint policy proposal crafted by NACA and CPR. These advocates 
generally wanted more protections for groundwater, refused to limit state authority to 
issue pesticide registrations, and refused to give chemical manufacturers an extended
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
108
patent protection for their pesticides as compensation for time lost due to delays in 
registration approval from EPA (Finegan, 1989, p. 627). Many agriculture promotion 
advocates also refused to accept a new regulatory mandate for pesticides in 
groundwater. However, the Senate’s focus on protecting human health and the 
environment also had much to do with this failure.
Democrats formally regained controlled of the Senate in 1987. However, even 
with Republican control o f the Senate in 1986, policymakers in that legislative body 
still focused more on protecting the environment and human health from the dangers 
o f pesticides than their counterparts in the House o f Representatives. In contrast, the 
House generally had a more balanced approach that equally focused on regulating to 
protect the environment and human health, as well as regulating to ensure the 
economic viability o f agriculture. The Senate, dominated by strong Democratic 
policymakers such as Patrick Leahy and Ted Kennedy, wanted FIFRA reform to focus 
more on safety. This stance helped to prevent FIFRA reform in 1986.
Second Attempt at FIFRA Reform: 1987-1988
Even though reform did not occur in 1986, all o f the participants knew that 
FIFRA reform still had to occur at some point. In March of 1987, the House 
Committee on Agriculture’s Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and 
Foreign Agriculture restarted the debates on reforming FIFRA’s registration and
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reregistration provisions. In order to ensure passage o f reform, the House Committee 
on Agriculture dropped controversial elements o f the proposed FIFRA reform from 
1986 and instead focused on a few core provisions that all advocates could agree on. 
These core elements included a revamped reregistration process, an increase in 
registration fees for pesticide manufacturers, an increase in fines for pesticide 
manufacturers when committing registration violations, an end to the practice o f EPA 
paying chemical manufacturers for stocks o f unused pesticides when their registration 
was cancelled or suspended, and new storage and disposal requirements for pesticides 
that had their registrations cancelled (Finegan, 1989, p. 628). The new proposal 
quickly became known as “FIFRA Lite” since it contained only a few provisions from 
the major FIFRA reform that agriculture promotion and consumer-environmental 
protection advocates envisioned from 1985-1986. Notably, FIFRA Lite did not 
mention the impact of pesticides on groundwater, prohibit the importation o f food 
commodities with residues of pesticides whose registration was cancelled in the 
United States, or extend patent protection for registered pesticides.
Over the course of the next twelve months, the Subcommittee held six hearings 
on FIFRA Lite and the general need for FIFRA reform. Concurrently, the Senate’s 
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry also held six hearings on its version of 
“FIFRA Lite” which still included a groundwater protection provision. Although most 
advocates supported “FIFRA Lite,” debates during the hearings quickly regressed 
from the spirit o f compromise exhibited by so many advocates in 1986. Agriculture 
promotion advocates lobbied hard for a significant reduction in the authority o f states
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and localities to issue pesticide registrations and opposed any increase in fines and 
fees for registration violations (U. S. House o f Representatives, 1988, p. 68-69). 
Consumer-environmental protection advocates lobbied hard for a prohibition on 
imported commodities with residues from pesticides whose registration was cancelled 
in this country', and supported the increase in fines and fees for registration violations 
(U. S. House o f Representatives, 1988, p. 69-71).
At the end o f the debates, in a somewhat unprecedented move for pesticide 
regulations, the House Agriculture Committee adopted the Senate version o f “FIFRA 
Lite” and specifically excised the groundwater provision from the bill (U. S. House of 
Representatives, 1988, p. 75). This marked the first time since the 1950s that most of 
the language for a pesticide regulation came from the Senate. In September o f 1988 
the Senate and the House passed “FIFRA Lite” and President Reagan signed the bill 
into law in October. The bill authorized FIFRA until 1991. This was a three-year 
extension aimed at avoiding the constant debates over FIFRA that plagued Congress 
through the 1980s.
“FIFRA Lite” was a marginal policy victory for consumer-environmental 
protection advocates since it increased fines and fees for registration violations, helped 
to ensure a pesticide registration process open to the public, and established a new 
eight-year time frame for reregistration. Agriculture promotion advocates were able to 
prevent the passage o f an amendment that included new protections for groundwater. 
However, many o f the policy beliefs o f agriculture promotion advocates were not 
addressed. These included an extension o f patent protection for registered pesticides
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and a limit on state and local authority to issue pesticide registrations. A decade that 
started out so promising for agriculture promotion advocates ended with hardly any of 
their policy beliefs being enacted into FIFRA reform.
First Attempt at FFDCA Reform: 1987-1988
Even though FIFRA reform finally occurred in 1988 and helped to solve the 
registration and reregistration problems plaguing the pesticide regulatory subsystem, 
another large problem remained for federal pesticide regulations. This was the 
Delaney clause o f FFDCA. The Delaney clause regulated pesticide residues on 
processed food and mandated that no carcinogens could be present in processed food. 
This was known as a zero risk standard for carcinogens. However, by the 1980s this 
zero risk standard presented a significant problem for policymakers since new 
analytical techniques commonly revealed that almost all pesticide residues posed at 
least a minimal amount o f carcinogenic risk. Additionally, the Delaney clause 
mandated that when setting tolerances for pesticide residues in processed food, there 
could be no consideration o f benefits. This was inconsistent with FFDCA regulations 
in raw food where regulators could consider both risks and benefits.
These problems remained in the background throughout the 1980s as 
advocates emphasized FIFRA reform over FFDCA reform. However, the Delaney 
problem reemerged in a significant way in 1987 when the National Academy of
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Sciences finished an EPA-commissioned report on the regulation o f pesticide residues. 
Titled Regulating Pesticides in Food: The Delaney Paradox, the report criticized 
current pesticide residue regulations and made two important recommendations for 
improvement. First, the report recommended consistent regulations for raw and 
processed food (Board on Agriculture o f the National Research Council, 1987, p. 11). 
Having more stringent regulations for processed food simply made no sense. Second, 
the report recommended a negligible risk standard for pesticide residues in both raw 
and processed food (Board on Agriculture o f the National Research Council, 1987, p. 
12-14). A negligible risk standard would allow EPA to set pesticide tolerances so that 
the likelihood o f a person developing cancer from a pesticide residue was a predefined 
probability based on toxicity studies. For example, a negligible risk standard could be 
set at 1 in 1,000 for certain classes o f pesticides. This meant that a person ingesting 
the residue had a 1 in 1,000 chance o f developing cancer from the residue over a 
course o f a lifetime.
The report had a large impact at EPA. The agency quickly adopted a 
negligible risk standard o f 1 in 1,000,000 for all pesticides as part o f its new “de 
minimis” or minimal risk policy for pesticide residues. The report also had a large 
impact on policymakers in the pesticide regulatory subsystem. After its publication, 
policymakers started to consider FFDCA reforms to implement the recommendations 
o f the report. The first attempt at FFDCA reform occurred in 1988 as the House and 
Senate considered policy proposals that implemented many o f the report’s 
recommendations.
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In this first attempt at FFDCA reform, policymakers considered three 
proposals. In the Flouse, policymakers considered a bill sponsored by Representative 
Pat Roberts, a Republican from Kansas, and a bill sponsored by Representative Henry 
Waxman, a Democrat from California. The bills were vastly different. The Roberts 
bill incorporated the policy beliefs o f agriculture promotion interests. It outlined a 
flexible negligible risk standard for carcinogens in raw and processed food that could 
be exceeded as long as the benefits of using a pesticide outweighed its costs (Smart, 
1998, p. 291). The Waxman bill targeted the policy beliefs o f consumer- 
environmental protection advocates. It adopted a more stringent negligible risk 
standard for carcinogens o f 1 in 1,000,000 (Smart, 1998, p. 291). In addition, the 
Waxman bill did not include any provisions for the consideration o f benefits when 
assessing the risk o f carcinogens (Smart, 1998, p. 291). Meanwhile, Senator Edward 
Kennedy sponsored an identical version of the Waxman bill in the Senate (Smart, 
1998, p. 291).
Hearings over these proposals occurred in the House Committee on 
Agriculture’s Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and Foreign 
Agriculture as well as the House Committee on Energy and Commerce’s 
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment. Nothing of consequence happened in 
the House hearings, and the Senate chose not to hold any hearings on the matter. In 
the House hearings, agriculture promotion advocates supported the Roberts bill and 
consumer-environmental protection advocates supported the Waxman bill (Pesticide 
Food Safety Act, 1988). With FIFRA reform still the main item of interest for
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pesticide regulations in 1988, both o f these bills failed to advance to a House floor 
debate. However, these initial bills established the basic framework o f legislation that 
drove the policy debates over FFDCA reform for the next eight years.
This basic framework included revising the Delaney’s clause zero risk standard 
for pesticide residues in processed food into a negligible risk standard for pesticide 
residues in both processed and raw food. The difference between the two sets of 
advocates was how to construct such a standard. Agriculture promotion advocates 
wanted a flexible negligible risk standard that considered the economic benefits as 
well as the environmental and health effects o f the pesticide (Pesticide Food Safety 
Act, 1988). In contrast, consumer-environmental protection advocates wanted a 
negligible risk standard strictly defined in statute that only considered the 
environmental and health effects o f the pesticide (Pesticide Food Safety Act, 1988).
Second Attempt at FFDCA Reform: 1989-1990
In 1989, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) released a report 
detailing the carcinogenic risks o f alar, a growth regulator commonly used on apples 
to make them more colorful and to make their harvest easier. The report discovered 
that alar produced tumors in laboratory animals and that alar residues on apples and in 
apple products posed an especially significant risk to children’s health. The report 
resulted in a large amount o f publicity, arguably the largest amount o f publicity on
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pesticides since Rachel Carson published Silent Spring. The television show 60 
Minutes did a report on the connection between alar, apples, and cancer. In addition, 
many Hollywood celebrities such as Meryl Streep actively lobbied Congress to cancel 
the registration for alar and implement stricter pesticide residue regulations.
The highly public nature o f the alar issue led to intense debates on reforms to 
pesticide residue regulations. Indeed, the debates over this issue from 1989-1990 
represented some of the fiercest debates in pesticide regulatory history. Agriculture 
promotion advocates, led by farmers and chemical manufacturers, maintained that alar 
was safe and needed for modem apple harvesting. Consumer-environmental 
protection advocates, led by the NRDC, aggressively used alar as an example as to 
why pesticide residue regulations failed to ensure the safety o f the nation’s food 
supply. In this stimulated policy environment, Congress once again considered 
FFDCA reform.
In the House, two proposals emerged for FFDCA reform in 1989. 
Representative Waxman introduced a bill very similar to his 1988 bill. However, the 
new version of the Waxman bill added one important section that required EPA to 
base risk standards on the most vulnerable subpopulations (Smart, 1998, p. 295-296). 
Although never precisely defined in the bill, Representative Waxman probably used 
the term “vulnerable subpopulations” as a way to protect children from the dangers of 
carcinogenic residues. The inclusion of vulnerable subpopulations was significant. 
The consequence o f basing risk decisions on more vulnerable populations was a 
stricter risk standard that could drastically limit the use of certain pesticides.
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Representative Kika de la Garza, a Democrat from Texas, sponsored the other 
House bill. De la Garza’s bill included much o f the language o f Representative 
Brown’s bill from a year earlier. This included a flexible negligible risk standard 
where the EPA considered a pesticide’s benefits when calculating the negligible risk 
standard (Smart, 1998, p. 296-297).
Hearings over these two bills mainly occurred in the House Committee on 
Agriculture's Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and Foreign 
Agriculture, and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce’s Subcommittee on 
Health and the Environment While both bills failed to emerge from committee, the 
debates in these hearings were fiery. In particular, the often simplistic testimony of 
Hollywood celebrities before the committees made farmers and other agriculture 
promotion advocates angry {Health Effects o f  Pesticide Use on Children, 1989). This 
helped to drive the policy beliefs o f consumer-environmental protection advocates 
further from the policy beliefs o f agriculture promotion advocates.
In the Senate, policymakers considered two proposals. Senator Ted Kennedy 
sponsored a bill that was identical to the current Waxman bill in the House (Smart, 
1998, p. 295-296). Additionally, the Senate considered a compromise bill sponsored 
by Senator Richard Lugar, a Republican from Indiana. Lugar’s bill replaced the 
Delaney clause with a negligible risk standard for both raw and processed food 
(Smart, 1998, p. 298). In this regard, the bill was like the Waxmarv'Kennedy bills. 
However, the Lugar bill also included a negligible risk standard as low as 1 in 100,000
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(Smart, 1998, p. 298). This resulted in higher cancer risks and was directly at odds 
with Waxman’s negligible risk standard o f 1 in 1,000,000.
Hearings on these bills occurred in the Senate’s Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources, and the Committee on the Environment and Public Works. The 
Lugar bill had the complete backing of President Bush (Smart, 1998, p. 298).
However, agriculture promotion and consumer-environmental advocates were in no 
mood to compromise. As a result, only the Kennedy bill reported out o f committee 
(Smart, 1998, p. 296). However, because the bill only had the support o f consumer- 
environmental protection advocates, policymakers never brought it to the Senate floor 
for a full debate.
Third Attempt at FFDCA Reform: 1991 -1994
The NAS study on the Delaney clause drove the first attempt at FFDCA reform 
in 1988. Then, the alar controversy intensified the debate over FFDCA and the 
general safety o f pesticides from 1989-1990. Nothing came of these debates, 
however. The Delaney clause still remained in effect as of 1991. However, the NAS 
report and the alar controversy were definitely moving the pesticide regulatory 
subsystem toward some type o f FFDCA reform.
Movement toward FFDCA reform again intensified in 1991. This time, the 
driver was uncertainty over EPA’s “de minimis” policy. After EPA implemented the
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“de minimis” policy in 1989, consumer-environmental protection advocates 
immediately filed a lawsuit to revoke existing tolerances for pesticides that EPA had 
classified as probable carcinogens (Smart, 1998, p. 299). Remember, the “de 
minimis” policy allowed carcinogens as long as the tolerance granted ensured 
negligible risk. However, consumer-environmental protection advocates viewed this 
as a direct violation of the Delaney clause since it allowed at least some amount of 
carcinogenic residue in processed food.
Anticipation over the judicial ruling on the “de minimis” policy helped to 
prevent real FFDCA reform from 1988-1990. Consumer-environmental protection 
advocates were confident that the court would overturn the policy. Therefore, these 
advocates were unwilling to work toward the passage o f any type o f FFDCA reform 
with a negligible risk standard when they were sure that the court would soon make 
EPA re-implement the Delaney clause’s zero risk standard. For their part, agriculture 
promotion advocates were unwilling to adopt any new FFDCA reform since they 
generally supported the use of the EPA “de minimis” policy.
The uncertainty over the pending decision once again helped to prevent 
FFDCA reform in 1991. Representative Waxman and Senator Kennedy reintroduced 
their bills with a more specific identification of vulnerable subpopulations as 
“sensitive populations” of children (Smart, 1998, p. 302). Representatives Terry 
Bruce, a Democrat from Illinois, and Thomas Bliley, a Republican from Virginia, 
sponsored a new bill that was essentially the de la Garza bill from 1989 (Smart, 1998, 
p. 303). Hearings on these bills occurred in the usual committees. In the House this
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included the Committee on Energy and Commerce’s Subcommittee on Health and the 
Environment, and the Committee on Agriculture’s Subcommittee on Department 
Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture. In the Senate, hearings occurred in 
the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry. However, the only bill to 
make it out o f committee was Senator Kennedy’s bill (Smart, 1998, p. 302). Once 
again, no further action was taken on the bill.
Then, in 1992 the Ninth Circuit Court announced its decision on the “de 
minimis” policy. In the Les v. Reilly (1992) case, the Ninth Circuit Court unanimously 
ruled in favor o f the consumer-environmental protection advocates and overturned the 
“de minimis” policy. As a result, EPA began the process o f strictly enforcing the 
Delaney clause’s zero risk standard for carcinogens in processed food. A strict 
enforcement o f the zero risk standard meant that the use of many pesticides soon faced 
elimination. Since new laboratory techniques could detect a small amount of 
carcinogenic risk in pesticides, and since these techniques could also detect these 
small amounts o f carcinogenic risk in the pesticide residues o f processed food, then 
EPA would soon have to revoke legal tolerances for many pesticide residues. This 
prospect forced agriculture promotion advocates such as rural policymakers and 
especially chemical manufacturers into action on FFDCA reform.
In 1993 debates once again started on FFDCA reform. Agriculture promotion 
advocates now desperately wanted reform. In addition, consumer-environmental 
protection advocates now wanted additional regulations that protected the health of 
children and infants. This new policy belief emerged from another NAS report that
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showed that pesticides were more dangerous to children and infants than adults (Board 
on Agriculture o f the National Research Council, 1993). As a result, the NAS report 
recommended a new type o f risk standard that considered the health effects on 
children and infants.
Policymakers considered four bills for FFDCA reform in 1993. Senator 
Kennedy and Representative Waxman reintroduced their bills from 1991. These bills 
called for: a strict negligible risk standard o f 1 in 1,000,000 for carcinogenic residues 
in raw and processed food, a calculation of risk based on children who were identified 
as the most vulnerable parts o f the population, and the elimination o f benefits when 
considering risk standards (Smart, 1998, p. 309). Following suit, Representative 
Bliley reintroduced the Bliley/Bruce bill from 1991. The Bliley/Bruce bill continued 
to advocate for: a consideration of benefits when calculating negligible risk, no special 
procedures to protect children, and a limit on state/local authority to issue state 
pesticide tolerances (Smart, 1998, p. 311). The inclusion o f limiting the power of state 
and local governments to set pesticide tolerances was significant since many states and 
localities had started to take action on alar and other pesticides that caused potential 
danger to human health.
The President once again supported compromise bills. However, this time it 
was President Clinton instead o f President Bush. Senator Kennedy sponsored a 
Clinton compromise bill in the Senate and Representative Waxman sponsored it in the 
House (Smart, 1998, p. 312). The Clinton compromise bill established one negligible 
risk standard for raw and processed food that resulted in a “reasonable certainty that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
121
no harm will result from all anticipated consumer exposures to such residues” (Smart, 
1998, p. 312). The inclusion o f the reasonable certainty provision negated attempts by 
consumer-environmental protection advocates to strictly define a negligible risk 
standard in statute. The proposal also had specific provisions that protected infants 
and children. However, the proposal also left in a consideration o f benefits in the 
negligible risk assessment.
Hearings on these bills occurred in the House Committee on Agriculture’s 
Subcommittee on Department Operations and Nutrition, and the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Health and the Environment. In the 
Senate, hearings occurred in the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry. 
Debates over these bills once again resulted in no enacted legislation. Indeed, only the 
Bliley/Bruce bill even made it out o f Committee (Smart, 1998, p. 318). However, 
many agriculture promotion advocates were receptive to the compromise proposal 
crafted by the Clinton administration (Smart, 1998, p. 315). In particular, advocates 
such as Monsanto and the National Agricultural Chemicals Association liked the 
proposal since it ended the Delaney clause, established a flexible negligible risk 
standard, and included a consideration o f economic benefits (Smart, 1998, p. 315). 
Agriculture promotion advocates still supported the Bliley/Bruce bill, but this 
movement toward accepting a compromise bill represented the first real attempt by 
either an agriculture promotion advocate or a consumer-environmental protection 
advocate to consider a FFDCA reform bill that did not directly conform to its policy
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beliefs. The extremism and brinkmanship that characterized pesticide regulatory 
debates since the alar controversy was starting to fade.
Fourth Attempt at FFDCA Reform: 1995-1996
A significant change in the political conditions affecting the pesticide 
regulatory subsystem occurred in 1995 as the Republican party took control o f the 
Senate and the House o f Representatives. By 1996 Republican leaders in Congress 
attempted to implement a steep cut in EPA’s budget and worked hard to rewrite acts 
such as the Clean Water Act to better suit their policy beliefs (Smart, 1998, p. 318). 
Much like the targeting o f the EPA and various environmental programs in the early 
1980s by Republican leaders, these acts in 1996 helped to mobilize consumer- 
environmental advocates. In turn, this mobilization, along with a Republican view 
that they had badly mishandled environmental policy in general, finally led to FFDCA 
reform.
Against this political backdrop, Representative Bliley reintroduced his bill 
from 1993 on pesticide residue reform (Smart, 1998, p. 329). Once again, this bill was 
crafted for agriculture promotion advocates. It replaced the Delaney clause with a 
flexible negligible risk standard that included a consideration o f economic benefits 
during risk assessment (Smart, 1998, p. 329). Senator Lugar adopted the language of 
that bill for his Senate version o f the bill (Smart, 1998, p. 329). In contrast,
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Representative Waxman once again sponsored an FFDCA reform bill tailored to the 
policy beliefs o f consumer-environmental protection advocates. This included a 
specifically defined negligible risk standard o f 1 in 1 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0  and also did not include 
provisions that allowed the consideration o f a pesticide’s economic benefit during risk 
assessment (Smart, 1998, p. 329). In addition to these provisions, the Waxman bill 
also required the labeling o f all food products that had carcinogens and established a 
new analytical mandate for EPA to make certain that exposure to carcinogenic 
tolerances did not result in breast cancer or any reproductive, neurological, or 
immunological disorders (Smart, 1998, p. 328).
Hearings on these bills mainly focused on the Bliley bill. The Waxman bill 
was ignored, even by many consumer-environmental protection advocates (Smart, 
1998, p. 329). Hearings occurred in the House Committee on Agriculture’s 
Subcommittee on Department Operations, Nutrition, and Foreign Agriculture, and the 
House Committee on Commerce’s Subcommittee on Health and the Environment. In 
the Senate, hearings occurred in the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 
Committee.
Bliley’s bill eventually passed the House Agriculture Committee, but failed to 
pass in the House Commerce Committee. That’s because most o f the controversial 
elements o f the bill relating to risk assessment were under the jurisdiction o f the 
Commerce committee (Smart, 1998, p. 331). In addition, Representative Waxman 
held up passage o f the bill since it did not conform to the policy beliefs o f consumer-
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environmental advocates (Smart, 1998, p. 331). By 1996, Bliley’s bill was stalled and 
no hope o f passage o f FFDCA reform seemed possible.
Then, an interesting thing happened. In June o f 1996 agriculture promotion 
advocates started to pressure Representative Bliley to take action on his bill (Smart,
1998, p. 335). Bliley then reached out to Democratic leaders for a compromise 
(Smart, 1998, p. 335). In July o f 1996, agriculture promotion advocates, consumer- 
environmental protection advocates, and key Congressional Committee members met 
and revised Bliley’s bill as a compromise bill. The impetus for this compromise came 
from agriculture promotion advocates and Republican policymakers (Smart, 1998, p. 
334).
By 1996, agriculture promotion advocates such as chemical manufacturers and 
food processors now desperately wanted FFDCA reform. Without reform, these 
groups faced the very real possibility that many pesticide tolerances would be revoked 
because the tolerances resulted in carcinogenic residues on processed food. But the 
biggest reason for movement was the Republicans’ need to pass some sort of 
environmental regulation that the public perceived to be fair and an improvement 
(Smart, 1998, p. 334). This need was very great in 1996 as the November elections 
neared. Consumer-environmental protection advocates were initially reluctant to join 
the compromise. But after Democratic Representative John Dingell and James Aidala 
(the Associate Assistant Administrator o f EPA’s Office o f Prevention, Pesticides, and 
Toxic Substances) supported the compromise, many consumer-environmental 
protection advocates joined the compromise legislation (Smart, 1998, p. 334).
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The compromise legislation eventually became known as the Food Quality 
Protection Act. Since agriculture promotion and consumer-environmental protection 
advocates agreed to the legislation, it easily passed the Commerce Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment in the House o f Representatives, and 
the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry in the Senate. On the House 
and Senate floors, FQPA passed without a single dissenting vote. Finally, on August 
3, 1996, President Clinton signed the bill into law.
The compromise legislation ended the Delaney clause’s zero tolerance 
standard for carcinogens in pesticide residues by specifically exempting pesticide 
residues in raw agricultural commodities and processed foods from food additive 
regulations (Food Quality Protection Act, 1996). In addition, all regulations of 
pesticide residues on raw and processed food were now detailed in a revised Section 
408 of the FFDCA (Food Quality Protection Act, 1996). This revised section 
established a “reasonable certainty” risk standard modeled on the compromise reform 
bill from the Clinton administration in 1993 (Smart, 1998, p. 336). The “reasonable 
certainty” standard directed risk assessments to determine that there was a reasonable 
certainty that a pesticide residue would not cause cancer and would not result in harm 
to sensitive populations such as infants and children (Food Quality Protection Act, 
1996).
The “reasonable certainty” standard appealed to both sets o f advocates. 
Agriculture promotion advocates backed it because it included a consideration of the 
economic benefits of using a pesticide during the risk assessment. Consumer-
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environmental protection advocates supported it because they felt that the “reasonable 
certainty” standard equaled the 1 in 1 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0  standard for risk assessments that they 
were seeking. The Commerce Committee supported this view and even issued a 
report in which it equated the 1 in 1 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0  standard to the “reasonable certainty” 
standard (Smart, 1998, p. 336). However, consumer-environmental protection 
advocates also supported the standard because it specifically examined aggregate risks 
and cumulative risks from pesticides. This allowed for a more stringent risk analysis 
that helped to protect human health.
In addition to FFDCA reform, FQPA also revised FIFRA. Most significantly, 
these revisions mandated a periodic review o f pesticide registrations every fifteen 
years and required EPA to examine pesticides for endocrine disruption (Food Quality 
Protection Act, 1996). Other provisions o f FQPA supported reduced-risk pesticide 
alternatives such as integrated pest management. As a result, while FQPA technically 
resulted in a less restrictive pesticide regulation that allowed carcinogenic residues on 
processed food, it also resulted in a more effective regulation that promoted reduced 
risk alternatives to pesticide use and increased the validity o f risk assessments that 
protected human health.
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This chapter examined the reform o f federal pesticide regulations in the 1980s 
and 1990s with a special emphasis on problems associated with registration, 
reregistration, and the Deianey clause. These three problems drove the debates over 
pesticide regulatory reform from 1983 until 1996. With the support o f agriculture 
promotion advocates and consumer-environmental protection advocates, policy 
makers solved these problems with FIFRA reform in 1988 and FFDCA/FIFRA reform 
in 1996.
But before those significant reforms, policymakers passed a 1980 FIFRA 
amendment that subjugated EPA registration decisions to oversight from an advisory 
panel and Congress. This helped to quell fears among agriculture promotion 
advocates that an over-zealous EPA would unfairly cancel or suspend the registrations 
for pesticides vital to modem agriculture tactics. In 1988, policymakers passed 
another amendment to FIFRA that helped to solve the problem of registration delays 
caused by pesticide manufacturers submitting insufficient data for registration 
decisions. In addition, the 1988 amendment also solved the reregistration issue by 
establishing new reregistration protocols and deadlines. And in 1996, policymakers 
solved the issue of the Delaney clause with the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA). 
All o f these policies were unique. But the debates over the 1988 FIFRA amendment 
and FQPA had at least four unique trends that help shed light on the nature o f the 
public policy process.
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First, external events drove policy reform as well as the policy beliefs of 
agriculture promotion and consumer-environmental protection advocates. The 
Bhopal, India pesticide tragedy in 1984 caused the American public to actively 
campaign for pesticide regulatory reform. This pressure played a large role in forcing 
agriculture promotion advocates to meet with consumer-environmental protection 
advocates to issue a joint pesticide regulatory reform proposal. This helped to pass 
FIFRA reform in 1988. Additionally, the alar residue problem as well as a judicial 
decision on reinstating the Delaney clause helped both sets o f advocates realize that 
FFDCA reform had to happen. As a result, FFDCA reform finally happened in 1996.
Second, in order to reform federal pesticide regulations both sets o f advocates 
had to compromise with their policy beliefs. By the 1980s, the federal pesticide 
regulatory subsystem was in a stalemate. Neither agriculture promotion advocates nor 
consumer-environmental advocates could completely control the subsystem. As a 
result, policymakers passed no significant amendments or revisions to FIFRA and 
FFDCA. This resulted in pesticide regulations quickly becoming obsolete. In the case 
o f FIFRA, unrealistic registration and reregistration deadlines established in the 1970s 
made parts o f the regulation obsolete by the late 1980s. In the case o f FFDCA, 
advances in risk assessment technology made the Delaney clause a regulation that no 
one wanted. In order to pass regulatory reform, both sets o f advocates had to come 
together and compromise on their policy beliefs in order to make pesticide regulations 
work again.
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Third, debates over pesticide regulations no longer garnered the national policy 
spotlight. Exceptions, o f course, occurred. But even with the Bhopal tragedy and the 
alar controversy, only a handful o f policymakers, agriculture promotion advocates, 
and consumer-environmental protection advocates focused constant attention toward 
federal pesticide regulatory policy in the 1980s and 1990s. Instead, the public, 
policymakers, chemical manufacturers, and consumer-environmental protection 
advocates focused more attention on EPA’s large budgetary cuts and the 
mismanagement of EPA’s Superfund program by politically appointed administrators. 
By the late 1980s, this lack o f attention enabled agriculture promotion advocates and 
consumer-protection advocates to compromise on their policy beliefs.
Fourth, consumer-environmental protection advocates continued the long-term 
trend o f losing much o f their policy influence on pesticide regulations. Consumer- 
environmental groups still had influence in this subsystem. They were able to stop the 
proposed 1982 amendment to FIFRA and still were able to influence powerful 
policymakers on the Congressional agriculture committees. In addition, the 
controversial administration o f Anne Burford as EPA administrator galvanized 
consumer-environmental protection advocates and helped lead to large membership 
increases in environmental protection groups (Bosso, 1987, p. 216). But by 1983, the 
ability of consumer-environmental protection advocates to actively propose and then 
influence new pesticide regulations degraded due to more conservative political 
conditions. Over time, this meant that agriculture promotion advocates had to initiate 
any compromises in policy beliefs in order to pass regulatory reform.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Concluding Remarks
130
More than anything else, these four trends help to explain pesticide regulatory 
reform in the 1980s and 1990s. Debates over pesticide regulations in the 1980s and 
1990s represented the final stage in the evolution of federal pesticide regulations. The 
reforms completed during this era completed the evolution o f federal pesticide 
regulations that began in 1906. With problems over registration, reregistration, and 
the Delaney clause solved, the debate over pesticide regulatory reform ended in 1996. 
Additionally, with both sets o f advocates finally content with the current setup of 
federal pesticide regulations, the evolution o f federal pesticide regulations also ended. 
From 1997-2003 the number o f hearings on pesticide regulations decreased to a point 
that by the year 2000 only one or two Congressional hearings occurred per year. The 
nine-decade debate over the evolution and validity o f federal pesticide regulations had 
ended.
The question that remains for political scientists is whether this pesticide 
regulatory reform debate can illuminate the nature of the policy process and 
specifically reveal the role o f policy beliefs in the policy process. Chapter 5 explores 
these issues with four different hypotheses that examine the policy core beliefs and 
secondary policy beliefs of both agriculture promotion advocates and consumer- 
environmental protection advocates. The research results associated with these 
hypotheses show how advocates change and compromise with their policy beliefs 
when policy change is eminent.
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CHAPTER 5
METHODOLOGY
Policy core beliefs and secondary policy beliefs both play an important part in 
the policy process. As detailed in Chapter 2, these statements o f principle guide 
participants in the policy process and help influence policy change in specific policy 
subsystems. In the ACF model o f the policy process, these types o f policy beliefs 
develop gradually and help to influence policy change along with a variety o f other 
political, socioeconomic, and information-processing factors. In the PE model o f the 
policy process, these types o f policy beliefs are not even mentioned. But presumably, 
in a PE model of the policy process, policy beliefs change suddenly and correspond to 
sudden, brief changes in policy.
The history o f the debates over federal pesticide regulations shows the 
importance of these types of policy beliefs on the policy process. From 1906-2003, 
policy beliefs drove the debate over pesticide regulations as a coalition o f agriculture 
promotion advocates and a coalition o f consumer-environmental protection advocates 
competed with one another to have their policy core beliefs and secondary policy 
beliefs expressed in pesticide regulations. During these years, the competition 
between coalitions helped to bring about policy change. But by the 1980s, the
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competition just led to a policy stalemate as significant problems occurred in the 
implementation o f FIFRA and FFDCA.
As both coalitions realized the need to break the policy stalemate in the late 
1980s and mid 1990s, the competition over influencing pesticide regulations 
temporarily ended. Rather suddenly, both coalitions compromised on their more 
specific secondary policy beliefs in order to reform federal pesticide regulations. This 
act o f compromise, termed here as a bargaining o f beliefs, led to FIFRA reform in 
1988 and the passage o f FQPA in 1996. These reforms helped ensure that federal 
pesticide regulations would continue to satisfy the policy core beliefs o f agriculture 
promotion advocates and consumer-environmental protection advocates.
After the reforms o f 1988 and 1996, both sets o f advocates stopped 
compromising on their secondary policy beliefs and went back to longstanding 
secondary policy beliefs that traditionally defined both coalitions. As a result, 
compromising with policy beliefs (alternatively identified as policy-oriented learning 
by ACF scholars) seemed to exhibit more o f a PE pattern as opposed to a typical ACF 
pattern. With an ACF pattern o f policy-oriented learning, secondary policy beliefs 
should change gradually over many years and eventually help lead to policy change. 
However, for federal pesticide regulations in the 1980s and 1990s this did not happen. 
Secondary policy beliefs changed quickly as the two coalitions temporarily changed 
some of their secondary policy beliefs in order to ensure passage of FIFRA reform and 
FFDCA reform.
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This finding, along with research on the ACF and PE policy models, leads to 
four research questions on both policy core beliefs and secondary policy beliefs. First, 
do the policy core beliefs o f like-minded advocacy groups, concerned citizens, and 
other organized entities possess enough uniformity, over time, to justify categorization 
o f these groups into larger advocacy coalitions? Second, if  uniform advocacy 
coalitions exist, do their secondary policy beliefs toward pesticide regulations change 
over time in a typical policy-oriented learning pattern? Third, are increases in 
compromises in secondary policy beliefs among advocacy coalitions associated with 
policy change? And fourth, do stronger advocacy coalitions influence compromises in 
secondary policy beliefs among weaker advocacy coalitions? Answering these 
research questions will help political scientists better understand how advocates use 
policy beliefs in the policy process.
To examine these four research questions, this dissertation examines the 
debates on federal pesticide regulations from 1982-2003. This dissertation uses 1982 
as the initial year o f analysis because in that year policymakers in Congress 
commenced the process o f FIFRA reform by releasing the controversial Brown Report 
detailing problems with EPA’s implementation o f FIFRA. That report eventually led 
to agriculture promotion advocates and consumer-environmental protection advocates 
compromising on their secondary policy beliefs in order to pass FIFRA reform in 1988 
and FFDCA/FIFRA reform in 1996. In addition, 2003 is chosen as the ending date 
since that date represents the year the analysis for this dissertation began. But more 
importantly, by 2003 the debates on reforming federal pesticide regulations had ended.
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What had once been an active policy subsystem in which agriculture promotion 
advocates and consumer-environmental protection advocates continually debated one 
another in attempts to influence pesticide regulatory policy had quietly turned into an 
inactive policy subsystem. By 2003, most agriculture promotion advocates, 
consumer-environmental protection advocates, and policymakers expressed little 
interest in the state of federal pesticide regulations.
Research Design
This dissertation uses an interrupted time-series research design. As 
diagrammed in Table 4, this type o f design compares the policy beliefs o f two separate 
coalitions from 1982-2003. Twenty-two observations occur for two sets o f groups: an 
agriculture promotion coalition and a consumer-environmental protection coalition. 
Each observation reflects the policy core beliefs and secondary policy beliefs made by 
each coalition during Congressional hearings on federal pesticide regulations for one 
year. For example, the first observation period (Oi) occurs in 1982. For that year, the 
research design: 1) identifies the Congressional hearings on federal pesticide 
regulations that took place during that year, 2 ) assigns advocates testifying in the 
hearing to either an agriculture promotion coalition or a consumer-environmental
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
135
protection coalition, and 3) uses a content analysis protocol to quantify policy core 
beliefs and secondary policy core beliefs expressed in the opening statement o f each 
advocate.
Table 4
The Interrupted Time Series Research Design
Oi O2 O3 O4 O5 Og X  O7 X  0 8 O9 O10 Oi 1 O12 0]3  O14 X  Oj5 X  Oi6 O17 O18 O19 O20 O21 O22 
O] O2 O3 O4 O5 Of, X  Oi X Os O9 O10 On O12 O13 0]4  X  O15 X  Oi6 0 |7 Oi8 O19 O20 O21 O22
Policy change in federal pesticide regulations occurred in 1988 and 1996. As a 
result, this dissertation identifies those two years as policy change years (the X after 
O 7 and the X after O 15). These years serve as an effective way to examine the role of 
policy beliefs on the policy process and policy change. However, if  advocates 
compromise on policy beliefs in order to pass policy, then policy beliefs should 
change just before a policy change year or during the actual policy change year. Thus, 
the sixth year and the fourteenth year (the X after 06 and the X after O 14) are also 
identified as treatment years since in those years Congress actively debated specific 
legislation that resulted in FIFRA reform in 1988 and in the passage o f FQPA in 1996.
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As a result, the policy core beliefs and secondary policy core beliefs o f advocacy 
coalition members should also change during those years.
There are numerous advantages to the use o f this type o f research design. The 
most significant advantages are that the design reduces threats to internal and external 
validity. With external validity assured, the results from this research can be expanded 
to new policy subsystems, different policy beliefs, and additional advocacy coalitions 
(Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002, p. 20). And with internal validity assured, 
researchers examining this research are assured that the causal relationship observed 
between variables actually occurred due to the hypothesized stimulus o f policy change 
(Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002, p. 37).
To reduce threats to internal validity, the design has repeated observations of 
policy beliefs both when policy change occurred and when policy change did not 
occur. Repeated observations both before and after a policy change year decrease the 
chances that maturation or historical effects could threaten the internal validity of the 
results. For example, if  the research design had only one observation before or after a 
policy change year, then there would be an increased chance that policy beliefs 
recorded during a policy change year were influenced by one-time events that 
reflected either the maturation of the two coalitions or another historical event 
(Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002, p. 56-57), With repeated observations, this 
dissertation’s research design catches such threats.
In addition, the dissertation’s research design reduces threats to external 
validity by examining two different coalitions across two different policy change
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years. By examining two different coalitions, the chances of negative interaction 
effects with one specific coalition decrease (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002, p. 
87). For example, if  the dissertation examined only one coalition, then conclusions 
reached could not apply to different types o f coalitions involved in federal pesticide 
regulatory policy. Also, by examining two different policy changes, the chances of 
negative interaction effects with one specific policy change decrease (Shadish, Cook, 
and Campbell, 2002, p. 87). For example, if  the dissertation examined only one policy 
change year, then conclusions derived from that year might not apply to another policy 
change year.
However, the dissertation’s research methodology still has numerous threats to 
validity. For external validity, the most obvious threat is a setting interaction effect.
In this type o f threat, findings from one type o f study may not extend to the findings in 
another type o f study (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002, p. 87). This type o f threat 
is important, because this dissertation only examines the policy beliefs on federal 
pesticide regulations. As a result, the findings may not hold when other types o f 
policy subsystems are examined.
For internal validity, the major threats are attrition and instrumentation. To 
analyze policy beliefs, the beliefs must be recorded from groups and individuals that 
appear before Congressional hearings. However, appearances before Congressional 
hearings are not stable. Different individuals, different groups, and different 
individuals within the same group testify before Congressional hearings from year to 
year. This makes the theoretical membership o f advocacy coalitions dynamic in any
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given year. As a result, when an individual or group stops appearing before 
Congressional hearings, then their attrition could lead to a change in policy beliefs for 
the whole coalition (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002, p. 59). This is a significant 
weakness associated with collecting information on policy beliefs expressed during 
any type o f public hearing. To help control this threat, this dissertation also analyzed 
letters and other types o f policy statements submitted by individuals and groups to 
Congressional hearings. These documents are included in the hearing document. That 
way, if an individual or group could not appear because of some unforeseen event, 
then this dissertation still analyzes their submitted policy beliefs. Otherwise, when 
groups or individuals stop testifying in hearings, it is treated as a significant event that 
indicates that the policy beliefs o f a group or individual no longer correspond to the 
policy beliefs o f the coalitions present in the hearing.
The instrumentation threat is especially worrisome for research using content 
analyses. If the content analysis is not constructed properly, then changing policy 
dynamics through the years could cause the content analysis to become obsolete and 
show an effect where there is none (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002, p. 60). For 
example, a content analysis may work well for policy beliefs in 1984, but no so well in 
2001 because beliefs, policies, and issues change. To avoid this, this dissertation uses 
a modified content analysis framework that emphasizes general topics related to 
federal pesticide regulations.
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Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) originally developed a complex ACF 
content analysis protocol that identified deep core, policy core, and secondary policy 
beliefs o f each individual testifying in hearings on development in the Lake Tahoe 
region o f Nevada and in hearings on oil and gas leasing on the U.S. continental shelf 
(p. 247-256). Sewell (2005) simplified the framework when he looked at the policy 
core beliefs o f policy actors on global climate change. Sewell (2005) first looked at 
the debate on global climate change and came up with eleven different policy core 
beliefs that policy actors usually expressed (p. 222). He then devised a Likert ranking 
for the eleven policy core beliefs (Sewell, 2005, p. 223). In that way, he grouped 
actors according to their expressed policy beliefs on global climate change.
Building on the work o f Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith, and Sewell, this dissertation 
simplifies the ACF content analysis to an even greater degree. For the years 1982- 
2003, this dissertation examines both the policy core beliefs and secondary policy 
beliefs o f agriculture promotion advocates and consumer-environmental protection 
advocates. These policy beliefs originate from opening statements made by these 
advocates at Congressional hearings on federal pesticide regulations. A content 
analysis coding framework originally developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) 
and later simplified by Sewell (2005) is adapted for this dissertation in order to 
quantify both policy core beliefs and secondary policy beliefs from opening 
statements.
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Content analysis is a research method that generates reliable and valid 
inferences from written material (Krippendorf, 2004, p. 18). It allows researchers to 
categorize and quantify written text into pieces o f data that can be further analyzed to 
yield answers to theoretical questions. To devise a research content analysis that is 
both reliable and valid, researchers commonly focus on conceptualization, 
operationalization, and inter-coder reliability (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 50-51).
Conceptualization o f Content Analysis
In conceptualization, researchers define the concepts to code (Neuendorf,
2002, p. 50). This dissertation’s content analysis has four concepts to code: coalition 
membership, policy core beliefs on pesticides, secondary policy beliefs on pesticide 
regulations, and secondary policy belief compromises on pesticide regulations. This 
dissertation defines coalition membership according to the interests o f either 
agriculture promotion advocates or consumer-environmental protection advocates. As 
such, agriculture promotion advocates are members of the agriculture promotion 
advocacy coalition and consumer-environmental protection advocates are members of 
the consumer-environmental protection advocacy coalition. Policy core beliefs are 
defined as any phrase or sentence spoken by a speaker during an opening statement on 
the issue o f pesticides, excluding phrases or sentences on specific pesticide regulations 
or pending pesticide regulation bills. Secondary policy beliefs on pesticide regulations
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are defined as those phrases or sentences spoken by speakers during an opening 
statement on specific aspects o f pesticide regulations. Lastly, secondary policy belief 
compromises on pesticide regulations are defined as opening statements that contain 
phrases or sentences supporting the secondary policy beliefs on pesticide regulations 
o f agriculture promotion advocates as well as phrases or sentences supporting the 
secondary policy beliefs on pesticide regulations of consumer-environmental 
protection advocates.
Operationalization of Content Analysis
Operationalization explains how the content analysis measures the concepts 
(Neuendorf, 2002, p. 107). The dissertation operationalizes agriculture promotion 
coalition membership as organizations that exist to promote farmers, businesses 
associated with agriculture, or agricultural practices. Membership in the consumer- 
environmental protection coalition is operationalized as organizations that exist to 
protect consumers or the environment in some capacity. Since organizations typically 
state their organization’s mission as part o f their opening statements, the identification 
o f membership in this manner is based on an examination of federal Congressional 
hearings on pesticide regulations. After recording each organization that submitted an 
opening statement in the hearing, the coder examined each organization’s mission 
statement contained in its opening statement to determine coalition membership.
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Operationalization of policy core beliefs and secondary policy beliefs 
proceeded according to an ordinal measurement scale as previously defined by both 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) and Sewell (2005). Policy core beliefs on 
pesticides and secondary policy beliefs related to the debates on pesticide regulations 
are operationalized on a 1-5 scale. While this is explained more thoroughly in 
Appendix B, scores o f 1 or 2 indicate consumer-environmental protection beliefs and 
scores o f 4 or 5 indicate agriculture promotion beliefs. The score o f 1 indicates an 
extreme consumer-environmental protection belief such as strengthening pesticide 
regulations and banning pesticides, and a score o f 5 indicates an extreme agriculture 
promotion belief such as mandating that there should be no regulations at all for 
pesticides. Scores of 3 indicate a neutral or no opinion statement. Coding the policy 
core beliefs and secondary policy beliefs o f advocates in this manner allows for 
answers to the first research question. Since the content analysis allows for an 
identification o f policy core beliefs from advocacy groups testifying before a 
committee, then these policy core beliefs can be analyzed to determine if like-minded 
advocacy groups possess similar policy core beliefs (the first research question).
However, over the course o f an opening statement, advocates also talked about 
more specific aspects of pesticide regulations. These are secondary policy beliefs. By 
examining Congressional debates on pesticide regulations beforehand, it was 
determined that advocates commonly focused on six types o f secondary policy beliefs 
during opening statements. These included secondary policy beliefs on pesticide 
regulations, water pollution, biotechnology, conservation, agri-business (excluding
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farmers), and the current economic state o f farmers. Advocates talked about these 
secondary belief areas when debating pesticide regulations (e.g. how pesticide 
regulations impact water pollution, how do pesticide regulations impact 
biotechnology, how can pesticide regulations support conservation efforts, how do 
pesticide regulations impact agri-business, and how do pesticide regulations impact 
the economic livelihood o f farmers). As a result, the content analysis also allows for a 
determination on whether the secondary policy beliefs o f like-minded advocacy 
groups changed over time (the second research question).
In the coding framework, each o f these secondary policy belief areas also 
receives a score from 1-5. Once again, scores o f 1 or 2 indicate consumer- 
environmental protection beliefs and scores o f 4 or 5 indicate agriculture promotion 
beliefs. The score of 1 indicates an extreme consumer-environmental protection belief 
such as strengthening pesticides and banning pesticides, and a score o f 5 indicates an 
extreme agriculture promotion belief such as mandating that there be no regulations at 
all for pesticides. Scores o f 3 indicate a neutral or no opinion statement.
Operationalization o f secondary policy belief compromises on pesticide 
regulations emerges from the coding o f secondary policy beliefs on pesticide 
regulations. In these secondary policy beliefs, the occurrence o f compromises often 
becomes evident. These compromises occur when an agriculture promotion advocate 
expresses both agriculture promotion secondary policy beliefs and consumer- 
environmental protection secondary policy beliefs. For example, a secondary policy 
belief compromise occurs when a member o f the agriculture promotion coalition
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scores a 4 on the farmer belief area and a score o f 2 on the pesticide regulation belief 
area. Such an act represents a coalition member reaching out to the opposing 
coalition. In essence, it represents an attempt at compromise (also called policy- 
oriented learning or bargaining o f beliefs) since some o f the secondary policy beliefs 
of one coalition member are moving toward some o f the secondary policy beliefs of 
the opposing coalition in the opening statement. Once the content analysis identifies 
these instances o f compromise, then the dissertation can examine if increases in 
compromises in secondary policy beliefs are associated with policy change (the third 
research question) and determine if stronger coalitions influence compromises in 
secondary policy beliefs among weaker coalitions (the fourth research question).
Reliability o f Content Analysis
Ideally, at least two different coders should use a content analysis to code 
documents (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 142). This helps to ensure inter-coder reliability. 
However, this dissertation analyzed 118 Congressional hearings and 1,807 opening 
statements with the coding scheme. As a result, the large number o f hearings and 
statements prevented two different coders from using the coding scheme on all o f the 
documents. However, to arrive at some measure o f inter-coder reliability, this 
dissertation randomly picked two hearings and had an external coder code the 
hearings. The external coder coded the hearings in the same manner as the original
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145
coder. That is, the external coder examined the entire hearing document starting from 
the first page and ending at the last page. Additionally, the external coder used the 
same content analysis protocol that the original coder used (this is included in 
Appendix B). The resulting inter-reliability o f the coding had an 83.9% agreement rate 
for the first hearing and an 85.7% agreement rate for the second hearing. In other 
words, the external coder produced coding results that agreed with author’s coding 
results approximately 84.8% of the time. From these results, the content analysis 
should have an inter-coder reliability rate o f above 80%. Such a rate is similar to the 
inter-coder reliability rate o f Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1993) work (p. 245).
Descriptive Statistics from the Content Analysis
As indicated in Table 5, a total o f 118 Congressional hearings on federal 
pesticide regulations were coded with the content analysis protocol. This included 757 
opening statements from advocacy groups in the agriculture promotion and consumer- 
environmental protection advocacy coalitions. These statements allowed for a coding 
o f the policy core beliefs on pesticides, secondary policy beliefs on pesticide 
regulations, and number o f annual secondary policy belief compromises on pesticide 
regulations by the agriculture promotion coalition and the consumer-environmental 
protection coalition.
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Table 5
Total Number of Opening Statements Coded with the Content Analysis
Speakers/Writers o f Opening Statements Number
Advocacy Groups
Agriculture Promotion Advocacy Groups 497





State and Local Governments 107
TOTAL 1807
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
147
Table 6 shows the number o f statements made by each coalition during each 
year o f analysis. As the table indicates, 1987 and the years 1991-1994 were the most 
active years for debating pesticide regulations. In contrast, after the formal passage of 
the Food Quality Protection Act in 1996, debates on pesticide regulations pretty much 
ended at the federal level. From 1997-2003 there were only nine Congressional 
hearings on pesticide regulations. Those nine hearings corresponded to twenty-nine 
opening statements by the agriculture promotion coalition and only two statements by 
the consumer-environmental protection coalition.
Tables 7 and 8 show descriptive statistics for the coding of policy core beliefs 
on pesticides. By comparing the two tables, the data reveals that the mean policy core 
belief value for the agriculture promotion coalition is higher than 3 (thus indicating an 
agriculture promotion policy core belief according to the content analysis protocol).
In contrast, the mean policy core belief value for the consumer-environmental 
protection coalition is always below 3 (thus indicating a consumer-environmental 
protection coalition policy core belief according to the content analysis protocol). 
Similar results are contained in Tables 9 and 10. These tables contain the mean 
secondary policy belief on pesticide regulations for each coalition. Once again, the 
agriculture promotion coalition constantly has coded values above 3 and the 
consumer-environmental protection coalition constantly has coded values below 3.
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Table 6
Statements by the Coalitions During Each Year o f Analysis
Year Number of Congressional 
Hearings on Pesticide 
Regulations









1982 1 0 1
1983 10 34 31
1984 7 3 6
1985 4 16 14
1986 7 38 19
1987 16 78 35
1988 7 28 13
1989 11 43 30
1990 5 14 16
1991 12 46 27
1992 9 45 15
1993 10 39 27
1994 6 50 14
1995 4 25 8
1996 1 9 2
1997 0 0 0
1998 3 6 1
1999 2 13 0
2000 1 4 0
2001 0 0 0
2002 2 6 1
2003 0 0 0
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Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for the Coding of Agriculture Promotion Advocates’ Policy Core
Beliefs on Pesticides
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Table 8
Descriptive Statistics for the Coding o f Consumer-Environmental Protection
Advocates’ Policy Core Beliefs on Pesticides
Year Sample 
Size (N)
Mean Median Mode Stand.
Deviation
1982 1 2.000 2.000 2.000
1983 31 1.968 2.000 2.000 0.180
1984 6 2.667 2.000 3.000 0.516
1985 14 2.000 2.000 2.000 0.000
1986 19 2.105 2.000 2.000 0.459
1987 35 1.771 2.000 2.000 0.490
1988 13 2.077 2.000 2.000 0.494
1989 30 1.767 2.000 2.000 0.430
1990 16 2.125 2.000 2.000 0.342
1991 27 1.926 2.000 2.000 0.474
1992 15 1.867 2.000 2.000 0.352
1993 27 2.000 2.000 2.000 0.277
1994 14 1.714 2.000 2.000 0.469
1995 8 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
1996 2 2.000 2.000 2.000 _ _ _
1997 0 — _ _ _ — —
1998 1 1.000 1.000 1.000 —
1999 0 — — — _ _ _
2000 0 — — —
2001 0 — — —
2002 1 2.000 2.000 2.000 —
2003 0
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Table 9
Descriptive Statistics for the Coding of Agriculture Promotion Advocates’ Secondary
Policy Beliefs on Pesticide Regulations




1982 0 — --- --- ---
1983 34 3.647 4.000 4.000 0.6912
1984 3 3.667 4.000 4.000 0.5774
1985 16 3.875 4.000 4.000 0.5000
1986 38 3.526 4.000 4.000 0.7618
1987 78 3.603 4.000 4.000 0.6515
1988 28 3.393 4.000 4.000 0.8751
1989 43 3.954 4.000 4.000 0.3750
1990 14 3.500 4.000 4.000 0.8549
1991 46 3.783 4.000 4.000 0.5543
1992 45 3.667 4.000 4.000 0.6742
1993 39 3.692 4.000 4.000 0.5691
1994 50 3.900 4.000 4.000 0.5803
1995 25 4.000 4.000 4.000 0.4083
1996 9 4.111 4.000 4.000 0.3333
1997 0 — — — _ _ _
1998 6 4.000 4.000 4.000 0.0000
1999 13 3.846 4.000 4.000 0.3755
2000 4 4.250 4.000 4.000 0.5000
2001 0 — — — —
2002 6 4.167 4.000 4.000 0.4082
2003 0 --- --- --- ---
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Table 10
Descriptive Statistics for the Coding o f Consumer-Environmental Protection
Advocates’ Secondary Policy Beliefs on Pesticide Regulations
Year Sample 
Size (N)
Mean Median Mode Stand.
Deviatio
1982 1 2.000 2.000 2.000
1983 31 1.903 2.000 2.000 0.301
1984 6 3.333 3.000 3.000 0.516
1985 14 1.929 2.000 2.000 0.267
1986 19 2.105 2.000 2.000 0.459
1987 35 1.771 2.000 2.000 0.490
1988 13 2.154 2.000 2.000 0.689
1989 30 1.767 2.000 2.000 0.430
1990 16 2.188 2.000 2.000 0.544
1991 27 1.963 2.000 2.000 0.587
1992 15 1.867 2.000 2.000 0.352
1993 27 2.000 2.000 2.000 0.437
1994 14 1.714 2.000 2.000 0.469
1995 8 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
1996 2 2.000 2.000 2.000 —
1997 0 — — — - - -
1998 1 1.000 1.000 1.000
1999 0 — — — — -
2000 0 — ---
2001 0 — — — ---
2002 1 2.000 2.000 2.000 — -
2003 0 -------- -------- -------- --------
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Tables 11 and 12 give descriptive statistics for the coding o f secondary policy 
belief compromises on pesticide regulations for each coalition. These tables show the 
rareness o f having a compromise on secondary policy beliefs in an opening statement. 
Out o f 497 opening statements made by advocacy groups within the agriculture 
promotion coalition, a compromise was coded in only 32 o f those statements. 
Similarly, out o f 260 opening statements made by advocacy groups within the 
consumer-environmental protection coalition, a compromise was coded in only 17 of 
those statements. The rareness o f secondary policy belief compromise is evident in 
the cumulative descriptive statistics contained in Table 12. That table reveals that the 
agriculture promotion coalition averaged 1.5 compromises per year and the consumer- 
environmental protection coalition averaged less than 1 compromise per year.
Overall, the descriptive statistics included in Tables 6-12 show support for the 
use o f the content analysis. For instance, the statistics prove that the agriculture 
promotion coalition constantly had scores indicative o f agriculture promotion policy 
beliefs on pesticides and pesticide regulations (i.e., scores above 3). Similarly, the 
statistics prove that the consumer-environmental protection coalition constantly had 
scores indicative o f consumer-environmental policy beliefs on pesticides and pesticide 
regulations (i.e., scores below 3).
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Table 11
Number o f Secondary Policy Belief Compromises on Pesticide Regulations by Each 
Coalition
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Table 12
Cumulative Descriptive Statistics for the Number of Secondary Policy Belief









Size (N) 22 22
Note that because this variable is a simple count variable, the 22 cases that comprise 
this sample size are the years o f analysis. So, each year equals one case. This type o f 
cumulative unit o f analysis is different from the preceding tables on policy core beliefs 
and secondary policy beliefs.
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Data Collection
To answer the four research questions posed in Chapter 5, this dissertation 
examined a variety of data sources. These data sources included primary historical 
documents such as Congressional hearings, secondary historical accounts o f the 
debates over pesticide regulations, and interviews with individuals who were involved 
in the pesticide regulatory debates. This section describes each data source and 
explains its importance.
Congressional Hearings
The most important data sources were Congressional hearings on pesticide 
regulations. Information extracted from Congressional hearings helped to answer all 
of the research questions. To answer these questions, this dissertation examined 
Congressional hearings on pesticide regulations from 1982-2003. This time period 
was chosen for study because in December o f 1982, Chairman Brown released the 
controversial report calling for FIFRA and FFDCA reform. As a result, in 1983 the 
first hearings were held on the inadequacy of current pesticide regulations. This 
started the line o f thinking that led to passage o f FIFRA reform in 1988 and the 
passage o f FFDCA reform in 1996. In many ways, 1982 represented the beginning of
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the era o f pesticide regulatory reform. In addition, 1982 represented the beginning of 
the full tilt o f the Reagan revolution and the increased scrutiny on regulations o f all 
types that that revolution entailed.
To discover the number o f Congressional hearings on pesticide regulations 
during this time period, two types o f searches were conducted. First, the legislative 
histories o f FIFRA 1988 and FQPA 1996 were examined. This revealed that Congress 
held 24 hearings on legislation that eventually became “FIFRA 1988” from 1983- 
1988, and 37 hearings on legislation that eventually became FQPA from 1986-1996 
(Note that these totals do not include unpublished hearings. In 1988, the House 
Agriculture Committee’s Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and 
Foreign Agriculture held a hearing on “FIFRA 1988” that was never published. Since 
it was not published, it could not be examined for this dissertation. Similarly, in 1996 
the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee held a hearing on FQPA 
that was never published). As a result, these 61 hearings were included in the 
analysis.
The second type o f search was broader. Using the Congressional Universe 
database o f Congressional hearings, a search was performed to find all hearings on 
pesticides from 1983-2003. This resulted in 57 more hearings that focused on 
pesticides. As a result, a total o f 118 hearings were examined for this dissertation.
These additional hearings were needed because they had important information 
that further illuminated the debate on pesticide regulatory reform in the 1980s and 
1990s. These types of hearings examined topics such as pesticide storage accidents or
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the specific health effects o f a pesticide. These hearings were omitted from 
Legislative Histories since they did not have any specific mention of FIFRA 1988 or 
FQPA. However, these types o f hearings had important information that showed the 
policy beliefs of both agriculture promotion and consumer-environmental protection 
advocates. Therefore, these hearings had to be included in the analysis. These 118 
hearings were then analyzed with a content analysis protocol modified from previous 
ACF studies that used content analyses (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sewell 
2005).
Historical Data Sources
To provide a basic background on pesticide regulations, this dissertation used a 
variety of secondary historical data sources. These sources included major works on 
the history o f pesticide regulations by James Whorton (1974), Christopher Bosso 
(1987), and James Smart (1998). When combined, these three sources helped to 
illuminate an important fact about the basic framework of the federal pesticide 
regulatory subsystem: Namely, that debates over federal pesticide regulations almost 
always had two main sets o f participants: agriculture promotion advocates and 
consumer-environmental protection advocates. Agriculture promotion advocates 
included groups that represented the agriculture industry, farmers, chemical 
manufacturers, and other agri-business concerns. Consumer-environmental protection
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advocates included groups that represented consumer advocacy groups, worker 
protection groups such as unions, and environmental protection groups. In addition, 
within both groups were also individuals and policymakers representing themselves or 
constituencies who felt strongly about pesticide regulations.
To assess the annual political conditions affecting these advocates in federal 
pesticide regulatory policy from 1982-2003, this dissertation used three political 
variables. These variables included an interval level variable showing the annual 
percent o f Democratic legislators in the U.S. House o f Representatives, another 
interval level variable showing the annual percent o f Democratic legislators in the 
U.S. Senate, and a nominal level variable indicating when a member o f the 
Democratic party occupied the U.S. Presidency. Data for these variables originated 
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s (2004) annual Statistical Abstract o f  the United States.
Interviews
In addition to the content analysis o f Congressional hearings, this dissertation 
examined other data sources. First, a very small sample of interviews was conducted 
to determine if  data and conclusions extracted from the content analysis o f hearings 
were accurate. Before any interviews took place, the author obtained Institutional 
Review Board approval from Northern Illinois University’s Office o f Research 
Compliance. After Institutional Review Board approval, the author located ten
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individuals who agreed to be interviewed. These individuals had extensive experience 
working in agri-environmental policy and pesticide regulations in particular. These 
individuals held high positions in the EPA and USDA during the years 1982-2003.
One individual even was on the EPA’s administrator’s high profile FQPA policy 
implementation team in 1996. Other individuals interviewed had extensive experience 
working for pesticide companies and working with environmental protection groups. 
Some o f these individuals were interviewed multiple times. In the end, sixteen 
interviews were conducted with these ten individuals.
While still a small sample o f interviews, this small sample served its purpose 
o f verifying conclusions reached in the content analysis as well as the overall 
conclusion that a consumer-environmental protection coalition and an agriculture 
promotion coalition exist in the agri-environmental policy domain. In essence, these 
interviews helped to triangulate the data. The interviews gave another viewpoint on 
this policy subsystem and allowed the researcher to determine if  conclusions from this 
research were accurate. Further interviews were not conducted because all o f the 
interviewees agreed on the main data points.
Hypothesis 1
Working from the research design, content analysis protocol, and a variety of 
data sources, this dissertation constructed hypotheses for each research question. To
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
161
answer the first research question on the existence of advocacy coalitions, Hypothesis 
1 theorizes that the pesticide policy core beliefs of advocacy groups with agriculture 
promotion interests should be statistically different from advocacy groups with 
consumer-environmental protection interests (see Table 13). Note that Hypothesis 1 
and the following hypotheses only examine advocacy groups. While this excludes 
from the analysis policymakers, the media, and other interested individuals who may 
be part o f a larger advocacy coalition, it does allow the analysis to concentrate on 
advocacy groups -  the largest and most significant component o f advocacy coalitions. 
To determine if distinct advocacy coalitions exist, this dissertation examined the 
policy core beliefs of advocacy groups testifying in Congressional hearings on 
pesticide regulations since 1982 with the content analysis framework. This quantified 
the policy core beliefs on pesticides for advocacy groups testifying in the 
Congressional hearings.
However, to ascertain if  distinct coalitions existed, these groups had to be 
assigned to their hypothesized coalition. Assignment proceeded according to the 
content analysis protocol by examining the mission statements o f advocacy groups. In 
the consumer-environmental protection advocacy coalition, assignment was based on 
being an advocacy group whose primary mission supported consumer or 
environmental protection. In the agriculture promotion advocacy coalition, 
assignment was based on being an advocacy group whose primary mission was to 
support the promotion of farming or business (see Appendix B).
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Table 13
Methodology for Hypothesis 1
R esearch Q uestion 1
Do the policy core beliefs o f  like-m inded advocacy groups 
possess enough uniform ity  to  ju s tify  categorization  o f  these 
groups into larger advocacy coalitions?
H ypothesis 1
T he pesticide policy core beliefs o f  advocacy  groups w ith 
agricu lture  prom otion in terests c luster a t h igher policy  b e lie f  
scores than advocacy groups w ith  consum er-environm ental 
protection interests.
M ethodology
C om parison o f  policy core b e lie f  scores w ith the M cN em ar’s 
test for ordinal data (i.e., the  m arginal hom ogeneity  test)
U nit o f  A nalysis 
Policy core beliefs
D ependent V ariable
A nnual policy core beliefs on pesticides
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By assigning groups to these two coalitions, this dissertation could use a 
version o f the McNemar’s test for ordinal level data (also known as a marginal 
homogeneity test) to determine if  the policy core beliefs of groups in each coalition 
were statistically distinct. A McNemar’s test is a procedure that examines whether 
two related samples have a significant difference in their values (Jacqmin-Gadda and 
Commenges, 1995, p. 1237; Norusis, 2000, p. 325). If advocacy coalitions existed in 
some form, then groups that traditionally protected consumers and the environment 
should have different policy core beliefs than groups that traditionally promoted 
business and farming. However, if  advocacy coalitions did not exist, then the policy 
core beliefs of those assigned to the consumer-environmental protection advocacy 
coalition should be no different than the policy beliefs o f those assigned to the 
agriculture promotion advocacy coalition.
Hypothesis 2
For the second research question that examined how the secondary policy 
beliefs of advocacy coalitions change over time, this dissertation used Hypothesis 2. 
Based off o f past research evidence from numerous ACF studies, Hypothesis 2 
theorizes that changes in an advocacy coalition’s secondary policy beliefs on pesticide 
regulations increase gradually throughout the years in a policy-oriented learning style. 
To test this hypothesis, the dissertation used a content analysis framework to quantify
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the secondary policy beliefs of a consumer-environmental protection advocacy 
coalition and an agriculture promotion advocacy coalition.
Using the content analysis framework to assign a numerical value to secondary 
policy beliefs on pesticide regulations, this dissertation averaged the expressed policy 
beliefs o f each coalition for each year. Then, the dissertation examined the percent 
change in the value of the secondary policy on pesticide regulations beliefs from year 
to year. Percent changes for each coalition were then plotted to discover kurtosis 
levels.
Kurtosis levels indicate whether the distribution of a variable is peaked 
(Greene, 1990, p. 60). If a variable exhibits kurtosis, then it means that the variance 
contained in the distribution o f the variable originates from sporadic, extreme values 
(Balandaand MacGillivry, 1988, p. I l l ;  Chissom, 1970,p. 19). Or, for Hypothesis 2, 
if the percent change in the secondary policy beliefs on pesticide regulation variable 
has high kurtosis, then the coalitions’ secondary policy beliefs on pesticide regulations 
had at least a few years o f major change and many years of relatively minor change 
(see Table 14).
If secondary policy beliefs changed in a gradual fashion, as Hypothesis 2 
theorizes, then kurtosis levels should be low. Or, in other words, the percent change in 
each coalition’s secondary policy beliefs should be small from year to year. In 
contrast, if  kurtosis levels are high, then it indicates that the percent change in each 
coalition’s secondary policy beliefs had sudden, large changes in at least one year.
This type o f percent change would be more aligned to a PE pattern o f change.
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Methodology for Hypothesis 2
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R esearch Q uestion 2
If  advocacy coalitions exist, do  th e ir secondary  policy  beliefs 
tow ard  pesticide regulations change over tim e?
H ypothesis 2
C hanges in an advocacy co a lition ’s secondary policy beliefs 
on pesticide regulations increase gradually  over tim e in a 
policy-orien ted  learning style.
M ethodology 
E xam ination o f  kurtosis
U nit o f  A nalysis 
Secondary  policy  b e lie f
D ependent V ariable
A nnual percent change o f  secondary policy beliefs on 
pesticide regulations
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Hypothesis 3
To analyze the third research question on whether increases in compromises in 
an advocacy coalition’s secondary' policy beliefs on pesticide regulations are 
associated with policy change, the dissertation uses Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 states 
that advocacy coalitions increase compromises with their secondary policy beliefs on 
pesticide regulations when policy change is about to occur (see Table 15). To 
examine this hypothesis, the dissertation uses opening statements coded with the 
content analysis protocol to reveal when acts o f compromise over secondary policy 
beliefs occur. As indicated previously, these acts o f secondary policy belief 
compromises by the consumer-environmental protection coalition and the agriculture 
promotion coalition are extremely rare and significant events.
Compromises over secondary policy beliefs occur when an advocacy coalition 
member expresses traditional secondary policy beliefs on one area o f pesticide 
regulations, but in the same opening statement also expresses additional secondary 
policy beliefs on issues related to pesticide regulations that are more aligned to the 
secondary policy beliefs o f the opposing coalition. These additional secondary policy 
beliefs occur over issues that commonly surround debates on pesticide regulations. As 
defined in the content analysis, these issues include: water pollution, biotechnology, 
conservation, agri-business, and farmers. If these acts o f belief compromise are 
important to the policy process, then they should be associated with policy change.
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Table 15
Methodology for Hypothesis 3
R esearch Q uestion  3
A re increases in com prom ises in secondary  policy  beliefs 
associated  w ith policy  change?
H ypothesis 3
A dvocacy coalitions increase com prom ises w ith th e ir secondary  
policy  beliefs on pesticide regulations w hen policy  change is 
about to  occur.
M ethodology
P earso n ’s correlation analysis 
U nit o f  A nalysis
N um ber o f  annual b e lie f  com prom ises fo r each coalition 
D ependent V ariables
i. A nnual num ber o f  tim es tha t m em bers o f  the agriculture 
prom otion coalition com prom ised  on th e ir secondary  policy 
beliefs (d ifferenced)
ii. A nnual num ber o f  tim es tha t m em bers o f  the consum er- 
environm ental protection coalition  com prom ised  on their 
secondary  policy  beliefs (d ifferenced)
Independent V ariable
Did C ongress debate on specific  legislation that eventually  
becam e a  new  pesticide regulation  (yes o r no, d ifferenced)
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To quantitatively answer this type o f hypothesis, this dissertation uses three 
time-series variables: policy output, number o f  belief compromises fo r  the agriculture 
promotion coalition, and number o f  belief compromises fo r  the consumer- 
environmental promotion coalition. As initially constructed, both belief compromise 
variables are interval level, count variables that tally the number o f belief 
compromises from the content analysis for each coalition during each year from 1982 
through 2003. In addition, as initially constructed the policy output variable is a 
nominal level, time-series variable that indicates the years that Congress debated and 
then passed specific legislation that became new pesticide regulations. This variable is 
coded 0 for a year in which Congress had specific debates that did not lead to a new 
pesticide regulation and 1 for a year in which Congress had specific debates that 
directly led to the passage o f a new pesticide regulations. As a result, the years 1987 
and 1988 are coded 1 since Congress passed the 1988 FIFRA revision off o f specific 
debates occurring in 1987 and 1988, and the years 1995 and 1996 are coded 1 since 
Congress debated the specific bills that later became FQPA in 1996 during those 
years.
These variables had certain anomalies common to time-series data. The most 
significant anomaly was a trend problem associated with both belief compromises 
variables. Trend indicates that the values in a time-series variable drift in one 
direction over the course o f many years (McDowal, McCleary, Meidinger, and Hay, 
1980, p. 13). To correct for this problem, time-series variables can be differenced. In 
differencing a variable, the researcher subtracts the value from an initial case from the
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value from the case immediately preceding it (McDowal et al., 1980, p. 20). This 
usually corrects for the drift problem.
In this dissertation, differencing is performed for the policy output, number o f  
belief compromises fo r  the agriculture promotion coalition, and number o f  belief 
compromises fo r  the consumer-environmental promotion coalition variables. While 
differencing these variables corrects the drift problem associated with the belief 
compromises variables, it also transforms the data. Notably, the policy output variable 
becomes a trinary variable. After differencing, the variable has more than two values 
and can no longer be classified as a nominal variable.
Differencing also changes the nature o f the belief compromises variables. 
Initially, these variables were count variables that tallied the occurrences o f 
compromises. As a result, as initially constructed they had more of a Poisson 
distribution common to count variables as opposed to a normal distribution (Kennedy, 
1998, p. 236). However, after differencing, these variables have negative values. As a 
result, they no longer exhibit a Poisson distribution (Kennedy, 1998, p. 236-237).
After differencing, these variables have an approximately normal distribution.
These changes allow for a statistical examination of Hypothesis 3. If 
compromises in secondary policy beliefs are associated with policy change, then 
Pearson’s correlations can be examined to determine if the belief compromises 
variables are statistically correlated with the policy output variable. Pearson’s 
correlations allow researchers to discover measures o f association for variables 
measured at the interval level (Healey, 1999, p. 394). Given that differencing turned
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all of the variables into interval variables, the use o f Pearson’s correlations should 
result in a valid analysis for Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4
Lastly, this dissertation examines the fourth research question that asks if 
stronger advocacy coalitions influence belief compromises in weaker advocacy 
coalitions. To answer this question, this dissertation developed Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 4 theorizes that the agriculture promotion coalition influences 
compromises in the consumer-environmental protection coalition’s secondary policy 
beliefs on pesticide regulations at a later time. Or, in other words, Hypothesis 4 
implies that the agriculture promotion coalition was the dominant coalition in the 
1980s and 1990s. As a result, when the agriculture promotion coalition issued 
opening statements with belief compromises, the consumer-environmental protection 
coalition followed suit and had opening statements with belief compromises at a later 
time.
To examine this hypothesis, the dissertation examines four policy belief 
variables and three political variables measured annually. The policy belief variables 
all originate from counting the annual number o f compromises in the secondary policy 
beliefs on pesticide regulations o f the agriculture promotion coalition and the
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consumer-environmental protection coalition. The political variables all originate 
from historical data sources.
As indicated in Table 16, the analysis for Hypothesis 4 has four policy belief 
variables. These variables include: number o f  belief compromises fo r  the agriculture 
promotion coalition in year (t), number o f  belief compromises fo r  the agriculture 
promotion coalition in year (t + 1), number o f  belief compromises fo r  the consumer- 
environmental promotion coalition in year (t), and number o f  belief compromises fo r  
the consumer-environmental promotion coalition in year (t + 1). As in the analysis 
for Hypothesis 3, these variables are differenced to correct for trend problems.
The three political variables measure the Democratic party’s control o f the 
main policymaking bodies at the federal level. These political variables are: 
Democratic control o f  the Presidency in year (t) (a nominal level variable coded 1 for 
when a Democrat is President and 0 for when a Republican is President), percentage 
o f  Democrats in the House o f  Representatives in year (t) (a continuous variable 
showing the total percentage o f Democrats in the House), and percentage o f  
Democrats in the Senate in year (t) (a continuous variable showing the total 
percentage of Democrats in the Senate). All o f these variables are time-series 
variables measured each year from 1982-2003. Just like the policy belief variables, 
the political variables are differenced to correct for trend problems.
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Methodology for Hypothesis 4
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R esearch Q uestion 4
Do stronger advocacy coalitions influence com prom ises in 
secondary  policy  beliefs am ong w eaker advocacy  coalitions?
H ypothesis 4
T he agriculture prom otion coalition  influences com prom ises in 
the consum er-environm ental p rotection  co a lition ’s secondary  policy  
beliefs on pesticide regulations.
M ethodology
Tim e-series, path analytic causal m odel 
U nit o f  A nalysis
N um ber o f  annual b e lie f com prom ises fo r each coalition 
D ependent V ariables
i. A nnual num ber o f  tim es tha t m em bers o f  the consum er- 
environm ental protection  coalition  com prom ised  w ith their 
secondary  policy  beliefs in y ear (t +  1)
ii. A nnual num ber o f  tim es th a t m em bers o f  the agriculture 
p rom otion coalition com prom ised  w ith  th e ir  secondary policy  
beliefs in year (t +  1)
Independent V ariables
i. A nnual num ber o f  tim es tha t m em bers o f  the agriculture 
prom otion coalition com prom ised  w ith th e ir secondary policy  
beliefs in year (t)
ii. A nnual num ber o f  tim es tha t m em bers o f  the  consum er- 
environm ental protection coalition  com prom ised  w ith their 
secondary  policy  beliefs in y ear (t)
iii. C ontrol o f  the  Presidency by the  D em ocratic  party  in y e a r(t)
iv. Percentage o f  D em ocrats in the H ouse o f  R epresentatives in y ear (t)
v. Percentage o f  D em ocrats in the  Senate in y e a r(t)
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These political variables are included in the causal model because they 
ultimately help to assess coalition strength. Stronger coalitions should be able to 
withstand political pressure to compromise better than weaker coalitions. As a result, 
if  the agriculture promotion coalition is the stronger coalition in the pesticide 
regulatory subsystem, then these political variables should influence the consumer- 
environmental protection coalition to a greater degree. Or, in other words, political 
variables should influence compromises in the weaker coalition and not influence 
compromises in the stronger coalition.
To determine if  the agriculture promotion coalition is stronger than the 
consumer-environmental protection coalition, this dissertation uses the policy belief 
and political variables in two time-series, path analytic causal models. In Model I, the 
agriculture promotion coalition is assumed to be stronger than the consumer- 
environmental protection coalition. This model should confirm Hypothesis 4. In 
Model I, the three political variables in year (t) influence the weaker consumer- 
environmental protection coalition in year (t) to compromise with their secondary 
policy beliefs. However, even with that effect accounted for, the stronger agriculture 
promotion coalition should have a greater influence on the consumer-environmental 
protection coalition. When the agriculture promotion coalition compromises on 
secondary policy beliefs in year (t), then that influences the consumer-environmental 
protection coalition to compromise on secondary policy beliefs in year (t + 1) (see 
Figure 5).









President (t) = Control o f  the Presidency by a Democrat in year (t)
House (t) = Percentage o f  Democrats in the House o f  Representatives in year (t)
Senate (t) = Percentage o f Democrats in the Senate in year (t)
Ag-comp (t) = Number o f  belief compromises by the agriculture promotion coalition in 
year (t)
En-comp (t) = Number o f belief compromises by the consumer-environmental protection 
coalition in year (t)
Ag-comp (t+1) = Number o f belief compromises by the agriculture promotion coalition in 
year (t + 1)
En-comp (t + 1) = Number o f  belief compromises by the consumer-environmental protection 
coalition in year (t + 1)
Figure 5 : Model I Indicating a Stronger Agriculture Promotion Coalition
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Model II reverses the hypothesized influence relationship and should not be 
significant. In Model II, the three political variables in year (t) influence compromises 
in secondary policy beliefs in the weaker agriculture promotion coalition in year (t). 
With that effect accounted for, the stronger consumer-environmental coalition should 
have a greater influence on the agriculture promotion coalition. When the consumer- 
environmental protection coalition compromises on secondary policy beliefs in year 
(t), then that influences the agriculture promotion coalition to compromise on 
secondary policy beliefs in year ( t + 1 )  (See Figure 6). If the agriculture promotion 
coalition controls this policy subsystem, then influence relationships in Model II 
should be weaker and more insignificant than the influence relationships in Model I.
Note that both models take into account how compromises by a coalition in the 
previous year influence compromises by the same coalition in the following year. For 
example, in Model I there are two main influences on compromises by the consumer- 
environmental protection coalition in year (t + 1). These influences are compromises 
by the agriculture promotion coalition in year (t) as discussed previously, and 
compromises by the consumer-environmental protection coalition in year (t). In 
Model II, the two main influences on compromises by the agriculture promotion 
coalition in year ( t+ 1 )  are compromises by the consumer-environmental protection 
coalition in year (t) and compromises by the agriculture promotion coalition in year 
(t). It stands to reason that a significant influence on a coalition’s compromises in a 
year should be the number o f compromises issued by the coalition in the previous 
year. As a result, it’s included in the causal model.
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President (t)
Ag-comp (t) "*j Ag-comp ( t + 1 )
House (t)
/ ------------------------ -------------------------
i  En-comp (t) t- -  ►
/  ! I
En-comp (t + 1)
Senate (t)
Where:
President (t) = Control o f  the Presidency by a Democrat in year (t)
House (t) = Percentage o f  Democrats in the House o f Representatives in year (t)
Senate (t) = Percentage o f Democrats in the Senate in year (t)
Ag-comp (t) = Number o f belief compromises by the agriculture promotion coalition 
in year (t)
En-comp (t) = Number o f belief compromises by the consumer-environmental 
protection coalition in year (t)
Ag-comp (t+1) = Number o f  belief compromises by the agriculture promotion coalition 
in year (t + 1)
En-comp (t + 1) = Number o f belief compromises by the consumer-environmental 
protection coalition in year ( t + 1 )
Figure 6 : Model'll Indicating a Weaker Agriculture Promotion Coalition
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The causal models also account for how political variables in year (t) affect 
compromises by coalitions in year (t). If  the agriculture promotion coalition is the 
stronger coalition and truly in control o f the pesticide regulatory subsystem, then they 
should be able to withstand political pressure to compromise on policy beliefs from 
Democratic policymakers. As a result, in Model II the political variables in year (t) 
influencing compromises in the agriculture promotion coalition in year (t) should be 
insignificant. Correspondingly, the weaker coalition o f consumer-environmental 
protection advocates should not be able to withstand political pressure to compromise 
on policy beliefs from Democratic policymakers. As a result, in Model I the political 
variables in year (t) influencing compromises in the consumer-environmental 
protection coalition in year (t) should be significant.
The results from both o f these models should reveal a number o f insights on 
the strength o f coalitions. These results should include how political pressure in 
year (t) influenced policy compromises in strong and weak coalitions in year (t), how 
the stronger coalition in year (t) influenced policy compromises in the weaker 
coalition in year (t + 1), and how a coalition at year (t) influenced its own policy 
compromises in year (t + 1). But the most important finding from Models I and II 
relates to the proving or disproving of Hypothesis 4.
These two causal models o f policy belief and political variables heavily rely on 
a concept known as Granger causality. Granger causality explains the occurrence of 
an event at time-point 1 as the result o f an event at time-point 0 (Granger, 1987, p. 45). 
For Hypothesis 4 this means that belief compromises by the agriculture promotion
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coalition in year (t), in conjunction with belief compromises by the consumer- 
environmental protection coalition in year (t) and various political factors in year (t), 
should influence belief compromises by the consumer-environmental protection 
coalition in year (t + 1).
Concluding Remarks
To summarize, this research uses a content analysis o f Congressional hearings 
on pesticide regulations to determine the primary and secondary beliefs expressed by 
each coalition during opening statements. The data collected from this type o f content 
analysis can answer important questions regarding the use o f policy beliefs in the 
policy process. Chief among these questions are whether like-minded advocacy 
groups have uniform policy core beliefs, how the secondary policy beliefs o f like- 
minded advocacy groups change over time, whether compromises in secondary policy 
beliefs occur when policy change is close to occurring, and if stronger coalitions of 
like-minded advocacy groups influence compromises in secondary policy beliefs in 
weaker coalitions of like-minded advocacy groups.
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CHAPTER 6
FINDINGS
This chapter includes the findings for the four research questions and the 
corresponding hypotheses. As discussed in the last chapter, these findings originate 
from a content analysis protocol modified from similar content analysis protocols 
designed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) and Sewell (2005). The overall goal 
of these findings is to discover the role o f policy beliefs in the policy process. With 
these findings, political scientists can learn if: 1) policy core beliefs o f like-minded 
advocacy groups possess enough uniformity to justify categorization o f these groups 
into larger advocacy coalitions; 2) if  secondary policy beliefs toward pesticide 
regulations change over time; 3) if  increases in compromise in secondary policy 
beliefs are associated with policy change; and 4) if  advocates within stronger 
advocacy coalitions influence compromises in secondary policy beliefs in advocates 
within weaker advocacy coalitions. These findings help political scientists learn about 
the role o f policy beliefs in the process. In addition, these findings help political 
scientists directly compare the ACF and PE models of the policy process to discover 
which parts of which model are accurate.
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Hypothesis 1 states that the pesticide policy core beliefs o f advocacy groups 
with agriculture promotion interests cluster at higher policy belief scores than 
advocacy groups with consumer-environmental protection interests. Or, in direct 
answer to the first research question, the policy core beliefs o f like-minded advocacy 
groups can be categorized into larger advocacy coalitions. To test this hypothesis, the 
policy core beliefs o f members o f advocacy groups testifying before Congressional 
committees were analyzed with this dissertation’s content analysis protocol. Since 
these hearings were on federal pesticide regulations and since this policy subsystem is 
on federal pesticide regulations, then these policy core beliefs were also on pesticides.
As mentioned in Chapter 5, only members o f advocacy groups were included 
in this type o f analysis since they were the only groups whose organizational mission 
could be grouped into an agriculture promotion coalition and a consumer- 
environmental protection coalition. This grouping was key. The only way to 
determine if policy core beliefs on pesticides were uniform among like-minded 
advocacy groups was to first categorize these groups testifying before Congress into 
an agriculture promotion coalition and a consumer-environmental protection coalition 
based on organizational mission. That way, similar advocacy groups were included in 
one advocacy coalition. Then, the content analysis protocol revealed the policy core 
beliefs on pesticide regulations for these advocacy groups.
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If policy core beliefs on pesticide regulations were uniform among like-minded 
advocacy groups, then there should be a statistical difference between the policy core 
beliefs o f members within the agriculture promotion coalition and the consumer- 
environmental protection coalition. If these policy core beliefs were not uniform 
among like-minded advocacy groups then there should be no statistical difference.
That is, the policy core beliefs o f those members grouped into the agriculture 
promotion coalition would not be statistically different from those members grouped 
into the consumer-environmental protection coalition. This would mean that policy 
core beliefs o f like-minded advocacy groups were not uniform. In essence, such a 
finding would also discredit the ACF as a viable framework for policy analysis.
The findings for this hypothesis originate from a comparison o f related groups 
using the McNemar’s test for ordinal data (i.e., the marginal homogeneity test). Note 
that in statistical terms the marginal homogeneity statistic is like a standardized Z 
score, with larger values indicating statistical significance. Also note that in each year 
of analysis this type o f comparison o f related groups can only use matched cases. As a 
result, analysis only proceeded on the lowest number o f statements per year. For 
instance, if  the agriculture promotion coalition had 16 statements in year 1985, and the 
consumer-environmental protection coalition had 14 statements in year 1985, then 
only 14 statements from year 1985 could be analyzed with the marginal homogeneity 
test.
The findings reveal that the pesticide regulatory policy beliefs o f advocacy 
groups with agriculture promotion interests are statistically different from the pesticide
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regulatory policy beliefs o f advocacy groups with consumer-environmental protection 
interests (see Table 17). The only year this did not happen was in 1984 because an 
unusually low number o f advocacy groups testified in Congressional hearings on 
pesticide regulations. In addition, statistically significant differences in policy core 
beliefs did not occur in 1982, or from 1996-2003. But this was mainly because of the 
low number o f hearings during those years. Remember, the prime years for debate on 
pesticide reform happened from 1983 to 1996. Since the time period o f 1996 - 2003 
had few hearings on pesticide regulations, a coding o f a suitable sample o f opening 
statements with policy core beliefs could not occur for those years. As a result, the 
policy core beliefs o f agriculture promotion advocates and consumer-environmental 
protection advocates could not be compared for those years.
Therefore, the results lend support for hypothesis 1. The pesticide policy core 
beliefs o f advocacy groups with agriculture promotion interests cluster at higher policy 
belief scores than advocacy groups with consumer-environmental-protection interests. 
Or, in other words, the pesticide policy core beliefs o f advocacy groups with 
agriculture promotion interests are statistically different from advocacy groups with 
consumer-environmental protection interests. This result supports the general notion 
o f advocacy coalitions since different groups with similar organizational missions will 
have similar policy core beliefs that are statistically distinct from different advocacy 
coalitions.
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Table 17
Results for Hypothesis 1















1982 ____ 2.0000 _ ____
1983 3.7353 1.9677 5.061 0.000
1984 3.6667 2.6667 -1.414 0.157
1985 3.9375 2.0000 3.638 0.000
1986 3.6842 2.1053 3.817 0.000
1987 3.6538 1.7714 5.196 0.000
1988 3.6071 2.0769 3.275 0.001
1989 3.9767 1.7667 4.998 0.000
1990 3.7143 2.1250 3.397 0.001
1991 3.8261 1.9259 4.626 0.000
1992 3.7111 1.8667 3.508 0.000
1993 3.7436 2.0000 4.702 0.000
1994 3.9200 1.7143 3.349 0.001
1995 4.0000 1.0000 -2.828 0.005
1996 4.1111 2.0000 — —
1997 — — — —
1998 4.0000 1.0000 — —
1999 3.8462 — — —
2000 4.2500 — — —
2001 — — — —
2002 4.1667 2.0000 — —
2003
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Hypothesis 2 states that changes in an advocacy coalition’s secondary policy 
beliefs on pesticide regulations increase gradually over time in a policy-oriented 
learning style. To test this hypothesis, this dissertation examined the annual percent 
change in secondary policy beliefs on pesticide regulations for advocacy group 
members in the agriculture promotion coalition and advocacy group members in the 
consumer-environmental protection coalition. Figure 7 shows these annual percent 
changes for the consumer-environmental protection coalition and Figure 8 shows these 
annual percent changes for the agriculture promotion coalition.
The values for secondary policy beliefs on pesticide regulations originated 
from the content analysis (see Appendix B). Then, the secondary policy beliefs were 
averaged for each coalition for each year. For example, all o f the secondary policy 
beliefs on pesticide regulations expressed during hearings in 1988 by the agriculture 
promotion were averaged. Then, the annual percent change for these secondary policy 
beliefs was calculated. Lastly, the annual percent change values for each coalition 
were plotted on a histogram chart. The histogram chart shows the frequency of 
percent changes for the years in the analysis. So, for example, the histogram chart can 
indicate that a 10% change occurred seven times or for seven years.
If these members engaged in policy-oriented learning, there should only be 
small percent changes in secondary policy beliefs from year to year. However, as 
Figures 7 and 8 demonstrate, some of these percent changes were not small. This was







-40.0 -20.0 0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0
Annual Percent Change
Figure 7: Distribution o f Annual Percent Changes in the Secondary Policy 
Beliefs o f Advocacy Groups within the Consumer-Environmental Protection 
Coalition (1982-2003)








Figure 8: Distribution o f Annual Percent Changes in the Secondary Policy 
Beliefs o f Advocacy Groups within the Agriculture Promotion Coalition 
(1982-2003)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
187
especially true for the consumer-environmental protection coalition. As Figure 7 
indicates, the consumer-environmental protection coalition typically had a 0% change 
in their annual secondary policy beliefs on pesticide regulations. However, in at least 
eight years, this coalition had percent changes in their secondary beliefs that ranged 
from 20-40%. In one year, the percent change was even 100%.
These percent changes are larger than what is observed in the agriculture 
promotion coalition. As shown in Figure 8, the agriculture promotion coalition 
typically had smaller annual percent changes in its secondary policy beliefs. For 
twelve years o f this analysis, these changes were in the range of 0-2.5%. This means 
that the agriculture promotion coalition had small, gradual changes in its policy beliefs 
for a majority of the time.
These findings lend support to the notion that changes in secondary policy 
beliefs do not always occur gradually. Or, in other words, policy-oriented learning as 
envisioned by the ACF does not always occur. Especially for consumer- 
environmental protection advocates, changes in secondary policy beliefs seem to 
follow a punctuated equilibrium pattern. In this type o f pattern, no change occurs to 
secondary policy beliefs for a majority o f the time. However, in a few instances, there 
are large swings in policy beliefs from year to year. This type o f pattern especially 
applies to the consumer-environmental protection coalition, where changes o f over 
100% were observed on at least one occasion.
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To more quantitatively indicate a punctuated equilibrium pattern, researchers 
often rely on measures o f kurtosis. Typically, researchers rely on the notion of 
positive kurtosis (also known as a leptokurtic distribution). Leptokurtic distributions 
have more values around the mean or center o f the distribution and more values near 
the tails or end of the distribution (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002, p. 295). As a result, 
leptokurtic distributions are often indicative o f a punctuated equilibrium pattern since 
these types o f patterns should reveal long periods o f no change (i.e., values cluster 
around the center o f the distribution) and short periods o f large change (i.e., some 
values in the tail o f the distribution).
To assess kurtosis in this manner, researchers rely on a measure o f kurtosis that 
is typically defined as the “ .. .ratio o f the average o f the fourth power o f the deviation 
from the mean, to the square o f the variance” (Chissom, 1970, p. 20). While normal 
distributions should have a kurtosis value o f zero, leptokurtic distributions should have 
a kurtosis value o f greater than one (Chissom, 1970, p. 20). However, when the 
standard error of the kurtosis measure is considered, leptokurtic distributions should 
probably have kurtosis values o f two or even three.
As indicated in Table 18, the secondary policy beliefs o f the consumer- 
environmental protection coalition exhibit a decided leptokurtic distribution. With a 
kurtosis value o f 9.9 and a standard error o f 0.97, there is no question that the 
distribution o f annual percent change in secondary policy beliefs for the consumer- 
environmental protection coalition as observed in Figure 7 is leptokurtic. However,
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the secondary policy beliefs of the agriculture promotion distribution have a relatively 
normal distribution with a kurtosis value o f 1.3 and a standard error o f 0.97. For all 
practical purposes, the distribution observed in Figure 8 for the agriculture promotion 
coalition is close to normal.
Table 18
Kurtosis Values for Annual Percent Change in the Average Secondary Policy Beliefs 
on Pesticide Regulations o f Advocacy Groups within the Agriculture Promotion 




Stand. Error 0.972 0.972
These mixed results both support and disprove hypothesis 2. On the one hand, 
the agriculture promotion coalition does seem to engage in policy-oriented learning 
since the coalition has annual percent changes o f secondary policy beliefs on pesticide 
regulations distributed normally, This is to be expected since only small, gradual 
changes in policy beliefs occur in policy-oriented learning. However, the consumer- 
environmental protection coalition does not have this pattern. Its annual percent
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changes on secondary policy beliefs are mostly unchanged from year to year, with a 
few years that exhibit rather large changes. This is indicative o f a leptokurtic 
distribution or a punctuated equilibrium pattern.
Results for Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 examined compromises in secondary policy beliefs among the 
agriculture promotion coalition and the consumer-environmental protection coalition. 
Hypothesis 3 declared that advocacy coalitions increase compromises with their 
secondary policy beliefs on pesticide regulations when policy change is about to 
occur. To more quantitatively test this hypothesis, a Pearson’s correlation analysis 
was performed on the variables policy output, annual number o f  compromises in 
secondary beliefs o f  the agriculture promotion coalition, and annual number o f  
compromises in secondary beliefs o f  the consumer-environmental protection coalition. 
As detailed in Chapter 5, all three of these variables are differenced to correct for 
time-series problems. Results from this analysis are presented in Table 19.
Results indicate that the annual number o f compromises in the agriculture 
promotion coalition does not have a statistically significant association with whether a 
new pesticide regulation is passed (i.e., a policy output). However, compromises by 
the consumer-environmental protection coalition do have more o f a significant 
association with new policy outputs than compromises by the agriculture promotion
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coalition. For example, compromises by the consumer-environmental protection 
coalition have a 0.077 significance level. Given the relatively low number o f cases in 
this analysis (there are only twenty-two cases -  one for each year o f analysis), this is 
an acceptable significance level. In addition, the association between compromises 
and policy output is better in the consumer-environmental protection coalition than in 
the agriculture promotion coalition. A Pearson’s r score of 0.323 suggests a moderate 
relationship between compromises by the consumer-environmental protection 
coalition and policy output.
Table 19
Pearson’s Correlations for Policy Output (Differenced) and the Annual Number of





Pearson’s r 0.258 0.323
Significance 0.130 0.077
These results indicate that a moderate association that is significant exists 
between the annual number o f compromises in secondary policy beliefs by the
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consumer-environmental protection coalition and the policy output o f a new pesticide 
regulation. This moderate association disappears when compromises in secondary 
policy beliefs by the agriculture promotion coalition are considered. For that 
coalition, the association is weaker and the statistical significance is worse. Overall, 
this suggests that policy output may be more important to the consumer-environmental 
protection coalition in regard to developing compromises in secondary policy beliefs.
Results for Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 states that the agriculture promotion coalition influences 
compromises in the secondary policy beliefs o f the consumer-environmental 
protection coalition. As Table 11 in Chapter 5 makes clear, opening statements with 
compromises on secondary policy beliefs are extremely rare events. Over the course 
o f twenty-two years, advocacy groups in the agriculture promotion coalition and the 
consumer-environmental protection coalition made 757 opening statements in 
hearings on pesticide regulations. Out o f those 757 opening statements, only 49 
statements had compromises on secondary policy beliefs.
As a result, the decision to issue an opening statement with compromises 
reflects much deliberation and thought by each coalition. For example, if  the 
agriculture promotion coalition issues opening statements with compromises in a 
hearing on March 1, then the consumer-environmental protection coalition does not
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automatically respond in that hearing with an opening statement with similar types of 
compromises. Instead, the consumer-environmental protection coalition may respond 
with compromises at a hearing date later in that year or even in the next year after they 
have carefully considered the public position o f the agriculture promotion coalition.
To try and catch this trend from year to year, two path analytic models were 
constructed. In Model I, the agriculture promotion coalition is the stronger coalition 
that influences policy compromises in the consumer-environmental protection 
coalition at a later time. In Model II, the agriculture promotion coalition is the weaker 
coalition. As a result, the consumer-environmental protection coalition influences 
policy compromises in the agriculture promotion coalition at a later time.
Both models examine four different time-series policy beliefs variables and 
three different political variables. The policy beliefs variables include: the annual 
number o f  compromises by the consumer-environmental protection coalition in year 
(t), the annual number o f  compromises by the consumer-environmental protection in 
year (t + 1), the annual number o f  compromises by the agriculture promotion 
coalition in year (t), and the annual number o f  compromises by the agriculture 
promotion coalition in year (t + 1). The political variables include: Democratic 
control o f  the Presidency in year (t), percentage o f  Democrats in the House o f  
Representatives in year (t), and percentage o f  Democrats in the Senate in year (t). All 
o f these variables are measured each year from 1982-2003 and are differenced to 
correct for trend problems. Additionally, further analysis o f Models I and II reveals 
no serial auto-correlation between variables (a common problem in time-series
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analyses). As a result, both models use twenty-one cases adjusted only for trend 
problems.
In Model I, compromises in secondary policy beliefs by the agriculture 
promotion coalition in year (t) influence compromises in secondary policy beliefs by 
the consumer-environmental protection coalition in year (t + 1). Or, in other words, 
the agriculture promotion coalition controls the pesticide regulatory policy subsystem. 
When its opening statements start to reflect compromises in secondary beliefs in any 
given year, then the consumer-environmental protection coalition takes notice. Seeing 
a window of opportunity to have their secondary policy beliefs translated into policy, 
the consumer-environmental protection coalition starts to also make opening 
statements that reflect compromises in secondary beliefs. In Model II, compromises 
in secondary policy beliefs by the consumer-environmental protection coalition in 
year (t) influence compromises in secondary policy beliefs by the agriculture 
promotion coalition in year (t + 1). This model shows the consumer-environmental 
protection coalition controlling the pesticide regulatory policy subsystem.
The path analytic models were analyzed through maximum likelihood 
estimation with AMOS statistical software. AMOS statistical software easily allowed 
for an analysis o f the path analytic models. In addition, this type o f statistical software 
allowed the researcher to model measurement error inherent in each variable. This 
was especially important since the House (t) and Senate (t) variables should share 
some of the same covariance. While the residual correlations between these two
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variables were not statistically significant, the covariance modeled between these two 
variables made both models more accurate.
Results from Models I and II are presented in Figures 9-10 and Tables 20-21. 
As expected, the results reveal that Model I performed better than Model II. This 
supports hypothesis 4 and the view that the agriculture promotion coalition was 
stronger than the consumer-environmental protection coalition from 1982-2003. 
During this time, the results indicate that the agriculture promotion coalition was able 
to withstand political pressure from federal policymaking institutions to compromise 
on their policy beliefs.
In contrast, the results indicate that the consumer-environmental protection 
coalition was not able to withstand this type o f pressure. As indicated in the Model I 
portion o f Table 20, when Democrats controlled the Presidency and when the 
percentage of Democrats in the Senate increased, the number o f policy compromises 
issued by the consumer-environmental protection coalition also increased. For 
example, when the percentage o f Democratic Senators increased by 1 point, there was 
a corresponding increase of 0.290 policy compromises by the consumer- 
environmental protection coalition. Additionally, when the Democrats controlled the 
Presidency, there was a corresponding increase o f over 2.435 policy compromises by 
the consumer-environmental protection coalition. This suggests that these 
policymaking bodies, when controlled by Democrats, influence the consumer- 
environmental protection coalition to compromise on their policy beliefs.














President (t) = Control o f the Presidency by a Democrat in year (t)
House (t) = Percentage o f Democrats in the House o f Representatives in year (t)
Senate (t) = Percentage o f Democrats in the Senate in year (t)
Ag-comp (t) = Number o f belief compromises by the agriculture promotion coalition 
in year (t)
En-comp (t) = Number o f belief compromises by the consumer-environmental protection 
coalition in year (t)
Ag-comp (t+1) = Number o f belief compromises by the agriculture promotion coalition 
in year (t + 1)
En-comp (t + 1) = Number o f belief compromises by the consumer-environmental protection 
coalition in year ( t + 1 )
e 1 - e7 = Measurement error in each variable
Figure 9: Model I Indicating a Stronger Agriculture Promotion Coalition with 
Standardized Estimates Shown
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Where:
President (t) = Control o f the Presidency by a Democrat in year (t)
House (t) = Percentage o f Democrats in the House o f Representatives in year (t)
Senate (t) = Percentage o f Democrats in the Senate in year (t)
Ag-comp (t) = Number o f belief compromises by the agriculture promotion coalition 
in year (t)
En-comp (t) = Number o f  belief compromises by the consumer-environmental protection 
coalition in year (t)
Ag-comp (t+1) = Number o f belief compromises by the agriculture promotion coalition 
in year (t + 1)
En-comp (t + 1) = Number o f belief compromises by the consumer-environmental protection 
coalition in year ( t + 1 )
e 1 - e7 = Measurement error in each variable
Figure 10: Model II Indicating a Weaker Agriculture Promotion Coalition with 
Standardized Estimates Shown
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Table 20
Results from Model I and Model II

































(0.218) -0.283 -0.283 (0.214)
Aa-comp (t+1)
En-comp (t) 








Error 3 - Error 2 0.601 5.731 (2.487)** 0.601 5.731 (2.487)**
Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
***p< 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p< 0.10
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Table 21
Measures o f Fit for Model I and Model II
Model I Model 11
R Squared
En-comp (t) 0.35 —
En-comp (t+1) 0.36 0.080
Ag-comp (t) — 0.056
Ag-comp (t+ 1) 0.045 0.056
Adjusted R Squared
En-comp (t) 0.23 . . .
En-comp (t+ 1) 0.29 0.032
Ag-comp (t) — -0.11
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However, the most significant impact on consumer-environmental coalition 
compromises was from the agriculture promotion coalition. When the agriculture 
promotion coalition increased its compromises in policy beliefs in year (t), the 
consumer-environmental protection coalition followed suit in year (t + 1). 
Specifically, for every 1 compromise issued by the agriculture promotion coalition in 
year (t), the consumer-environmental protection coalition issued 0.443 policy 
compromises in year (t + 1). This is almost a 2:1 ratio and suggests that for every 2 
compromises issued by the agriculture promotion coalition in year (t), at least 1 
compromise by the consumer-environmental protection coalition occurred in 
year (t + 1).
In contrast to Model I, none o f the estimates in Model II are significant. This 
suggests that the three political variables in year (t) did not have a statistically 
significant impact on the agriculture promotion coalition in year (t). In addition, the 
number o f compromises by the consumer-environmental protection coalition in 
year (t) did not have a statistically significant impact on the agriculture promotion 
coalition in year (t + 1). Both o f these findings lend support to the notion that the 
agriculture promotion coalition was the stronger coalition in the pesticide regulatory 
subsystem from 1982-2003.
The fit statistics in Table 21 also reveal that Model I is a better fitting model 
than Model II. For instance, Model II’s chi-square is significant. This suggests that 
the null hypothesis o f no statistically significant relationship between the data exists. 
In practical terms, this means that the hypothesized relationship depicted among the
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variables in Figure 10 probably does not exist. In addition, Model II’s GFI, AGFI, 
and PGFI scores are all lower than Model I. Lower scores for these three fit indices 
reflect poorer fitting models and suggest that Model II does not adequately explain the 
variance and covariance in the data. Additionally, the AIC, BIC, and CAIC scores in 
Model II are higher than in Model I. Higher scores for these three fit indices suggest a 
poorer fitting model. These latter fit statistics suggest that the inherent data structure 
of the existing variables is more parsimonious in Model I.
Overall, these results indicate support for hypothesis 4. However, the analysis 
did reveal some inconsistencies. O f note, Model I indicates that an increasing 
percentage o f Democrats in the House o f Representatives actually led to a decrease in 
policy compromises by the consumer-environmental protection coalition. However, it 
should be noted that this value is not significant. In addition, Model I reveals that 
compromises by a coalition in year (t) did not influence compromises by the same 
coalition in year (t + 1). For example, compromises issued by the agriculture 
promotion coalition in year (t) had no statistically significant impact on compromises 
issued by the agriculture promotion coalition in year (t + 1). This unexpected finding 
suggests that policy compromises have no long-lasting effect within a coalition.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Concluding Remarks
202
Results from this statistical analysis reveal varying levels of support for each 
hypothesis. The strongest statistical evidence is found for hypothesis 1. The 
McNemar’s test for ordinal data (i.e. the marginal homogeneity test) revealed 
statistical differences in the policy core beliefs o f each hypothesized coalition on 
pesticides. As a result, the policy core beliefs o f like-minded advocacy groups possess 
enough uniformity to justify categorization o f these groups into larger advocacy 
coalitions.
The statistical evidence for hypothesis 2 was mixed. Assessments o f kurtosis 
revealed that policy-oriented learning does not always occur. Weaker coalitions seem 
to have long periods of no change in their secondary policy beliefs followed by 
relatively short periods o f large change in their secondary policy beliefs. This was 
especially the case for the consumer-environmental protection coalition. In contrast, 
stronger coalitions exhibit policy-oriented learning that has small changes occurring in 
secondary policy beliefs from year to year. This was especially the case for the 
agriculture promotion coalition. As a result, the secondary policy beliefs o f advocacy 
coalitions do change over time. But the pattern o f change depends on the strength of 
the coalition.
Hypothesis 3 had some statistical evidence. In part, this is due to the small 
number o f cases in the analysis. However, even with a limited number o f cases the 
analysis revealed that increases in compromises in secondary policy beliefs seem to be
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moderately associated with occurrences o f policy change in weaker coalitions. 
Stronger coalitions, such as the agriculture promotion coalition, had no association 
between compromises and policy change. As a result, increases in compromises in 
secondary policy beliefs among advocacy coalitions are sometimes moderately 
associated with policy change. However, this association seems to depend on the 
strength o f the coalition.
Hypothesis 4 had good statistical support. Most notably, the statistical analysis 
discovered that stronger coalitions influence future compromises in secondary policy 
beliefs among weaker coalitions. For example, when the agriculture promotion 
coalition compromises with secondary policy beliefs in one year, then the consumer- 
environmental protection coalition compromises with secondary policy beliefs in the 
following year. This seems to indicate that stronger advocacy coalitions influence 
compromises in the secondary policy beliefs o f weaker advocacy coalitions.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
The research in this dissertation had four main objectives. First, this 
dissertation updated the policy history of pesticide regulations by integrating the 
debates over FIFRA reform in 1988 and FFDCA/FIFRA reform in 1996 with the 
traditional pesticide regulatory debates that occurred since the early 1900s. Second, 
this dissertation directly tested the ACF notion of advocacy coalitions by examining 
whether advocacy groups categorized in one advocacy coalition were statistically 
distinct from different advocacy groups categorized in another advocacy coalition. 
Third, the research in this dissertation assessed the importance o f policy core beliefs 
and secondary policy beliefs to the policy process. Fourth and perhaps most 
importantly, this research explored whether advocacy coalitions’ secondary policy 
beliefs undergo a relatively enduring change as theorized by the ACF model’s 
emphasis on policy-oriented learning, or whether these beliefs change quickly over the 
short term and then go back to their original state, as theorized by the PE model.
Secondary historical sources and interviews with individuals who were active 
participants in the pesticide regulatory debates in the 1980s and 1990s helped this 
dissertation meet the first objective. Four research questions and their corresponding
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hypotheses helped this dissertation meet objectives two through four. Taken together, 
research associated with these four objectives generated three substantive research 
conclusions. These conclusions should help political scientists better understand the 
policy process.
Conclusion 1: The Need for Reform Drives Policy Compromise
This dissertation provided an overview of the main provisions o f federal 
pesticide regulations since 1906. Because o f the sheer complexity o f each regulation, 
the historical accounts provided in Chapters 3 and 4 were broad. This resulted in a 
historical account that possessed none of the finer details that often make policy 
histories worthwhile. However, there was also a significant benefit in providing a 
broad history o f all federal pesticide regulations rather than a specific policy history of 
one pesticide regulation. The broad overview allowed for a better understanding of 
the dynamics at work in federal pesticide regulations during the 1980s and 1990s.
These dynamics included the fact that coalitions of agriculture promotion 
advocates and coalitions of consumer-environmental protection advocates had 
continually debated one another over pesticide regulations since 1906. However, by 
the 1980s the debate was at a stalemate. Due to a patchwork o f regulations passed 
since 1906 and changing technology, both sets o f advocates wanted significant 
reforms to federal pesticide regulations. Knowing that each side had a vested
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historical interest in pesticide regulations, the two sets o f advocates finally agreed to 
compromise in order to pass reforms in 1988 and 1996.
Accounts o f the pesticide regulatory debates in the 1980s and 1990s detailed 
the need for compromise. In addition, interviews conducted for this dissertation 
confirmed the notion that the main driver o f compromise in the 1980s and 1990s was 
pesticide regulatory reform. This made the pesticide regulatory debates o f the 1980s 
and 1990s unique when compared to the historical debates on pesticide regulations. 
Instead o f considering new pesticide regulations, advocates in the 1980s and 1990s 
considered reform to existing pesticide regulations.
This conclusion has consequences for our understanding of environmental 
policymaking. It suggests that compromises between opposing advocates should 
occur more frequently when some type o f policy reform is needed for existing 
environmental policies. As policymakers become more reluctant to pass proactive 
environmental legislation that turns into new policies, the reform o f existing 
environmental policies will become more important and more frequent in the future. 
This dissertation shows that when policymakers consider environmental policy 
reform, the dynamics o f a typical environmental policy debate change. Advocates are 
likely to compromise and policy reform is likely to occur. This is at odds with typical 
views o f the environmental policy process where little change occurs and advocates 
hardly ever compromise with their policy beliefs.
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Conclusion 2: Policy Beliefs Have a Subtle Impact on Policy Reform
The historical accounts o f the pesticide regulatory debates provide evidence 
that at least two sets o f advocacy coalitions debated each other on the economic, 
environmental, and human health aspects o f pesticides. This dissertation added to that 
evidence by statistically proving that distinct advocacy coalitions exist. By examining 
the main part of any advocacy coalition, the advocacy group, this research discovered 
that the policy core beliefs of like-minded advocacy groups are statistically distinct 
from the policy core beliefs of other advocacy groups. This lends support to the ACF 
model.
However, the results from this dissertation also indicate that advocacy 
coalitions influence the policy process in subtle ways. Rather than influencing direct 
changes on policymakers or policy, advocacy coalitions mainly influence policy belief 
changes in other advocacy coalitions. This is especially true during times o f policy 
reform and is supported by three key findings in this dissertation.
First, advocacy coalitions differ in terms o f strength. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
the historical evidence indicates that the agriculture promotion coalition was generally 
stronger than the consumer-environmental protection coalition due to favorable 
political conditions. This difference in strength had profound implications for the use 
o f policy beliefs. Results from hypothesis 2 indicate that the weaker consumer- 
environmental protection coalition did not exhibit policy-oriented learning patterns in 
its secondary policy beliefs. Instead, it had little or no change in secondary policy
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beliefs most of the time, and large changes in secondary policy beliefs on a few 
occasions. This corresponds to a punctuated equilibrium pattern o f policy belief 
change for weaker coalitions. In contrast, the stronger agriculture promotion coalition 
had more gradual adjustments to its policy core beliefs that followed a policy-oriented 
learning pattern as theorized in the ACF.
Second, weaker coalitions also seem to compromise with their secondary 
policy beliefs closer to times o f policy change. As the results from hypothesis 3 
indicate, weaker coalitions have a very moderate statistical association between 
compromises and times o f policy change. In contrast, the association completely 
disappears when the compromises o f the stronger agriculture promotion coalition are 
considered.
Third, stronger coalitions also seem to influence compromises in secondary 
policy beliefs in weaker coalitions. As indicated in the results for hypothesis 4, the 
stronger agriculture promotion coalition influences compromises in the weaker 
consumer-environmental protection coalition. The results from hypothesis 4 also 
indicate that the weaker consumer-environmental protection coalition is not able to 
influence compromises in the stronger agriculture promotion coalition.
Taken together, these three findings indicate that stronger advocacy coalitions 
influence weaker advocacy coalitions to greatly change their policy beliefs as chances 
for policy reform improve. Once policy reform occurs, the stronger coalition stops 
working with the weaker coalition and the weaker coalition regresses back to its
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
209
traditional policy beliefs. Meanwhile, the stronger advocacy coalition is able to use 
the weaker coalition to pass some type of policy reform.
Conclusion 3: The ACF Model Should Better Incorporate Punctuated Equilibrium
An important finding o f this research is that the concept o f policy-oriented 
learning does not always apply to the policy beliefs o f advocacy coalitions. Instead, 
policy beliefs can also exhibit a punctuated equilibrium pattern where beliefs greatly 
change on a few occasions, but more often than not exhibit no change. As indicated in 
this research, this type o f pattern probably occurs in the weakest advocacy coalition in 
a policy subsystem. As a result, future ACF studies should consider punctuated 
equilibrium patterns when analyzing the process o f policy belief change in advocacy 
coalitions.
Traditional ACF studies can readily incorporate the use of punctuated 
equilibrium. As used in this dissertation, researchers can use the annual percent 
change of secondary policy beliefs to determine whether policy-oriented learning 
occurs in advocacy coalitions. If the punctuated equilibrium pattern appears, than 
policy-oriented learning did not occur. However, the real value o f using the 
punctuated equilibrium pattern is that it makes intuitive sense. Secondary policy 
beliefs are dynamic values. They do not gradually change to a new level and then stay 
at that newly changed level for some time, as envisioned by the ACF view o f policy-
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oriented learning. Instead, advocacy coalitions can readily change their secondary 
policy beliefs to suit new policy situations while still retaining uniform policy core 
beliefs. As a result, the use o f punctuated equilibrium in ACF studies does not really 
take away from the ACF model; it simply adds more depth and more analytical 
richness to an already valid policy model.
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A. COALITION MEMBERSHIP
1. Consumer/Environmental Protection Coalition
i. Organizations that exist to protect consumers or the environment in
some capacity
2. Agriculture Promotion Coalition
i. Organizations that exist to promote farmers, businesses associated with
agricultural, or agricultural practices
B. POLICY CORE BELIEFS ON PESTICIDES/FERTILIZERS/CHEMICALS
0-1. Policy Core Beliefs on Pesticides/Fertilizer/Chemicals
1. Government should strengthen regulations on pesticides, fertilizers, and
chemicals and ban certain ingredients in order to protect the environment and 
human health.
2. Government should strengthen regulations on pesticides, fertilizers, and
chemicals to protect the environment and human health, but not ban certain
ingredients at this time.
3. No opinion or stance.
4. Government should not strengthen regulations on pesticides, fertilizers, and 
chemicals at this time.
5. Government should not have any regulations on pesticides, fertilizers, and 
chemicals at this time.
C. SECONDARY POLICY BELIEFS ON THE MAIN TOPIC AREAS
DISCUSSED IN THE FEDERAL PESTICIDE REGULATORY POLICY 
DOMAIN
1 -1. Secondary Policy Beliefs on Current Pesticide Regulations
1. Supports sections o f proposed legislation that strengthen pesticide regulations 
and ban certain pesticides
2. Supports sections o f proposed legislation that strengthen pesticide regulations
3. No opinion or stance on proposed pesticide regulatory legislation
4. Supports sections of proposed legislation that weaken pesticide regulations
5. Supports sections of proposed legislation that end pesticide regulations
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1-2 Secondary Policy Beliefs on Pesticides’ Impact On Water Pollution
1. Supports sections o f proposed legislation that strengthen pesticide regulations 
and ban certain pesticides to protect water quality
2. Supports sections o f proposed legislation that strengthen pesticide regulations
to protect water quality
3. No opinion or stance on proposed pesticides’ impact on water pollution
4. Supports sections o f proposed legislation that do not strengthen pesticide 
regulations to protect water quality
5. Supports sections of proposed legislation that have no pesticide regulations to
protect water quality
1-3. Secondary Policy Beliefs on Biotechnology and Pesticide Regulations
1. Supports sections o f proposed legislation that strengthen pesticide regulations
and ban certain practices in order to protect the environment and human health 
from potential dangers associated with biotechnology
2. Supports sections o f proposed legislation that strengthen pesticide regulations 
in order to protect the environment and human health from potential dangers 
associated with biotechnology
3. No opinion or stance on proposed regulatory legislation
4. Supports sections of proposed legislation that do not strengthen pesticide 
regulations in order to protect the environment and human health from 
potential dangers associated with biotechnology
5. Supports sections of proposed legislation that have no pesticide regulations to
protect the environment and human health from the potential dangers 
associated with biotechnology
1-4 Secondary Policy Beliefs on Conservation Tactics and Pesticides
1. Supports sections of proposed legislation that require farmers to adopt 
mandatory conservation practices that can reduce pesticide use
2. Supports sections of proposed legislation that require farmers to adopt 
voluntary conservation practices that can reduce pesticide use
3. No opinion or stance on how conservation tactics can reduce pesticide use
4. Supports sections o f proposed legislation that do not include voluntary 
conservation practices that can reduce pesticide use
5. Supports sections o f proposed legislation that eliminate conservation programs 
that can reduce pesticide use
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2-1 Secondary Policy Beliefs on the Impact o f Pesticide Regulations on Agri-
Business (excluding farmers)
1. Supports sections o f proposed legislation that end all support o f agri-business 
(excluding farmers)
2. Supports sections of proposed legislation that support agri-business (excluding 
fanners) in ways that decrease pesticide risk to human health and the 
environment
3. No opinion or stance on the impact of pesticide regulations on agri­
business (excluding farmers)
4. Supports sections o f proposed legislation that continue general support o f agri­
business (excluding farmers) regardless o f how pesticides impact human health 
and the environment
5. Supports sections o f proposed legislation that increase general support of agri­
business (excluding farmers) regardless o f how pesticides impact human health 
and the environment
2-2- Secondary Policy Beliefs on the Impact o f Pesticide Regulations on Farmers
1. Supports sections of proposed legislation that end all support for farmers
2. Supports sections o f proposed legislation that only supports farmers if  they
minimize human health and environmental impact o f pesticide applications
3. No opinion or stance on the impact o f pesticide regulations on farmers
4. Supports sections o f proposed legislation that continue general support of
farmers regardless of how pesticides impact human health and the environment
5. Supports sections of proposed legislation that increase general support of 
farmers regardless of how pesticides impact human health and the environment
D. SECONDARY POLICY BELIEF COMPROMISES ON PESTICIDE 
REGULATIONS
3-1. Compromise Definition for the Consumer-Environmental Protection Coalition
1. The consumer-environmental protection coalition has one act o f compromise
on their secondary policy beliefs on pesticide regulations when both o f the 
following occur for a member o f the coalition:
i. The coalition scores either a 1 or 2 on any of the six secondary policy 
belief topic areas listed in section C.
ii. The coalition scores a 4 or 5 on any of the additional secondary policy 
belief topic areas listed in section C.
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3-2. Compromise Definition for the Agriculture Promotion Coalition
1. The agriculture promotion coalition has one act of compromise on their
secondary policy beliefs on pesticide regulations when both o f the following 
occur for a member o f the coalition:
i. The coalition scores either a 4 or 5 on any of the six secondary policy 
belief topic areas listed in section C.
ii. The coalition scores a 1 or 2 on any of the additional secondary policy 
belief topic areas listed in section C.
E. TYPICAL FRAMEWORK OF AN OPENINING STATEMENT
1. First Paragraph
i. Greeting and personal identification statement
ii. Organizational identification statement
iii. Identification o f the organization’s primary policy beliefs
2. Second Paragraph
i. Identification of pending legislation issue
ii. Statement on whether the organization can support the legislation
3. Third-Penultimate Paragraphs
i. Identification o f which sections o f the pending legislation the 
organization supports or does not support (i.e. the secondary policy 
beliefs o f the organization)
ii. Statements on other topic areas related to pesticides
4. Last Paragraph
i. Thank-you statement
ii. Final summation statement on whether the organization can support the
legislation
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